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COMMANDER, NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND

NAVY INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM MANUAL

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From: Commander, Navy Installations Command

Subj: NAVY INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Ref: See appendix A

1. Purpose. Per references (a) and (b), to provide policy and guidance for developing, implementing, and maintaining emergency management programs onboard Navy installations worldwide.

2. Cancellation. CNICINST 3440.17.

3. Scope and Applicability. This manual applies to all Commander, Navy installations Command (CNIC) headquarters (HQ), Region and installation personnel.

4. Records Management. Records created as a result of this manual, regardless of media and format, must be managed per Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1 of September 2019.

5. Review and Effective Date. Per OPNAVINST 5215.17A, CNIC N3 will review this manual annually around the anniversary of its issuance date to ensure applicability, currency, and consistency with Federal, Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and Navy policy and statutory authority using OPNAV 5215/40 Review of Instruction. This instruction will be in effect for 10 years, unless revised or cancelled in the interim, and will be reissued by the 10-year anniversary date if it is still required, unless it meets one of the exceptions in OPNAVINST 5215.17A, paragraph 9. Otherwise, if the manual is no longer required, it will be processed for cancellation as soon as the need for cancellation is known following the guidance in OPNAV Manual 5215.1 of May 2016.

Y. B. LINDSEY

Releasability and distribution:
This manual is cleared for public release and is available electronically only via Gateway 2.0 web site, https://g2.cnic.navy.mil/CC/Documents/Forms/Directives%20Only.aspx

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PREFACE

1. Overview

a. Scope. The Navy Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program Manual complies with Presidential Policy Directive - 8 (PPD-8), Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 5 (HSPD-5), and references (a) through (br). CNIC provides policy, guidance, operational structure, and assignment of responsibilities for maintaining a comprehensive, all-hazards Navy IEM program. The Navy IEM program applies to Regions, installations, and tenant commands onboard Navy installations in its organization, and execution. Emergency Management (EM) programs should attempt to align with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and National frameworks when applicable.

b. Purpose. The purpose of the Navy IEM program is to prepare installations for emergencies; respond appropriately to protect personnel, save lives and protect property; recover and restore operations after an emergency; and continue Navy critical missions.

c. Execution

(1) Region Commanders (REGCOMs) and installation commanding officers (COs) are responsible for ensuring implementation, resourcing, and execution of this instruction's requirements. Existing related plans and programs, such as anti-terrorism (AT), public safety, occupational safety and health (OSH), fire and emergency services (F&ES), environmental compliance, and environmental liabilities are integral parts of the overall effort and must be actively engaged through the Region and installation working groups described in Standard 1 - Program Management.

(2) Per Navy regulations as amended by ALNAV 074/11, revising command authorities ashore, REGCOMs and installation COs have the authority to execute and enforce the requirements of the EM program. REGCOMs may also direct action to commands not otherwise aligned to an installation. This authority includes, but is not limited to, all matters related to force protection and emergency management.

(3) This instruction applies to all Navy Regions and installations within the United States (U.S.), its territories and possessions; overseas in peacetime; during civil support; and war. This instruction is applicable to Active Duty and Reserve Navy Service Members, Navy civilians, Navy families, Navy and non-Navy tenants on Navy installations, transient military or U.S. Government (USG) personnel, contractor personnel, visitors and guests, host nation personnel and foreign personnel, living, working or visiting Navy installations worldwide.

(4) Exemptions. This instruction supports, but does not supersede other policies regarding nuclear reactor accidents and incidents, nuclear weapons support operations, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBR-D), Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR).

(a) Reference (b) describes management of radiological and nuclear incidents onboard shore installations, including intentional nuclear and radiological release or other terrorist events that originate from radiological sources not under Navy custody.

(b) Reference (c) defines the policy, responsibilities and response structures for nuclear reactor accidents and incidents involving U.S. nuclear-powered warship propulsion plants and associated radioactive material. These accidents and incidents are supported by EM activities as described in this instruction.

(c) Reference (d) provides specific policy, planning, and guidance for nuclear weapons accidents and incidents. EM activities described in this manual support response efforts for these types of accidents and incidents.

(d) Incidents that fall within the scope of Navy support to civil authorities follow procedures prescribed in reference (e), and are supported by and require close coordination with EM activities as defined in this instruction.

2. National Planning Frameworks

a. The National Response Framework (NRF) is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles, and responsibilities across the nation. It describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF response doctrine defines basic roles, responsibilities, and operational concepts for response across all levels of government. The NRF provides structures for implementing nationwide response policy and operational coordination for all types of domestic incidents. It builds upon the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The NRF covers elements of planning, response actions, and response organizations. It is always in effect and can be implemented as needed on a flexible, scalable basis to improve response. The NRF provides a structure for coordinating federal interagency response to an incident by using emergency support functions (ESF). ESF group roles are most frequently used to provide federal support to states and federal-to-federal support.

b. The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) provides a flexible coordinating structure that enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and collaborative manner. It also focuses on how best to restore, redevelop, and revitalize the health, social, economic, and environmental fabric of an affected community. The NDRF defines core recovery principles and introduces six recovery support functions that provide a structure to facilitate problem solving, improve access to resources and foster coordination among state and federal agencies, non-governmental partners, and stakeholders. The NDRF presents a recovery continuum that advocates preparedness, response, and long and short-term recovery priorities throughout the evolution of a disaster.

3. National Preparedness Goal. The National Preparedness Goal (NPG) and National Preparedness System (NPS) were developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) per the requirements of PPD-8. Reference (a) requires all Department of Defense (DoD) EM programs to align their EM programs with PPD-8.

a. The NPG organizes national preparedness activities into five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The NPG establishes 32 core capabilities to support the execution of the five mission areas. Many of the core capabilities span multiple mission areas. Table P-1 portrays the relationship of core capabilities to preparedness mission areas. Table P-2 portrays the relationship of ESFs to core capabilities. Table P-3 portrays the relationship of ESFs to Navy IEM functional areas.

b. The NPS is organized into six components designed to enable the success of the NPG; which include, identifying and assessing risk; estimating the level of capabilities needed to address those risks; building or sustaining the required levels of capability; developing and implementing plans to deliver those capabilities; validating and monitoring progress; and reviewing and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement.

4. National Incident Management System. HSPD-5 requires the development and administration of NIMS. NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to enable federal, state, tribal and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the planning frameworks provide the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management. For Navy installations, use of NIMS supports the interoperability between installations, other services, and the civilian community. Incident management and coordination under NIMS is accomplished using the Incident Command System (ICS), Center Management System (CMS), Multi-agency Coordination (MAC) Groups, and Joint Information Systems (JIS) described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

5. Organization of Standards. The IEM program standards discussed in this manual are consistent with reference (a), and the NPG 32 core capabilities. Figure P-1 illustrates the standards required to build and sustain a successful EM program. Per reference (b), the cornerstone for Region and installation EM programs is the development and implementation of an all-hazards EM plan. CNIC Emergency Management (N37) will provide a virtual annex of sample plan templates, forms, and community best practices.

NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 32 CORE CAPABILITIES	PREPAREDNESS MISSION AREAS				
	PREVENTION	PROTECTION	MITIGATION	RESPONSE	RECOVERY
	FORENSICS ATTRIBUTION	ACCESS CONTROL & ID VERIFICATION	COMMUNITY RESILIENCE	CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION	ECONOMIC RECOVERY
	INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION SHARING	CYBERSECURITY	LONG TERM VULNERABILITY REDUCTION	ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE/HEALTH & SAFETY	HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES
	INTERDICTION & DISRUPTION	INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION SHARING	OPERATIONAL COORDINATION	FATALITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES	HOUSING
	OPERATIONAL COORDINATION	INTERDICTION & DISRUPTION	PLANNING	FIRE MANAGEMENT & SUPPRESSION	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
	PLANNING	OPERATIONAL COORDINATION	PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	NATURAL & CULTURAL RESOURCES
	PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING	PHYSICAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES	RISK & DISASTER RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT	LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT	OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
	SCREENING, SEARCH, AND DETECTION	PLANNING	THREATS & HAZARDS ID	MASS CARE SERVICES	PLANNING
		PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING		MASS SEARCH & RESCUE OPERATIONS	PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING
		RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PROTECTION PROGRAMS & ACTIVITIES		ON-SCENE SECURITY, PROTECTION, & LAW ENFORCEMENT	
		SCREENING, SEARCH, AND DETECTION		OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS	
		SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY & SECURITY		OPERATIONAL COORDINATION	
				PLANNING	
				PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTHCARE, & EMS	
				PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING	
				SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT	

Table P-1. Preparedness Mission Areas to Core Capabilities Crosswalk

Emergency Support Function (ESF)-1 Transportation	ESF-2 Communications	ESF-3 Public Works and Engineering	ESF-4 Firefighting	ESF-5 Information & Planning	ESF-6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Svcs	ESF-7 Logistics
CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION	OPERATIONAL COMM-UNICATIONS	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	OPERATIONAL COMM-UNICATIONS	SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT	MASS CARE SERVICES	LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
		CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	PLANNING	LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT	MASS CARE SERVICES
		LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT	FIRE MANAGEMENT & SUPPRESSION	PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING	PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTHCARE, & EMS	CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION
		ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE / HEALTH & SAFETY	SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT		CRITICAL TRANS-PORTATION	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
		FATALITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES			FATALITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES	OPERATIONAL COMM-UNICATIONS
		MASS CARE SERVICES				
		MASS SEARCH & RESCUE OPERATIONS				

ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services	ESF-9 Search and Rescue	ESF-10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	ESF-11 Agriculture and Natural Resources	ESF-12 Energy	ESF-13 Public Safety and Security	ESF-15 External Affairs
PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTHCARE, & EMS	MASS SEARCH & RESCUE OPERATIONS	ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE / HEALTH & SAFETY	MASS CARE SERVICES	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	ON-SCENE SECURITY, PROTECTION, & LAW ENFORCEMENT	PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING
FATALITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES		CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION	CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION	LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT		
MASS CARE SERVICES		INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT		
CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION		PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING	LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT			
PUBLIC INFORMATION & WARNING			ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE / HEALTH & SAFETY			
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE / HEALTH & SAFETY			PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTHCARE, & EMS			
LOGISTICS & SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT						

Table P-2. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to Core Capabilities Crosswalk

Emergency Support Function (ESF)-1 Transportation	ESF-2 Communications	ESF-3 Public Works and Engineering	ESF-4 Firefighting	ESF-5 Information & Planning	ESF-6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services	ESF-7 Logistics
SUPPLY & LOGISTICS	COMMAND STAFF	PUBLIC WORKS	FIRE & EMERGENCY SERVICES	PUBLIC AFFAIRS	MORTUARY AFFAIRS	SUPPLY & LOGISTICS
	CAT 1 PERSONNEL	SUPPLY & LOGISTICS	EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS	COMMAND STAFF	NAVAL SECURITY FORCES	
				CAT 1 PERSONNEL	OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH SUPPORT	
					EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES	
					HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT	
					MASS CARE	
					SUPPLY & LOGISTICS	

ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services	ESF-9 Search and Rescue	ESF-10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	ESF-11 Agriculture and Natural Resources	ESF-12 Energy	ESF-13 Public Safety and Security	ESF-15 External Affairs
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES	FIRE & EMERGENCY SERVICES	EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS		PUBLIC WORKS	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL	PUBLIC AFFAIRS
MASS CARE	METOC SUPPORT	OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH SUPPORT			NAVAL SECURITY FORCES	COMMAND STAFF
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT		INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE SUPPORT			EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT	
MORTUARY AFFAIRS					CAT 1 PERSONNEL	
					COMMAND STAFF	

Table P-3. ESFs to Navy IEM Functional Area Crosswalk



Figure P-1. Navy Installation Emergency Management Standards

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STANDARD 1 - PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

1. Overview. An installation EM program is a cross-functional program that integrates procedures and standards for all-hazards emergency preparedness, response, and recovery on Navy installations. Management of the EM program requires the diligent implementation of the standards contained in this manual. All REGCOMs and installation COs have EM responsibilities and will develop a documented EM program that includes an executive policy or vision statement for EM and a multi-year strategic plan developed in coordination with the EM working group (EMWG) that defines the mission, goals and objectives, and milestones for the EM program. An active plan of action and milestones (POA&M) can suffice as a multi-year strategic plan. All EM risk management products, plans, and procedures will be reviewed annually and updated if necessary, per requirements described in Standard 11 - Risk Management.

2. Objectives. The primary objectives of the Navy installation EM program are to prepare Navy installations for emergencies; respond appropriately to protect personnel and property; save lives; and recover and restore operations after an emergency.

3. Requirements

a. Required EM Capabilities. Capabilities may be organic, regionalized, or provided by federal, state, local, other service, and private (or host nation) agencies and departments through appropriate support agreements. Support agreements may include memorandums of understanding (MOUs), memorandums of agreement (MOAs), mutual aid agreements (MAAs), intra-agency support agreements, outside continental United States (OCONUS) status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), and contracts.

b. Environmental Compliance. Within the U.S., including its territories and possessions, Navy civilian and military first responders and emergency responders will comply with all applicable Navy Environmental and Natural Resources Program requirements as delineated in reference (k).

c. Tenant Command Support. Commands located on or grouped with an installation, commonly known as tenants, do not require separate EM programs, but will assign an EM coordinator to participate in designated preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts under the Region and installation EM programs. Tenant command EM coordinators will work with the installation EM Officer (EMO) to ensure their tenant emergency action plan (EAP) aligns with the installation EM plan.

d. Continuity of Operations (COOP). Per reference (m), Navy commands, not included in their immediate superior in command (ISIC) or parent command continuity of operations (COOP) program, will develop a COOP program that supports the ISIC's continuity requirements. The COOP program will identify mission essential functions (MEF) in prioritized order and identify the COOP requirement (e.g., constitutional, legislative, DoD regulation, Navy regulation). Tenant commands will coordinate their COOP plans with the installation EMO. Tenants with MEFs should share and coordinate their COOP plans with the installation COOP

Planning Officer or EMO to ensure support required from the installation is included in the installation's COOP planning process.

e. Medical Support. Per reference (w), during an all-hazards incident, Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) facilities will provide medical support to the affected Navy installation. BUMED medical support can include:

(1) Medical and syndromic surveillance through the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE).

(2) Mass casualty response to include patient decontamination.

f. Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO) Assignment. Per reference (as), a PHEO and alternate PHEO will be assigned to support all Navy installations, Regions, and all medical treatment facilities (MTFs).

4. Responsibilities

a. CNIC, Director of Operations (N3) will:

(1) Designate, train, and resource a program director responsible for implementing CNIC HQ, Region and installation EM program guidance based on references (a) and (b).

(2) Maintain coordination of the EM program with other echelon 2 commands.

(3) Liaise with component commanders to identify task critical assets and seek operational input in support of the shore installation requirements development process.

(4) Coordinate as appropriate, applicable inter-agency and multi-state consequence management activities affecting Navy Regions and installations.

(5) Per reference (b), collect and submit to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (OPNAV N1) annual reports of tenant commands that have not provided MEFs and category (CAT) 1 personnel information to hosting installations.

(6) Develop, coordinate, and maintain support for the personnel categorization process required by reference (b) in the Total Workforce Management System (TWMS).

(7) Establish procedures for Region, installation, and tenant commands to report categorized personnel in TWMS.

(8) Establish procedures for Region, installation, and tenant commands to collect, report, and update personnel categorization data.

(9) Update all Region Operations Center (ROC) Crisis Action Team and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel position descriptions.

(10) Develop, maintain, and disseminate guidance regarding mass casualty management and mortuary affairs procedures pertaining to all categories of Navy personnel.

(11) Maintain and sustain the Navy Emergency Manager training course, course identification number (CIN) S-540-1001.

(12) Maintain and sustain the Navy EOC Incident Management Team course, CIN S-540-1000.

(13) Maintain and sustain the ROC Operations course, CIN S-540-1005.

(14) Maintain and sustain the EM for Senior Leaders course, CIN S-540-1013.

b. CNIC EM Program Director (N37) will:

(1) Provide EM program oversight, policy, guidance, operational structure, staffing requirements, and assignment of responsibilities for a comprehensive, all-hazards EM program at Navy Regions and installations.

(2) Plan, program, budget and execute a resource-balanced approach to ensure full operating capability of the standards set forth within this manual including the development of applicable program objective memorandum (POM) inputs and the development and distribution of fiscal controls for the region EM programs.

(3) Coordinate with CNIC Public Safety Systems (N6) for central acquisition and sustainment of EM program capabilities.

(4) Resource, budget, and establish standardized policies and procedures for the CNIC Shore Enterprise Operations Center (SEOC), ROCs, and installation EOCs, as well as Region and installation dispatch centers.

(5) Manage the Emergency Management Program Assessment (EMPA) program.

(6) Conduct an enterprise-wide region EMWG at least annually.
(7) Conduct CNIC HQ EMWG meetings at least quarterly.

(8) Review all EM program-related federal, DoD, Joint, and Navy publications for interpretation and possible inclusion and implementation within the Navy EM program. Develop and maintain enterprise standardized position descriptions for EM program billets.

(9) Provide operational oversight and technical standardization of dispatch services.

(10) Where applicable, support the CNIC Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (NEPLO) program.

(11) Sustain and ensure functionality and availability of enterprise standard collaboration tools.

(12) Collect and disseminate EM community lessons learned and best practices.

(13) Serve as the principal EM point of contact for CNIC COOP and the Navy's EM, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND), and CBRN programs.

(14) Support the CNIC Mission Assurance Program Manager as it relates to matters involving EM.

c. REGCOMs will:

(1) Outside the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), REGCOMs will support combatant commander (CCDR) requirements and integrate EM capabilities to the greatest extent permitted by the U.S. Department of State (DOS), CCDR, Joint, and Service guidance, including SOFAs.

(2) Designate a Region Emergency Manager in writing.

(3) Provide oversight of the Region's EM program.

(4) Designate an appropriate number of personnel to serve as full-time or collateral duty staff to support the Region EM program.

(5) Coordinate with Fleet commanders in the prioritization and allocation of resources, capabilities, and MEFs identification within their AOR in support of tiered implementation of the EM program.

(6) Oversee and coordinate EM processes and procedures involving Navy assets throughout their assigned geographic region per Navy Regulations, Article 0702.

(7) Maintain charter and chair the region EMWG. EMWGs will meet at least quarterly.

(8) Determine the appropriate installation group-level designation for assigned installations.

(9) Validate the ROC level of assigned installations annually. Submit recommended changes to the applicable Fleet commander and CNIC N37. Ensure that all required risk management and MA assessments results are incorporated into Region EM planning. Assessments must be completed and verified annually.

(10) Review, validate, and approve the Region EM plan annually.

(11) Identify assigned Region MEFs by Fleet commander and CNIC, and conduct personnel categorization of Region command personnel. Provide host installation with Region command MEFs and CAT 1 billet/personnel information, broken down by CAT 1A, 1B, and 1C. Ensure Region personnel categorizations are recorded in TWMS. CAT definitions are described in Standard 12 - Personnel.

(12) Identify and provide installations with Region assigned installation-level MEFs.

(13) Per reference (b), direct installations to collect tenant command MEFs and CAT 1 (1A, 1B, and 1C) billets/personnel information. Gather support from Fleet commander and tenant ISIC participation where applicable.

(14) Ensure that essential services personnel in direct support of MEFs and critical Fleet operations are identified as CAT 1C throughout the Region and installations.

(15) Validate installation consolidated MEF and CAT 1 billet/personnel reports are supported by lists provided by installation and tenant commands. Provide an annual report to CNIC annotating only those tenant commands which did not provide MEFs and CAT 1 reports per reference (b) and Standard 12 - Personnel.

(16) Establish operable and, when possible, interoperable communications across assigned response communities.

(17) Establish a ROC and designate a full-time ROC manager in writing.

(18) Identify and designate in writing the appropriate number of personnel to act as the CAT members in support of ROC activation periods. Assign CAT members as CAT 5 personnel per reference (b), and ensure administrative assignment reflects in position descriptions.

(19) Ensure all CAT members complete appropriate duty task list training requirements.

(20) Participate in ROC training and exercises.

(21) Per reference (n), designate a Region PHEO and alternate PHEO in writing.

(22) Consolidate installation local dispatch centers at the Region level, whenever possible.

(23) Pre-identify a Joint Information Center (JIC) location (when Region is not located onboard an installation) in coordination with the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), federal, state, or host nation representatives.

(24) Ensure Region EM efforts are coordinated with CNIC, assigned Fleet commander, and the assigned CCDR.

(25) Review Region exercise and real-world incident after-action reports (AARs).

(26) Review and comment on EMPA, Navy MAA, Joint MAA, Integrated Nuclear Survivability Assessments (INSER), Balanced Survivability Assessments (BSAs) and other DoD/Navy Audit results.

(27) Ensure EM-related resources and issues are programmed during the budget process.

(28) Serve as the Response Task Force (RTF) or Joint Task Force (JTF) commander as applicable.

(29) Serve as the Navy on-scene coordinator for environmental hazards.

(30) Serve as the area commander, when assigned by the Fleet commander, for incidents involving non-nuclear shipboard casualties.

(31) Maintain and manage all support agreements established within the Region. Require installations to validate support agreements annually.

(32) Serve as the DSCA Region planning authority (RPA) per reference (x).

d. Region Emergency Managers will:

(1) Manage the EM program within their assigned Region.

(2) Support installation EMOs in the development and maintenance of installation EM plans and programs. Maintain situational awareness and status of installation EM plans and programs.

(3) Support installation EMOs in the development and approval of support agreements with appropriate federal, state, local, other service, private sector, and host nation responders.

(4) Maintain communications and points of contact lists for off-installation activities within the Region.

(5) Maintain oversight of the EMPA program within the Region. Support the CNIC Force Protection (N34) and Director of Assessments (N3E) Command Assessment for Readiness and Training (CART) and Final Evaluation Problem (FEP) program for Region and installations as it applies to EM.

(6) Maintain oversight of ROC operations.

(7) Oversee Region dispatch services. Supervise the management, administration, and operations of the assigned region dispatch center (RDC).

(8) Serve as an advisor to the REGCOM as applied to DSCA RPA roles and responsibilities if assigned.

(9) Provide Navy EM program oversight to the Joint Forces and RTF or JTF program missions as applicable.

(10) Serve as coordinator for all EM-related working groups, e.g., Public Safety Working Group. Maintain all region EMWG minutes and documentation.

(11) Serve as the principal point of contact for Region command COOP, MA, CBRN, and CBR-D issues as they apply to EM.

(12) Serve as member of the region Military Biological Advisory Committee (MBAC).

(13) Provide oversight of all EM duty task list requirements within the Region.

(14) Seek professional certification in EM through International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), Certified Emergency Manager (CEM), Navy - Certified Emergency Manager.

e. Installation COs will:

(1) Designate in writing an installation EMO. Group 1, 2, and 3 installations require a full-time EMO. The EMO will not be assigned as the Mission Assurance Officer (MAO).

(2) Provide oversight of the installation's EM program.

(3) Designate an appropriate number of personnel to serve as full-time or collateral duty staff to support the installation EM program.

(4) Oversee and coordinate EM processes and procedures involving Navy assets onboard the installation per Navy Regulations, Article 0702.

(5) Validate the ROC and group designation level of the installation annually. Submit change requests to the REGCOMs.

(6) Ensure EM program standards are properly implemented onboard the installation.

(7) Charter and chair the installation EMWG.

(8) Ensure that all required threat, hazard, vulnerability, capability, and consequence management assessments are conducted annually and incorporated into installation EM plan.

(9) Review and approve the installation EM plan and ensure the plan is validated annually.

(10) Maintain, charter, and participate in the installation EMWG. EMWGs will meet at least quarterly.

(11) Ensure that all required risk management and MAA results are incorporated into installation EM planning.

(12) Review, validate, and approve the installation EM plan annually.

(13) Identify assigned MEFs and conduct personnel categorization of installation personnel. MEF information will be provided by Region and tenant commands. Personnel will be broken out by CAT 1 through 5, locations/commands, day, night, and weekend. CAT 1 personnel will be broken down by subcategories A, B, and C and designated in writing by assigning command. All CAT 5 personnel will be assigned in writing. Ensure all assignments are recorded in TWMS. This process is further described in Standard 12 - Personnel.

(14) Ensure that essential services personnel in direct support of MEFs and critical Fleet operations are identified as CAT 1C and assigned in writing.

(15) Provide an annual report to Region annotating only those tenant commands which did not provide MEFs and CAT 1 reports per reference (b) and Standard 12 - Personnel.

(16) Establish operable and, when possible, interoperable communications with local first responder agencies.

(17) Establish an installation EOC and designate a full-time EOC manager in writing for group 1 and 2 installations only.

(18) Identify and designate in writing the appropriate number of personnel to act as IMT members in support of EOC activation periods. Assign IMT members as CAT 5, and ensure administrative assignment reflects in position descriptions and in TWMS.

(19) Ensure all IMT members complete appropriate duty task list requirements.

(20) Participate in EOC training and exercises.

(21) Assist the REGCOM in the consolidation of local dispatch centers at the Region level, when directed. Maintain local dispatch capabilities when RDC activates the COOP.

(22) Maintain procedures for integration with a JIS or a host nation equivalent to include procedures to establish and maintain a JIC with partner federal, state, or local agencies as the primary means of releasing information to the media and other public affairs functions.

(23) Maintain copies of all EM-related support agreements and contracts. Agreements must be validated on an annual basis.

(24) Ensure installation EM efforts are aligned with Region, CNIC, assigned Fleet commander, and the assigned CCDR requirements.

(25) Review and publish exercise and real-world incident AARs.

(26) Review and comment on EMPA, Navy MAA, Joint MAA, INSER, BSAs and other DoD or Navy Audit results.

(27) Provide EM input during the budget process so that proper resources are programmed.

(28) Ensure tenant commands participate in the installation EM program, to include training and exercises.

(29) Serve as the area commander for incidents involving non-nuclear shipboard casualties onboard the installation. Support unified command when directed.

f. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Manage the installation EM program.

(2) Supervise the management, administration, and operation of the installation EOC, and dispatch center, if applicable.

(3) Seek professional certification in EM through IAEM, CEM, Navy - Certified Emergency Manager.

(4) Develop and maintain a comprehensive, all-hazards EM plan, supporting annexes and appendices, associated instructions, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and checklists to prepare for, mitigate, respond, and recover from man-made, and natural hazards.

(5) Collaborate and coordinate with local first responders; state, local and tribal governments; other military departments; and host nation emergency managers to achieve EM plan integration and interoperability. Attend local emergency planning committees when available.

(6) Ensure critical infrastructure, hazard and threat, vulnerability, consequence, and response capability assessments and MA Corrective Action Plans (CAP) are incorporated during development and review of the EM plan.

(7) Provide EM emergency response training and oversight for Command Duty Officers (CDOs) and watch standers.

(8) Provide and manage Mass Warning and Notification (MWN) systems to include, emergency public information (EPI) dissemination.

(9) Provide EM inputs for exercise and drill package development.

(10) Maintain MEF and categorization personnel reports.

(11) Coordinate with the designated supporting MTF medical emergency manager to ensure medical resource and response activities are coordinated and included in the EM plan.

(12) Coordinate the prioritization and allocation of EM-related resources at the installation and ensure to incorporate into the installation's capability assessment. Resources will be broken down by type, kind, location, and serviceability.

(13) Integrate installation emergency response requirements into resource planning.

(14) Ensure that community awareness requirements are incorporated into emergency planning, preparation, and exercise. Develop and maintain a community profile.

(15) Provide subject matter expertise to support communication about installation-specific all-hazards planning.

(16) Serve as program coordinator for the installation EMWG. Maintain and disseminate minutes of the installation EMWG meetings to members and tenant commands.

(17) Support the CNIC CART and FEP program as it applies to EM.

(18) Activate and manage support agreements and contracts.

(19) Coordinate EM Training. Manage the Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program and qualifications for all EM functions.

(20) Coordinate and maintain the development of EAPs by tenant commands. Maintain EM coordinator database of all tenant commands. Ensure EAPs align with fire and security pre-planned response, and EM Plans. Ensure EAPs address shelter-in-place (SIP), lockdown, safe haven planning, and evacuations.

(21) Develop and maintain COOP plans per reference (m).

(22) Administer the CBRN program. Provide for planning and oversight of equipment fielding and sustainment for those installations with a fielded capability.

(23) Report to the installation CO operationally and to the Region Emergency Manager administratively.

g. Tenant commands will:

(1) Comply with this manual regarding emergency response planning and operations.

(2) Designate an EM coordinator to support installation EM program objectives and activities including participation in training, exercises, and supporting operations.

(3) Develop an EAP and ensure it aligns with the installation EM plan.

(4) Designate MEFs and CAT 1 personnel in writing and submit to the installation EMO annually.

(5) Coordinate with the host installation to identify specific base operating support and critical support functions to continue MEFs during an incident.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Tiered Implementation. Most incidents begin and end locally and are managed at the local level per the NRF. Responses to incidents on Navy installations are normally handled by Navy assets and the NRF provides resources from other federal, tribal, state, or local governments, if needed. These incidents may require a unified response to include local agencies, the private sector, and NGOs. National response protocols are structured to provide tiered levels of support when additional resources or capabilities are needed. A tiered implementation approach is necessary in the Navy to prioritize resource allocation and provide a risk-rationalized approach to investing in installation protection. CNIC will maintain a tiered implementation approach for evolving EM capabilities onboard installations. A tier designation is based primarily on group designation, ROC, mission criticality and capabilities available. Available response capabilities will be organic or provided through agreements with outside agencies. Regions and installations are required to maintain a level of EM capabilities commensurate with the risks associated with local threats, hazards, and mission requirements.

b. ROC Levels. The concept of tiered implementation is based upon an installation's mission, capability, and the priority of the mission in relation to the National Military Strategy. ROC level designations provide the priority order for fielding desired response capabilities. Installation EM capabilities and group level assignments will be consistent with the criticality of assets assigned and functions performed and supported. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established delineation of ROC levels applicable to AT and EM capabilities and associated responsibilities for the protection of Navy installations and activities. Refer to reference (o) and CNIC N37 for the installation or activity criteria and assignment of ROC levels. The installation CO will submit annual recommendations for ROC level modification to the REGCOM or as a special circumstances request if a situation emerges during the interim that warrants a change in ROC level assignment.

c. Installation Group Designations. Per reference (b), installation group designations will be used to develop the appropriate EM strategy for each installation, to include planning, training and equipment, exercise, and sustainment requirements. Installation group designations must be clearly identified in Region and installation EM plans. EM response capabilities will be grouped into three tiers (Groups 1, 2, and 3) based upon a risk-based strategy that considers population, number and mission criticality of tenants, ROC level, location, threat or hazard probability, vulnerability, consequences, critical infrastructure, critical assets, and mission requirements. Required response capabilities may be organic (resident onboard installation or within immediate area as defined by Region guidance) or provided by agreement with federal, state, local, other service, private sector, or host nation agencies and departments. Region and installation EM programs will leverage existing theater CCDR emergency response elements per reference (g), whenever possible.

(1) Group 1: Technician level response capability. Ability to effectively respond to, contain, identify, and mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made emergency, including a CBRN incident. Ability to conduct offensive hazardous materials (HAZMAT) operations within a contaminated environment during a CBRN incident, per references (bq) and (br).

(2) Group 2: Operations level response capability. Ability to effectively respond to and isolate, deny entry, and make notifications regarding the effects of a natural or man-made emergency, including a CBRN incident. Ability to conduct defensive HAZMAT operations outside the contaminated environment during a CBRN incident, per references (bq) and (br).

(3) Group 3: Awareness level response capability. Ability to recognize a natural or man-made emergency and conduct protective measures, including SIP, evacuation, and safe haven.

d. Critical Infrastructure. Installations designated within the DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program as critical by a Service or theater CCMD will be designated as either a Group 1 or Group 2 installation. Critical installations cannot be designated as Group 3.

e. Capability Integration. The Navy installation EM program will focus its efforts on integrating and improving the capability of Group 1 and 2 installations to ensure the Navy's ability to meet critical strategic and operational requirements. Group 3 installations will rely primarily on integration of existing organic capabilities with appropriate state, local community, or host nation (as applicable) response capabilities.

f. Organization

(1) Navy EM Organization. The Navy EM program resides within the operations core business area and consists of Fleet, HQ, Region, installation, and tenant command EM components. The command structure for the Navy EM program is represented in Figure 1-1.



Figure 1-1. Navy EM Command Structure

(2) Region EM Organization. Figure 1-2 depicts the EM command structure for all Navy Regions. Regions will publish the command relationships for administering EM within their specific Regions that could in some cases deviate from Figure 1-2.



Figure 1-2. Region EM Command Structure

(3) Installation EM Organization. Each installation is unique in terms of operational requirements, AOR, scope, resources, and priority. Some COs may be assigned command responsibility over multiple activities, sites, or fence lines combined within one installation title, unit identification code (UIC), or located on a joint base. The installation EMO reports operationally to the installation CO via the installation Operations Officer (if assigned) and administratively to the Region Emergency Manager. The installation EMO should be supported by a staff ample enough to fulfill all EM-related duties with positions that include an installation EOC Manager (required for group 1 and group 2 installations), an installation Dispatch Manager (as required), and an installation Continuity Program Officer (CPO) (required for group 1 and group 2 installations). The installation EMO will not be assigned as the installation MAO or CPO. Figure 1-3 depicts a notional installation EM command structure.



Figure 1-3. Notional Installation EM Command Structure

g. Supporting Organizations

(1) System Commands (SYSCOMS). SYSCOMs relevant to the Navy EM program include the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) which provides support for facilities engineering and maintenance, geographic information systems (GIS), environmental issues, Disaster Assessment Teams (DATs), and Contingency Engineering Response Teams (CERT); Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC); and Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). Each SYSCOM provides a unique mix of systems engineering, technical expertise, program management, research, development, testing, evaluation, acquisition, procurement, maintenance, and integrated logistics support to Navy and DoD customers.

(a) CNIC N3S. CNIC N3S serves as the lead acquisition, fielding, and sustainment agent for implementing facilities, infrastructure, environmental and other base operating systems in support of the EM program. CNIC N3S also provides both material and non-material support to Navy Regions and installations, to include required equipment, training, exercises, and integrated logistics sustainment support for ROCs, installation EOCs, dispatch centers, MWN systems, and the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Suite.

1. CNIC N3S is also the shore CBR-D program manager responsible for program, planning, budgeting, and sustaining Navy Region and installation CBR-D capabilities, as well as development of equipment tables of allowance (TOA).

2. CNIC N6 develops the POM submission for all acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of EM program systems. Region and installation acquisition, procurement, and maintenance of EM program systems outside of the CNIC N3S authorized systems is prohibited

(b) NIWC. NIWC serves as a lead SYSCOM for Navy installation command and control, MWN systems, and hazard prediction systems. Through coordination with CNIC N3S, NIWC supports the acquisition and sustainment of EM program systems related to the three aforementioned areas. NIWC, in coordination with CNIC N3S, works with CNIC Information Technology, and Command and Control (N6) to ensure compliance with all information assurance requirements for C4I Suite and other software solutions (as required).

(c) NAVSUP. NAVSUP is the lead SYSCOM to establish policies for delivery of logistics capabilities in support of the EM program.

(d) BUMED. BUMED is an echelon 2 command that oversees three Navy Medicine regions in continental United States (CONUS). Navy medical centers, hospitals, clinics, and other Navy Medicine facilities located onboard or assigned to support Navy installations are echelon 4 and 5 commands that report to one of the three Navy Medicine regions. BUMED regions coordinate with Navy Regions for providing region PHEOs. BUMED MTFs coordinate with Navy installations to provide installation PHEOs. Reference (as) provides additional details regarding the Navy PHEO program and reference (n) provides additional details regarding managing public health emergencies on DoD installations. Other BUMED support includes:

1. Triage and treatment.

2. Epidemiological support including health surveillance for disease containment.

3. Medical logistics support including dispensing and immunizing teams.

4. CBRN countermeasure support.

5. Environmental health and medical surveillance of potable water, food, and air quality.

6. Medical site surveys and risk assessments.

7. Recommendations regarding personnel and respiratory protective equipment, and medical prophylaxis.

8. Psychological care.

9. Medical and public health risk communications.

10. Technical consulting in mass care and mass fatality contingencies.

11. MTF Medical Emergency Manager (MEM) support. Per reference (w), the MEM is the MTF lead for emergency management and is the primary MTF point of contact for the host installation EMO, as well as the lead in coordinating EM support agreements with any local civilian medical emergency response organizations. It is critical for the installation EMO to coordinate with the MEM to determine the capabilities the MTF will be able to provide to the installation during an incident or disaster, and when developing or revising the installation EM plans.

(e) Judge Advocate General (JAG). The JAG provides guidance and interpretation of legal implications on matters pertaining to incidents at Navy installations. Legal issues can include DSCA support, foreign HA/DR, support agreements and contracts, incidents within the U.S. and territories utilizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and incidents within foreign countries where a SOFA is in effect. The JAG may also assist in matters overseas where the DOS is the lead federal agency for incident management overseas.

(f) NCIS. NCIS initiates, conducts, and directs criminal, counterintelligence, terrorism, and related investigations. Moreover, NCIS conducts the full range of counterintelligence activities in support of the Department of the Navy (DON). NCIS duties also includes:

1. All incidents of actual, suspected, or alleged major criminal offenses, to include espionage, acts of terrorism, and all instances of suspicious activities or anomalies that might indicate the involvement of a foreign government or terrorist organization, regardless of whether they occur on or off an installation or ship or are being investigated by other authorities.

Referrals must be made prior to any substantive investigative steps by the command, to include interrogation of suspects.

2. Within the DON, NCIS has responsibility for liaison with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies for the collection and exchange of international terrorist threat information. NCIS is the primary liaison to civil law enforcement authorities but this relationship does not preclude local Security Officers, Anti-Terrorism Officers, and Provost Marshals from coordinating with local law enforcement when necessary and applicable.

g. Working Groups

(1) EMWG. REGCOMs and installation COs will establish and maintain an EMWG to assist the Region Emergency Manager and installation EMO in the development, execution, exercising, and assessment of the Region and installation EM programs. The principal goal of an EMWG is to ensure the alignment of all functional areas (organic and non-organic) responsible for contributing to an effective EM program and to provide executive leadership throughout the response phase. The EMWG provides the REGCOMs and installation COs with an effective organization to oversee the establishment and maintenance of EM plans and assess the effectiveness of the EM program. EMWGs will seek participation by major tenant commands, federal, state, local, other Service and private (or host nation) EM-related agencies and departments. The EMWG will meet at least quarterly. EMWG meeting minutes will be recorded, distributed to all members and non-participating tenants, and retained for two years. EMWGs will:

(a) Provide a forum for the REGCOM or installation CO to execute directions and decisions on issues related to all-hazards emergency planning and response.

(b) Include representatives of all relevant functions and offices that would be affected by or be involved in EM at the Region or installation level.

(c) Invite and include liaison personnel from appropriate federal, state, local, other service, private (or host nation) responder communities and major tenant organizations, as necessary. Provide representation on the host nation EMWG equivalent.

(d) Ensure that the Region and installation EM plans are integrated with local, state and host nation EM plans, as necessary.

(e) Review all support agreements and modify as necessary.

(f) Integrate Region and installation EM initiatives into resource and budget planning.

(g) Ensure that the Region and installation EM training programs are developed and executed to support CAT 1 through CAT 5 personnel.

(h) Conduct or support all required risk management and assessments.

(i) Participate in the development, review, and validation of EM plans.

(j) The EMWG may be consolidated with the anti-terrorism (AT) working group to form a single public safety working group at the discretion of the REGCOM or installation CO chairing the EMWG.

(k) The Region EMWG will be chartered and chaired by the REGCOM and the installation EMWG will be chartered and chaired by the installation CO. The Region Emergency Manager and the installation EMO will serve as the principal action officer for their respective working groups. EMWGs should include the following, or their designee:

1. Region Chief of Staff or installation Executive Officer
2. Operations Officer (if assigned)
3. Region Emergency Manager or installation EMO
4. Security Officer
5. Safety Officer
6. Explosives Safety Officer
7. Legal Officer
8. Training Officer
9. Fire Chief
10. ROC Manager or installation EOC Manager
11. PAO
12. Engineer/Public Works Officer
13. PHEO
14. Environmental coordinator (if assigned)
15. Chaplain (if assigned)
16. Fleet and Family Readiness (FFR) representatives
17. Major tenant command EM coordinators (as required)
18. Navy Medicine region or MTF MEM

19. State, local, or DoD partners (as required)

(l) Depending on assignment, membership should also include:

1. Air Operations Officer

2. Port Operations Officer

3. Information Technology (IT)/Information Systems (IS) Manager

4. Cybersecurity representative

5. OSH Manager

6. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment Officer-in-Charge (OIC)

(2) ROC Operations Board. The ROC Operations Board, chartered and chaired by CNIC N37, serves as a working group for CNIC, supporting commands and Region EM representatives for synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating issues related to ROC operations. The board operates with business rules, action items, and minutes as assigned by the board leadership. The ROC Operations Board should:

(a) Synchronize ROC operations throughout the Shore Enterprise.

(b) Identify, validate, prioritize, and execute requirements based on plans and procedures for ROC operations.

(c) Develop, evaluate, and implement policies, and standards for current and future ROC operations.

(d) Resolve conflicts of requirements and priorities of ROC capabilities with other ongoing development efforts.

(e) Maintain records and minutes of all meetings and coordinate future meetings.

(f) The ROC Operations Board should include the following members:

1. CNIC N37

2. CNIC N34

3. CNIC Fleet Integration (N3F)

4. CNIC Command, Control, Communications and Protection Ashore (N61)

5. Region EM representatives

6. CNIC N6 (when necessary)

(3) MBAC. The MBAC is formed at the region level and may be a standing sub-committee of the Region EMWG. Per references (n) and (w), public health emergency management requirements are to be considered. The mission of the MBAC is to evaluate potential biological threats and hazards to the Region, installations, and supported MEFs and recommend appropriate and legal courses of action (COAs) to the REGCOM in a timely manner. The MBAC should determine the population at risk based on available intelligence, time of release, exposure route, meteorological prediction, and community demographic data. Prior MBAC decisions, data, and COAs can be found on the C4I Suite. The MBAC should convene:

(a) Upon receipt of pandemic or biological endemic warnings from the Center for Disease Control, BUMED or local MTF, or military chain of command.

(b) At the beginning of specific endemic disease seasons such as influenza.

(c) Upon receipt of credible biological terrorism threat warnings from civilian or military public health, law enforcement, military chain of command, or intelligence communities.

(d) The MBAC will be chaired by the Region Director of Operations and should include the following members:

1. Region Chief of Staff

2. Region Emergency Manager

3. PHEO

4. MTF Commander

5. Region Security Officer

6. Region Safety Officer

7. Region PAO

8. Region Legal Officer

9. ROC Manager

10. Region Environmental coordinator (if assigned)

11. Region FFR representatives

12. Region Fire Chief

13. Installation, state, local, or DoD partners (as required)

h. EMPA. CNIC will conduct program assessments for each Navy Region and installation. This assessment evaluates the organization's ability to respond appropriately to save lives, protect personnel and property, sustain critical operations, and restore operations after an emergency. EMPA periodicity will be approximately every three years, and when possible for regions, aligned with the CCDR AT/Force Protection (FP) Program Reviews and the CNIC N3E AT/FP CART-FEP cycle.

(1) Purpose. The EMPA focuses on the organization's ability to develop, implement, and sustain a comprehensive, all-hazards EM program to include the following:

(a) Ability to develop and maintain an all-hazards IEM plan.

(b) Ability to prepare for, and mitigate the potential effects of, responding to and recovering from all man-made, and natural emergencies.

(c) Ability to collaborate efficiently with stakeholders, tenants, and mutual aid partners.

(d) Ability to prioritize resources based on risk management strategies that consider hazard and threat, vulnerability, and capability assessments.

(e) Ability to provide and sustain training, manning, and equipage.

(f) Asses overall operational EM readiness and status of ongoing mitigation and correction efforts.

(2) Discussion. The program review utilizes the EM benchmark assessment tool and the Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Assessment Checklist to assist in executing the EMPA program. The EM assessment tool is aligned with the standards in this manual and those benchmarks established by references (a) and (b). The EM assessment tool includes a thorough examination of requirements established for administration, assessment, operations, planning, protective strategies, and dispatch. Additional information regarding the Region and installation EM assessment tools may be found at https://g2.cnic.navy.mil and the virtual annex of this manual. All discrepancies, once identified, will be used to develop mitigation and corrective action plans. Discrepancies are categorized in the following manner:

(a) Major. Non-compliance will cause severe impact in ability to prepare, respond, or recover from an incident. Requirements represent core pillars of the EM program.

(b) Significant. Non-compliance will cause significant impact in ability to prepare, respond, or recover from an incident.

(c) Minor. Non-compliance will inhibit sound program oversight and ability to self-assess.

(3) Regions will:

(a) Conduct a self-assessment using the region EM benchmark assessment tool at least 30 calendar days prior to the CNIC EMPA. Self-assessment results should be posted a minimum of ten days prior to the CNIC EMPA. Upon completion, develop mitigation and corrective action plans to address each identified finding.

(b) Assist installations in preparation for their EMPAs. Ensure each installation conducts a self-assessment using the installation EM benchmark assessment tool at least 30 days prior to the CNIC EMPA to identify actions that can be corrected prior to the scheduled EMPA. Self-assessment results should be posted a minimum of ten days prior to the CNIC EMPA.

(c) Provide Region EM representation at all installation CNIC EMPAs.

(d) Upon completion of the CNIC EMPA, review monthly installation mitigation and ensure corrective action plans are submitted. Provide oversight of all necessary corrective actions and ensure major findings are corrected within 90 days following the EMPA.

(4) Installations will:

(a) Conduct a self-assessment using the installation EM benchmark assessment tool at least 30 days prior to the CNIC EMPA. Self-assessment results should be posted a minimum of ten days prior to the CNIC EMPA. Upon completion, develop mitigation and corrective action plans to address each identified finding.

(b) Ensure all documentation is readily available during the assessment.

(c) During the exercise portion of the EMPA, ensure the IMT can demonstrate proficiency in emergency center operations, maintain situational awareness, establish a common operating picture, and meet MWN and reporting objectives.

(5) Reporting. Upon completion of the CNIC EMPA, CNIC will provide a detailed final report indicating overall EM program readiness, key observations, best practices, and required corrective actions for major discrepancies. The results will be displayed as an overall EM program compliance percentage along with individual scores for each core capability. This report will direct the development of a POA&M for submission to CNIC N37 within 30 days. Approved POA&M should be updated monthly prior to the last day of each month until all discrepancies are resolved. POA&M corrective actions should resolve all major discrepancies within 90 days, significant discrepancies within 180 days, and minor discrepancies as determined by the installation CO.

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STANDARD 2 - PREPAREDNESS

1. Overview. Preparedness is defined as a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action to ensure effective coordination during incident response. Within NIMS, preparedness focuses on the following elements: planning, procedures and protocols, training and exercises, personnel qualification and certification, and equipment certification.

2. Objectives. Preparedness as a Mission Area and Capability. DoD, EM programs are aligned with the NRF and National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) in promoting planning, public information and warning, and operational coordination capabilities. Per reference (a), these capabilities crosscut the five preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2-1. These capabilities and mission areas that form the backbone of preparedness are the foundational EM standards contained in this manual. Each of the crosscutting capabilities and the five mission areas are discussed in detail in their respective standard that includes Standard 3 - Prevention, Standard 4 - Protection, Standard 5 - Mitigation, Standard 6 - Response, Standard 7 - Recovery, Standard 8 - Planning, Standard 9 - Public Information and Warning, and Standard 10 - Operational Coordination. Preparedness requirements and responsibilities for Regions and installations are contained in those standards. Other critical areas that support preparedness are detailed in the other standards which include Standard 1 - Program Management, Standard 11 - Risk Management, Standard 12 - Personnel, Standard 13 - Training, Standard 14 - Equipment and Sustainment, and Standard 16 - Continuity of Operations.

Figure 2-1. Crosscutting Capabilities and Mission Areas

a. Preparedness as a Phase. The preparedness phase encompasses all activities taking place prior to the onset of an incident to prepare Navy personnel for the eventual response to, and recovery from, an emergency. Installations may be threatened by a variety of natural and man-made hazards that could result in significant loss of life and property. Installations must mitigate those hazards as best as possible and, as necessary, prepare for, respond to, and recover from

incidents as they occur. The readiness and capability to meet that challenge is predicated upon a Navy community that is manned, trained, and equipped prior to the event. EM preparedness provides the unifying processes and procedures to ensure that readiness. Regions and installations have the flexibility to execute EM to meet the needs of their local area. As such, approaching EM from a phased perspective within the EM process continuum addresses the foundational core capabilities required for success. Figure 2-2 shows the EM process continuum depicting preparedness as the first phase followed by response and recovery with mitigation continuously evaluated and appropriate actions taken.

Figure 2-2. Navy EM Process Continuum

b. Preparedness as an Organization. The preparedness organization provides coordination for EM and incident response activities before a potential incident. The preparedness organization incorporates the requirements embedded in these standards and exercises their organization to meet any hazard or threat to an installation. It is important to recognize that most Navy installations are required per Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guard regulations to follow the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines.

3. Requirements. CNIC will achieve the NPG by:

a. Preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of terrorism.

b. Protecting Navy installations, Service Members, and civilian personnel onboard, assets, systems, and networks against the greatest threats and hazards in a manner that allows the nation's interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.

c. Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future disasters.

d. Responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs in the aftermath of an incident.

e. Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening, and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and the economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historic, and environmental fabric of communities affected by an incident.

4. Responsibilities. Preparedness is the shared responsibility of the entire nation. The NPG is, "A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk." This goal is designed to prepare for the risks that will severely stress the nation's collective capabilities and resources and is the cornerstone of implementing the NPS.

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STANDARD 3 - PREVENTION

1. Overview. Prevention is the combined capabilities, efforts, and actions, taken to avoid, stop, or thwart hostile attacks by adversaries of the U.S., against Navy installations, MEFs, critical mission facilities (CMF), critical assets, and personnel.

a. Terrorism is considered a preventable threat, unlike natural hazards that are predominantly unpreventable. Individuals or groups with hostile intents towards Navy installations are motivated by a wide array of influences and agendas that are continuously changing. Counterterrorism (CT) efforts, tactics, and capabilities also evolve in response to the dynamics of the threat environment. This cyclical process requires a fluid and flexible approach to preventing an attack from occurring.

b. Navy AT efforts support the national CT and prevention effort that coordinates all federal, state, and local government capabilities, along with elements of the public and private sector.

2. Objectives. In the effort to prevent a terrorist attack, everyone is a stakeholder. In addition to knowing what prevention capabilities are locally available to the installation, the NPG and the National Prevention Framework identify seven core capabilities for the prevention mission area. The following core capabilities fall under the AT program, but could require EM program support:

a. Planning. Region and installation planners must engage the whole community (entire base population), both on and off-installation when developing strategic, operational, and tactical-level plans to meet defined objectives.

(1) Identify and synchronize achievable objectives within the capabilities of the EM, AT, and force protection (FP) programs. Planning is further discussed in Standard 8 - Planning.

(2) Assist to develop and execute COAs to prevent an imminent terrorist attack upon a Navy installation, off-installation activities, stand-alone facilities, CMF, asset, or personnel.

b. Public information and warning. An emergency warning message is critical to delivering prompt and actionable information to the whole community. Persons with disabilities or language barriers may not be able to receive or understand a warning message if it is not clear, consistent, and culturally or linguistically appropriate. This is further discussed in Standard 9 - Public Information and Warning.

(1) Region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs must develop methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard to all persons within their AOR that is actionable, accurate, and consistently reliable.

(2) Provide public awareness information on how to identify and report terrorism-related information to the appropriate law enforcement officials that could help prevent an imminent or follow-on act of terrorism.

c. Operational coordination. Establish and maintain unity of effort across all operational and protection related domains. Coordinate operations, using interoperable communications, with all installation departments and tenant commands, law enforcement, intelligence, media, local and state governments, private sector, and the public, to prevent initial or follow-on terrorist attacks. This is further discussed in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

d. Forensics and attribution. In coordination with NCIS, and other federal or local law enforcement and intelligence officials: conduct analysis and attribute terrorist acts (including the means and methods) to their source, to aid in preventing initial or follow-on acts, and to swiftly develop CT and law enforcement (LE) response COAs. Prioritize incident scene security to support physical evidence collection and analysis of, CBRN material (bulk and trace), biometric, digital media, and network exploitation, to assist in preventing initial or follow-on terrorist acts.

e. Intelligence and information sharing. Provide timely and actionable information regarding physical and cyber threats; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; and all other matters regarding homeland security for local, state, tribal, federal, military, host nation, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among government or private sector entities, as appropriate.

f. Interdiction and disruption. This capability involves delaying, diverting, intercepting, halting, apprehending, or stopping terrorist threats or plots before they occur. This is achieved by maintaining plans and capabilities to accomplish, or support CT partners in:

(1) Interdicting specific conveyances, cargo, and persons associated with an imminent terrorist threat to prevent entry into the U.S.

(2) Conducting operations to render safe and dispose of CBRN hazards in all environments.

(3) Preventing proliferation of CBRN materials, precursor agents, and related technology.

(4) Preventing financial or material support from reaching suspected terrorists.

(5) Conducting tactical CT operations.

g. Screening, search, and detection. This capability involves Navy installations maintaining plans and capabilities to, or supporting CT partners in, the use of active and passive surveillance and search techniques to identify, discover, or locate threats. This effort may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, bio-surveillance, sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence.

(1) Maximize the screening of targeted cargo, conveyances, mail, baggage, and people associated with an imminent terrorist threat using all legal technical and non-technical means available.

(2) Initiate operations immediately to locate persons and networks associated with an imminent terrorist threat or act.

(3) Conduct CBRN detection operations in all environments.

3. Requirements. Preventing terrorist attacks onboard Navy installations is a primary mission for all Regions and installations

a. Regions and installations will coordinate all threat and hazard prevention efforts with all protection related programs to ensure consistent results are pursued and to maximize the application of limited resources.

b. Region and installation EM plans will:

(1) Contain a Prevention section that discusses prevention concepts, application, responsibilities, and the command's threat prevention coordination structure across all protection related programs.

(2) Provide guidance for applying risk management (RM) assessment results for preventing the occurrence of identified threats.

(3) Identify all injury and disease prevention related organic resources from area public health disciplines (e.g., environmental health and safety, preventive medicine, and epidemiological services), and area public safety disciplines (e.g., fire and emergency, security force, facility and transportation engineering, and emergency management services).

(4) Discuss how prevention capabilities are coordinated as they apply to installation departments, tenants, military and civilian personnel, and other local stakeholders.

c. Tenant EAPs should complement installation EM plans and follow the prevention standard.

d. Public safety working groups should proactively coordinate threat prevention strategy and activity across all protection related programs. This coordination must include all tenant command and public or private stakeholder engagement.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs and installation COs will:

(1) Promulgate commander's guidance regarding prevention strategies, goals, objectives, and end state. Ensure EM, AT and public safety working groups develop actionable prevention planning that pursues the commander's guidance.

(2) Ensure annual exercises are conducted to validate prevention planning.

(3) Ensure validated prevention and RM measures are documented.

b. Region Emergency Managers will:

(1) Update the region EM plan to include a Prevention section per this Standard. Ensure Navy installation EM plans within the Region's AOR are also updated accordingly.

(2) Coordinate with the Region ATO, develop validation metrics for use during exercises that measure the degree of success of the command's prevention efforts and planning effectiveness. Validation metrics will depend on exercise scenario and objectives, but should measure various components of the EM plan.

(3) Document the results of the validation exercise and develop CAPs to remediate deficiencies.

(4) Ensure prevention efforts are appropriately prioritized during EMWG meetings.

c. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Update the installation EM plan to include a prevention section per this standard. Ensure tenant command EAPs are also updated accordingly.

(2) Coordinate with installation personnel, develop validation metrics for use during an annual exercise that measures the degree of success of the command's prevention efforts and planning effectiveness. Validation metrics will depend on exercise scenario and objectives, but should measure various components of the EM plan.

(3) Document the results of the validation exercise and develop CAPs to remediate deficiencies.

(4) Ensure prevention efforts are appropriately prioritized during EMWG meetings.

d. Navy MTFs. Navy MTFs are responsible for conducting routine medical surveillance on Navy installations to identify, investigate and respond to public health threats. Every Navy MTF is supported by an assigned PHEO, who is a clinician trained to provide public health emergency and force health protection support. Navy Environmental Preventive Medicine Units (NEPMUs), Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center and ESSENCE provide technical and scientific subject matter expert reach-back support to MTFs and PHEOs. Public health surveillance activities support the evaluation, planning, and implementation of public health practice, disease prevention and emergency response.

5. Concept of Operations. The federal government carries out statutory and regulatory responsibilities for a wide array of prevention-related programs. The following departments and agencies have specific roles regarding terrorism prevention:

a. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) conducts homeland defense and civil support missions to prevent an imminent terrorist attack from occurring. The DoD is responsible for domestic military activities that protect U.S. sovereignty, U.S. territory, the domestic population, and the critical defense infrastructure, against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President or SECDEF. DoD also provides DSCAs for domestic incidents as directed by the President or SECDEF, when consistent with military readiness and circumstances, and appropriate under the law.

b. The DON supports SECDEF homeland defense and civil support missions by conducting and maintaining the capabilities to prevent a terrorist attack as one of the many contributing stakeholders. Military forces may be needed to protect military equipment, personnel, and assets critical to mission essential functions and critical infrastructure. Also, the DON supports DSCA requests when tasked by higher headquarters, through mutual aid agreements, or under the immediate response authority per reference (e). This support is made possible by Navy installation's maximizing their prevention efforts, and maintaining a high state of readiness.

c. The Director, NCIS will:

(1) Provide prompt dissemination of information on terrorist threats, including specific warning of threats against DoD elements and personnel.

(2) Conduct liaison with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign agencies for the collection and exchange of international terrorist threat information. NCIS is the primary liaison to civil LE authorities but this relationship does not preclude local Security Officers, ATOs, and Provost Marshals from coordinating with local LE when necessary and applicable.

(3) Establish and implement counterintelligence (CI) initiatives to identify and counter espionage, international terrorism, and the CI insider threat.

d. Navy Regions and installations that successfully incorporate prevention standards and efforts into their EM programs can significantly reduce the likelihood of a terrorist threat that becomes a successful attack. In the unlikely event a terrorist attack is conducted, robust prevention efforts may have measurable mitigating effects on the negative impacts of the attack as well as disrupting the occurrence of any planned follow-on attacks.

e. Without the support of the whole community, prevention efforts will not have consistent application across the various protection related domains and result in gaps that may only be discovered in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

6. Administration. Region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs, in collaboration with Region and installation Security, will support the POM process in order to adequately execute prevention-related objectives in the EM plan.

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STANDARD 4 - PROTECTION

1. Overview. Protection strategies are designed to safeguard personnel and property from all threats and hazards. The installation protection posture is established consistent with the prevailing threat levels and hazard conditions. Protection strategies available to the installation CO include evacuation to safe havens, SIP, or lockdown. These are further described in Standard 6 - Response.

2. Objectives. The Protection mission is led by AT personnel and is supported by EM personnel as appropriate. Protection-related programs are discussed in detail throughout this manual such as:

a. AT

b. CBRN protection

c. Critical Infrastructure Protection

d. Continuity of Operations

e. Energy Security

f. F&ES

g. Force Health Protection

h. FP

i. LE

j. Physical Security

3. Requirements. EM personnel will coordinate with all other protection-related programs to address protection requirements. The installation EM plan must include protection related requirements and strategies.

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STANDARD 5 - MITIGATION

1. Overview. Mitigation involves developing capabilities to reduce disruptions to MEFs, personnel casualties, loss of critical assets, facilities, or infrastructure, and damage to the environment by lessening the negative impact of disasters when they occur. Per the National Mitigation Framework:

a. Threats and hazards present long-term risks to Navy installations. Mitigation is a RM action taken to avoid, reduce, or transfer those risks. By reducing the impact of disasters, mitigation enhances protection and prevention efforts, eases response actions, and speeds recovery, thus increasing installation resiliency.

b. Effective mitigation begins with understanding risk based on the vulnerabilities to threats and hazards. Mitigation requires a process of continuous learning, adapting to change, managing risk, and evaluating progress. Understanding the risks to Navy installations and MEFs supports the development of strategies and plans to manage them.

2. Objectives. Risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, as determined by its likelihood, associated consequences, and vulnerability to those consequences. Navy Regions and installations must maintain the ability to conduct MEFs during all hazards or threats to ensure delivery of core capabilities. The Strategic National Risk Assessment indicates a wide range of threat and hazard scenarios that continue to pose a significant risk to the nation. At a minimum, Navy Region and installation mitigation efforts must focus on all applicable risk scenarios discussed below:

a. Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts, wildfires, winter storms, and floods, present a significant, and varied risk across the country. Climate change has the potential to increase the severity of a number of threats and hazards. Rising sea levels, and increasingly powerful storms, are now contributing to an increased risk of flooding. Droughts and wildfires are becoming more frequent and severe in many areas across the country.

b. A virulent strain of pandemic influenza or other infectious disease could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, affect millions more, and result in considerable economic loss. Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those undiscovered, may present significant risks.

c. Technological and accidental hazards, such as transportation system failures, dam failures, and chemical spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities and severe economic impacts. In addition, these hazards may increase due to aging infrastructure.

d. Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use weapons of mass destruction. Conventional terrorist attacks, including those by “lone actors” employing physical threats such as explosives and armed attacks, present the most likely kinetic risk to the nation.

e. Cyber-attacks can have catastrophic consequences, which in turn, can lead to other hazards, such as power grid or financial system failures. These cascading hazards increase the potential impact of cyber incidents. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and

connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, placing the nation's security, economy, and public safety and health at risk. The vulnerability to cyber-attacks will continue to increase as the dependency on IT systems increase.

3. Requirements. Per reference (a), Region and installation EM plans will address the following mitigation activities:

a. Community profile. Installations will develop and maintain a profile of the protected population. A community profile informs the installation CO about the demographics of personnel and facilities to be protected.

(1) At the CNIC level, the community profile involves the identification and prioritization of installations, and facilities, along with associated tenants.

(2) At the Region level, a community profile is tailored to identify and prioritize EM activities based on mission requirements set by CNIC and supported CCDRs. Region EM plans will also include profile information for off-installation activities and stand-alone facilities (SAFs).

(3) At the installation level, a community profile entails a comprehensive demographic analysis to include:

(a) Personnel broken down by categorization (CAT 1 through 5).

(b) Primary and secondary populations for MWN.

(c) Military, dependent, civilian employees, contractors, and foreign nationals.

(d) Principal work locations or by command.

(e) Principal gathering locations outside of work locations.

(f) Onboard installation daytime, nighttime, and weekend populations with approximate number of guests, visitors, and other potentially impacted secondary population personnel.

(g) Locations and capacity numbers of housing, barracks, or other lodging facilities.

(h) Evacuation zone information depicted with maps or overlays.

(i) Personnel affiliated with mission essential personnel that are not protected such as family members living off the installation.

b. RM. Mitigation actions will be developed and applied in response to risks identified during a command's risk assessment (RA) per Standard 11 - Risk Management.

c. Per reference (t), Regions, and installations will:

(1) Exercise and evaluate mitigation and risk remediation plans per reference (r).

(2) Develop mission mitigation plans for the loss of all identified defense critical infrastructure (DCI) related to installation MEFs, supported CCDR operational plans (OPLANs), concept plans (CONPLANs), or core joint mission essential tasks (JMETs).

d. Per reference (b), Regions and installations will:

(1) Ensure tenant commands assign an EM coordinator to participate in designated mitigation efforts under the Region and installation EM programs. The EM coordinator will ensure their command EAP aligns with the installation EM plan and complies with this manual.

(2) Employ mitigation tools to assist in the identification of sites where mitigation efforts may negate or reduce the effects of identified threats and hazards, including CBRN incidents. Refer to Standard 17 - CBRN for information on CBRN mitigation tools.

(3) Ensure relevant Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) are considered for new construction and major modifications to mitigate the structural effects of natural and man-made hazards.

4. Responsibilities. Managing the mitigation of threats and hazards onboard Navy installations is the responsibility of the region Emergency Manager or the installation EMO, ATO, and MAO; and a supporting responsibility for all hands.

a. Mitigation is under the purview of CNIC N3 with input from F&ES, EM, FP, and CNIC Director of Facilities and Environment (N4) for measures relating to facility engineering, building codes, UFCs, and the CNIC Comptroller (N8) for funding of improvements in conjunction with the NAVFAC.

b. REGCOMs and installation COs will:

(1) Ensure mitigation actions are correctly and consistently applied per Standard 11 of this manual.

(2) Provide appropriate support and oversight to the EMO and others, for the mitigation of all threats and hazards.

c. Navy Region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs, ATOs, and others will:

(1) Develop community profiles for the command as discussed in paragraph 3a.

(2) Conduct an all hazard threat assessment (AHTA), and RA per Standard 11 of this manual and reference (r). Develop appropriate mitigation COAs in response to identified risks.

(3) Monitor applied mitigation COAs for effectiveness.

5. Concept of Operations. Mitigation actions are conducted for critical assets, facilities, infrastructure, and other vulnerable areas of the installation with high risk factors as determined by the EMWG. After mitigation actions are applied, continued surveillance of these actions must be conducted to measure and document their effectiveness. Installation risks are identified after completing a RA. Many of the risks listed in the Strategic National Risk Assessment have been identified at the local installation level. Refer to Standard 11 - Risk Management and reference (r) for a detailed discussion of RAs. Options for mitigating threats and hazards are wide-ranging. Commands are encouraged to develop creative solutions for reducing risks to vulnerabilities that provide effective results and represent the best value.

a. Design and construction. The facility standards discussed in references (g) and (u) and applicable UFCs are designed to reduce the vulnerability of personnel and facilities to all threats and hazards. These physical security and construction standards apply to buildings or portions of buildings owned, leased, privatized or otherwise occupied, managed or controlled by or for the DoD. Navy REGCOMs and installation COs will utilize relevant UFCs to mitigate the structural effects of identified threats and hazards. Specifically, references (g) and (u) are directly relevant to these mitigation efforts. The Region engineer is responsible for overseeing design and construction of facilities and installations within the Region.

(1) Representatives from AT, EM, Navy Occupational Safety and Health (NAVOSH), intelligence, security, fire safety, fire prevention, medical, industrial health, and facility engineering personnel will assist the Region engineer in:

(a) Identifying project requirements to facilitate the mitigation of identified risks to MEFs, CMFs, and personnel.

(b) Coordinating for adequate resources to enhance the protection of an installation or facility.

(2) NAVFAC and installation Public Works Officers (PWOs) are responsible for the on-going maintenance and repair of facilities and critical infrastructure. Representatives from AT, EM, NAVOSH, intelligence, security, fire safety, fire prevention, medical, industrial hygiene, and facility engineering personnel will assist the Region and installation PWOs with:

(a) Identifying vulnerable facilities and infrastructure at risk to threats and hazards.

(b) Recommending appropriate mitigation actions to reduce identified risks. Options include, but are not limited to:

1. Redundant systems (lighting, power, water, and communications).

2. Improving drainage.

3. Identifying (or installing) safe rooms.

4. Adopting defense in depth strategies such as grouping or isolating CMFs in protected enclaves.

5. Updating or installing MWN systems such as Giant Voice and internal facility public address systems.

(c) Obtaining adequate resources to facilitate the application of recommended mitigation actions.

b. Public Health and Force Health Protection. BUMED is responsible for public health and force health protection support to Navy installations and Regions. Public health and force health protection efforts mitigate the impact of public health threats and hazards, such as pandemics, on the Navy installation population and families. Public health mitigation efforts include, but are not limited to vaccination, prophylaxis, and education on infectious disease control measures (e.g., hand washing and respiratory hygiene). The beneficiaries of public health and force health protection measures can also extend beyond the Active Duty population in the form of vaccination clinics or prophylaxis dispensing for beneficiaries and public health information messages on infection control measures during an infectious disease outbreak. In the event of an infectious disease epidemic, even broader actions may be taken to control the spread of disease, including isolation, quarantine, social distancing, telework, and other restriction of movement. Reference (n) outlines the steps that an installation PHEO can take to mitigate the effects of an ongoing or impending disease outbreak, and reference (w) details the BUMED force health protection EM program.

c. COOP. COOP is a contingency program for sustaining MEFS in the event of an emergency. A COOP plan is required by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) for all commands supporting MEFs and associated CMFs. The coordination of the COOP program is the responsibility of the Region and installation. The development and implementation of COOP plans is the responsibility of the activity resourcing the MEF and their associated CMF. Maintaining the ability to transfer MEFs to alternate facilities mitigates the negative impacts to the MEF, however, does not mitigate the negative effects of the threat or hazard experienced at the primary CMF. Refer to Standard 16 for discussion of EM-related COOP requirements.

d. Public awareness. Navy Region Emergency Managers, installation EMOs and ATOs can educate their protected populations with effective public awareness campaigns designed to enhance public safety, increase preparedness, and improve individual level of knowledge about the threats and hazards for which the installation is at risk. PAOs also have a role in public awareness as defined in Standard 12. An informed public will help to mitigate the risk of personnel casualties associated with certain threats and hazards. Additional information regarding public awareness materials may be found at www.ready.navy.mil. The Ready Navy Personal Preparedness Course hosted on Navy-e-Learning is an annual requirement for all CNIC Active Duty, Reserve, Civil Service, and contractor personnel.

e. Training and exercises. Providing effective training to personnel will reduce the occurrence of man-made hazards and technological accidents. Exercise evaluators should be familiar with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). Exercises measure the effectiveness of the training and give personnel the opportunity to gain experience

during simulated conditions. The installation EMO will ensure that scenario specific mitigation efforts are evaluated for effectiveness after exercise and real-world events.

f. Technology. Use of approved tools such as final denial barriers, video surveillance, automatic fire suppression systems, or emergency generators are available to installations for various mitigation applications.

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STANDARD 6 - RESPONSE

1. Overview. Emergency response operations entail all activities taken from the initial discovery of a hazard or threat through transition and eventually recovery. Although each installation response is unique and occurs under different circumstances, they are all conducted using a common framework and the ICS under the NRF and NIMS. The NPG defines response as "the capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred." Annexes included in this section to address specific response operations are:

a. Annex A-Evacuation

b. Annex B-Safe Haven

c. Annex C-Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

d. Annex D-Shelter-in-Place

e. Annex E- Lockdown

f. Annex F-Defense Support of Civil Authorities

g. Annex G-Fatality Management

h. Annex H-ESF-1 Transportation Planning Template

2. Objectives

a. Per reference (a), installation COs must develop all-hazards incident response plans consistent with NIMS, National Planning Frameworks, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards, and other relevant laws, policies, regulations, and consensus standards. Incident response plans:

(1) Support the overall protection of the installation's missions, personnel, infrastructure, and the environment.

(2) Support the incident command (IC) or unified command (UC) at the incident location.

(3) Potentially include DCSA coordination per reference (x).

b. An installation's ability to respond to all hazards and threats is predicated on the installation's level of preparedness, readiness, and resiliency. Successful application of EM program requirements, training, planning, assessments, operational coordination, resource management, and COOP are fundamentally linked to the installation's all hazard and threat response capability.

3. Requirements. Per reference (a), the following EM program response capabilities are required for all installations:

a. Incident Management. Conduct incident management activities using the systems described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination as applicable. They include utilization of the ICS and MAC groups.

b. Response Command, Control, and Communications (C3). Per Standard 1 - Program Management, installations are echelon 4 commands that report operationally and administratively to their respective REGCOM. Special circumstances may add additional layers of reporting such as nuclear weapons accidents and incidents or DSCA missions. In the CONUS, RTF planning for nuclear weapons accidents and incidents is managed by Commander, Navy Region Southeast (CNRSE) and Commander, Navy Region Northwest (CNRNW), who are designated RPAs for these events. DSCA C3 is described in Annex F of this standard.

(1) Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Installations are required to operate, equip, staff, and maintain a primary and alternate EOC according to their installation group designation per Standard 1 - Program Management and reference (b). EOC operations are described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

(2) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Suite. Installations and Regions will use C4I Suite for all incident coordination, situational awareness (SA), common operating picture (COP) development, and higher headquarters (HHQ) situational reporting, as applicable, per Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

(a) Installations and Regions must develop and maintain a COP within their command level C4I Suite page. The COP provides consistent, standardized, and geospatially referenced information to the EOC, ROC, HHQ, tenant organizations, and partner agencies, including local mutual aid partners and first responders. The COP supports actions required by the EM plan, the incident commander, resource management activities, and coordination of response and recovery operations.

(b) Installations may have access to modeling and simulation (M&S) systems for identified hazards and threats, including hazard prediction and consequence and effects assessment systems. This capability may be located in the EOC or supported by external resources.

(3) Emergency Communications. Installations will use the Emergency Land Mobile Radio (ELMR) system for all tactical voice communications between security, F&ES, CDO, local or RDCs, incident commander, EOC, and other first responders. Installations will develop a written emergency communications plan that discusses procedures for communicating with all C3 nodes identified in the EM plan. Emergency communications are further described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

(4) Mass Warning and Notification (MWN). Installations will use organic outdoor public address systems (Giant Voice), indoor public address, audible/visual warning systems, landline or

wireless phone calls, text messaging, and computer-based notification such as AtHoc, to conduct MWN and EPI for the required target audience within the prescribed time limits of reference (a) and Standard 9 - Public Information and Warning.

(5) Operational Reporting. Installations will conduct all initial and follow-on operational incident reporting per references (y) and (z). C4I Suite will be used as a redundant platform for notifying officials within the installation's reporting chain for all Operational Report (OPREP)-3 voice and message report information within the prescribed time limits. Operational reporting is further described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

(6) Emergency Dispatch. Installations must have a capability to conduct emergency call-taking and dispatch operations, either organically or at the Region level, per reference (aa).

(7) Joint Information System (JIS). The JIS is used for dissemination of timely and accurate information to the installation's protected populations, the general public, and the media during all phases of incident management. Installations must have procedures for integration with JIS (or equivalent host nation concepts), including use of social media, and procedures to establish or be part of a JIC with partner agencies as the primary means of releasing EPI to the media. JIS and JIC are further described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

c. Evacuation Management. Regions and installations are required to establish and maintain evacuation plans and capabilities per Response Annex A of this manual.

d. Safe Haven Operations. All Regions and installations are required to establish and maintain safe haven plans and capabilities per Response Annex B of this manual.

e. Personnel Accountability (PA). Navy Regions and installations will conduct PA for all personnel affected by hazards that, trigger evacuations, negatively impact installation access or MEF sustainment, impacts the community surrounding the installation, or when ordered to account for personnel by HHQ per Standard 12 - Personnel.

f. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Regions and installations are required to establish and maintain NEO plans and capabilities per Response Annex C of this manual.

g. Shelter-in-Place (SIP). Installations are required to establish and maintain SIP plans and capabilities per Response Annex D of this manual.

h. Lockdown. Installations and tenants are required to establish and maintain lockdown plans and capabilities per Response Annex E of this manual.

i. On-Scene Security. Installations will provide appropriate security resources needed to protect the installation's personnel, assets, and resources, throughout the response and recovery phases of an emergency. Conduct on-scene security actions per local policies and procedures. Maintain continuous communications with the installation EOC (if activated) to report status of security cordons, and other security concerns as required.

j. DSCA. CONUS Regions and installations are required to establish and maintain DSCA plans and capabilities per Response Annex F of this manual.

k. Anti-Terrorism (AT). Response operations for an AT incident onboard an installation will develop per local policies and procedures following the standards discussed in this manual, reference (ac), and other higher authorities as applicable. Incidents that require activation of COOP may require region assistance. In addition to the normal C3 reporting previously discussed, terrorism-related incidents normally involve response by other federal agencies such as the FBI and NCIS. A large-scale terrorist attack may lead to the formation of a JTF. The involvement of additional agencies will require continuous coordination assistance by the ROC throughout the response and recovery phases.

l. Fatality Management. Regions and installations are required to establish and maintain fatality management plans, and capabilities per response Annex G of this manual.

m. Pandemic and Infectious Disease. Pandemic and infectious disease outbreak is a national hazard identified by the Strategic National Risk Assessment. Navy Regions and installations are required to include pandemic and infectious disease outbreak in their local AHTA and conduct mitigation, response, and recovery planning for outbreaks. Pandemic plans will be consistent with references (w), (ac), (ad), all other applicable CCDR and Navy component commander (NCC) contingency plans.

n. Search and Rescue (SAR). SAR missions vary in type and scope. Many Navy installations are capable of supporting SAR missions for their local communities in addition to military SAR support. From an EM perspective, a SAR operation could be in response to a missing person report (child, elderly, infirm), a collapsed building incident, an aircraft or boating mishap over water, or a criminal investigation into a possible homicide. Regardless of the circumstances, Navy installations should be prepared to support their local communities through the DSCA process for SAR support and coordination. SAR response support could entail anything from the use of available aviation assets to a call for volunteers to search a field. SAR response support requests must be reported to HHQ per Response Annex F of this manual.

o. Emergency Declaration. Per U.S. Navy Regulations, commanders have a responsibility to declare an emergency when one arises. Emergency declaration has legal ramifications for operational and logistical support.

p. Logistics. Issuing food and water during mass care and other EM operations. Installations must follow the guidelines for reimbursement established by NAVSUP and their local municipalities.

q. Critical Transportation. Critical transportation refers to the infrastructure and the resources necessary to move personnel and materials from one location to another; in support of MEFs, COOP, DSCA mission assignments or mutual aid requests, or other urgent tasking as assigned by HHQ. Installations must assess their requirements for, and capabilities to, support critical transportation missions and develop an EM plan functional area annex (FAA) or ESF that

provides guidance for critical transportation support. Response Annex H of this manual is provided as an ESF planning template for critical transportation.

r. Fire Management. Navy F&ES are the front line first responders onboard installations involved in fire safety, prevention, and response. Installation EMOs should conduct robust planning and coordination with Navy F&ES to ensure seamless support for routine and larger disaster response. The installation EMO must ensure that wherever Navy F&ES is integrated into the installation EM plan, such planning is consistent with references (i) and (ac).

s. Environmental Response. CONUS and OCONUS installations are subject to a wide array of oil and hazardous substance planning, training, exercise, reporting, and response requirements. CONUS installations fall under either the EPA or the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) jurisdictions for preparedness and response requirements. Additionally, CONUS installations are required to comply with environmental regulations of the state and local municipalities where they are located. Installations must conduct environmental planning, preparedness, response, and recovery operations per references (k), (ac) and any Region oil and hazardous substance plans. Installations must also include an EM plan annex that addresses oil and hazardous substance response.

t. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). An EOD shore detachment is a shore-based operational EOD unit which is assigned in direct support of a REGCOM and usually hosted by an installation. The EOD shore detachment provides general EOD and AT/FP support to Regions and installations.

u. Law Enforcement. A Navy Security Department is a shore based operational department that provides initial LE response to the installation and/or Region. It is the installation CO's limited offensive capability available to take back control of facilities that have been taken by hostile forces. In conjunction with NCIS, it also coordinates exercises for and with outside agencies to provide additional capabilities that the Security Department does not possess.

4. Responsibilities. Installation COs will ensure the EM program response capability requirements listed above and required by applicable installation group designation is manned, trained, and equipped per references (a), (b), and this manual.

5. Concept of Operations. When responding to an emergency, installations are constrained by the uniqueness of the hazard, geography, the response resources they have available, the depth of mutual aid and support agreements they have with the local municipality, the type of operations being performed at the installation, and other situational limiting factors such as weather. Notwithstanding these constraints, all installations are manned, trained, and equipped to respond to all hazards in the following manner:

a. Monitor. Installation personnel must be trained for continuous outward sensing of hazards and threats, and should be provided with tools to aid in hazard sensing. The tools that are available are varied throughout the Shore Enterprise due to their hazard/threat specific nature and may include, but are not limited to:

(1) CBRN sensors or personal dosimeter devices.

(2) Television, radio, computer, or other messaging systems capable of receiving destructive weather, terrorism, or other hazard warnings and reports.

(3) Automated common alarm systems to alert personnel of dangerous conditions developing with hazardous machinery or materials.

(4) Duress and other security alarm systems.

(5) Fire alarm systems.

b. Detect. Installation personnel must be trained about identified installation hazards and threats. The installation AHTA should be incorporated into NSF and quarterdeck watchstander training to raise awareness about these dangers and their potential for occurrence. The goal is to ensure installation watchstanders can detect a hazard or threat before, or when, it presents itself and correctly identify it before it threatens the safety of personnel, and the operations of the installation.

c. Alert. Once a hazard or threat has been detected or reported to the installation, personnel must alert first responders and senior command officials and communicate the potential, or actual impacts of the hazard/threat.

d. Activate. After consultation with the installation leadership, the CDO or EMO activates the EOC in anticipation of a large-scale incident that requires a coordinated response. The EOC may also be activated after a threshold or pre-determined tripwire is crossed that requires automatic activation of the EOC.

e. Dispatch first responders. 9-1-1 dispatch must be contacted immediately to deploy first responders to the scene. Often, this step is conducted prior to the Alert step discussed above if 9-1-1 dispatch is called by the person witnessing the incident. In this case, the CDO or other watch standers must alert senior command officials as soon as they are made aware of the incident.

f. Mass warning. Installation personnel are made aware of the hazard through all available MWN systems within the time periods discussed in paragraph 3.b(4) above, and are provided with appropriate guidance for personal protective actions per the appendices of this Standard.

g. HHQ reporting. Conduct all operational reporting within the time limits established per references (y) and (z).

(1) ROC watchstanders that monitor open source media channels must be cognizant of the vulnerabilities installations have to their identified hazards and threats. When a report of an impending hazard threatens an installation, the ROC must contact the CDO to alert them of that hazard.

(2) ROC watchstanders will report these hazard and threat events occurring at the installations per references (b), (y), (z), (ac), and (ai).

h. Activation levels. During the initial operational phase, the IMT should assess the anticipated duration of response and recovery operations and determine what level of effort is needed from the IMT to manage these operations. The Operations Section Chief will advise the incident commander on which activation level is needed to support response and recovery, and establish the battle rhythm for the remaining operational periods. Activations levels are further described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

i. Deploy mutual aid special teams. If determined by the incident commander that additional technical support is required to halt the occurrence or spread of a specific hazard, an organic or mutual aid specialty resource, such as EOD, HAZMAT, special reaction teams (SRT), or special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, may be required. The incident commander or IMT should identify these requirements as soon as possible to allow for travel time of a special team to the installation if not locally resourced. Installations should consider notifying the owner of a specific special team or mutual aid resource the moment an incident occurs to place them on alert status if needed.

j. Establish staging areas. If not already completed, the incident commander determines the appropriate area to stage responding personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

k. Casualty tracking. The incident commander may establish a triage area if casualties are involved during the incident and moving them to an area of safety is necessary. The triage area may be co-located with the staging area.

l. Incident modeling. The incident commander, other first responders, or EOC IMT may develop a model or simulation of hazard effects to determine the negative impacts to installation or local community personnel.

m. Mass Care. Conduct mass care as applicable per Standard 7 - Recovery. Establish an Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC) if needed.

n. Consequence Management. Consequence management at the scene will follow hazard-specific protocols. Installation EOC staff should be aware of these protocols and prepared to support the incident commander in coordinating their execution if requested. There are 14 elements of a successful consequence management effort at the incident command level. These elements are:

(1) Site assessment.

(2) Scene safety including establishment of hazard/contamination control zones.

(3) Self-protection including personal protection equipment (PPE) selection and employment.

(4) Command and control.

(5) Victim rescue.

(6) Decontamination of victims and responders.

(7) Communication and coordination.

(8) Casualty management and treatment facilities.

(9) Crime scene preservation and management.

(10) Hazard identification and mitigation.

(11) Resource coordination and sustaining incident management.

(12) Media relations.

(13) Weather and environmental concerns.

(14) Public welfare and information.

o. Recovery. Transition into recovery operations normally occurs when the hazard or threat has been stopped or abated, all lifesaving activity has ceased, and F&ES has overhauled the buildings involved in the incident to mitigate the possibility of secondary hazards or flare ups. Response periods can last for many days depending on the incident scope, scale, and hazard or threat type. Recovery requirements are discussed per Standard 7 - Recovery.

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STANDARD 7 - RECOVERY

1. Overview. PPD - 8 established the NPG and the NPS managed by FEMA. To support the NPS, FEMA has developed National Planning Frameworks and Federal Interagency Operational Plans. These provide a unified approach and common terminology to plan for all threats and hazards, across all preparedness mission areas. The NDRF is guided by eight principles that when put into practice, maximize the opportunity for achieving recovery success and support building resilience:

a. Individual and family empowerment.

b. Leadership and local primacy.

c. Pre-disaster recovery planning.

d. Engaged partnerships and inclusiveness.

e. Unity of effort.

f. Timeliness and flexibility.

g. Resilience and sustainability.

h. Psychological and emotional recovery.

2. Objectives

a. Per the NDRF, the recovery mission area defines capabilities necessary for communities affected or threatened by any incident. The ability to manage recovery effectively begins with pre-disaster preparedness and requires support and resources focused on recovery at the immediate onset of an incident. Recovery support functions include the following:

(1) Rebuilding infrastructure systems.

(2) Providing adequate accessible interim and long-term housing that meets the needs of all survivors.

(3) Revitalizing health systems (including behavioral health) and social and community services.

(4) Promoting economic development.

(5) Restoring natural and cultural resources.

b. Recovery is the effort to restore installation infrastructure to normal. Recovery often begins while response functions are still in progress. In addition, recovery activities often extend long after the initial incident response is complete. Short-term recovery actions seek to restore

essential services and ensure that the immediate needs of the impacted installation community are met. Longer-term recovery actions include fully restoring non-critical and critical operations, rebuilding destroyed property, and reconstituting other noncritical services. Short-term recovery ends and long-term recovery begins when the IC, UC, EOC, ROC, and other response organizations are no longer required.

c. All recovery standards must be consistent with existing OSHA guidelines, EPA regulations and NFPA standards. The main goal of recovery is mission reconstitution and restoration of essential operations.

d. Recovery efforts may quickly exhaust Region and installation EM capabilities and require assistance from CNIC, federal, state, local, other Service and private or host nation EM, public works (PW), environmental, and mass care-related agencies and departments. Special attention and planning must be focused on the fiscal and logistical impact of recovery efforts, especially those incidents requiring long-term displacement of the population, decontamination, restoration, and environmental remediation of affected areas.

3. Requirements. For recovery planning and operations, REGCOMs and installation COs will:

a. Execute accountability procedures per reference (ar) and Standard 12 - Personnel.

b. Activate the Recovery Working Group (RWG) early in the recovery phase.

c. Establish an EFAC.

d. Continue communication during recovery operations by providing pertinent information such as conveying impacts and analyses of the incident.

e. Establish plans and procedures for mass care of affected personnel.

4. Responsibilities

a. Region and installation EMOs should concentrate on the coordination and resource management between different recovery specialties, to include OSH, PW, environmental, medical, and mass care experts, rather than attempting to develop expertise in these specialty areas.

b. Installation EMOs should facilitate execution of the following short-term recovery tasks.

(1) Further restoration of MEF and CMF functionality.
(2) Restore installation utilities and support infrastructure to necessary levels to support operations.

(3) Restore tenant command functionality.

(4) Provide improved shelter and life-sustaining operations until long-term or permanent shelters are established.

(5) Develop long-term recovery and mitigation plans.

c. Installation EMOs should facilitate the execution of the following long-term recovery tasks:

(1) Fully restore all MEFs and CMF functionality.

(2) Fully restore installation utilities and support infrastructure.

(3) Commence moving personnel and families to permanent housing.

d. Recovery Working Group. Per reference (a), the installation CO will activate a RWG early in the recovery phase. Installations will pre-identify RWG members and incorporate group assignments within the installation EM Plan. The RWG is a task-organized working group focused on the evaluation, prioritization, and coordination of recovery requirements.

(1) RWG responsibilities:

(a) Meet at least annually to pre-determine recovery functions, roles and structures.

(b) Convene early in the recovery phase of large-scale incidents.

(2) RWG recovery priorities:

(a) Establish recovery priorities consistent with the installation mission.

(b) Consider operational mission priorities and re-establishment of the normal operating environment, including installation community support systems that include health and social services, housing, infrastructure, and natural resources.

(3) The RWG, with the technical direction of the installation EMO and the installation PW representative, conducts recovery planning at the installation level. The installation EM plan facilitates response and short-term recovery. The recovery plan provides detailed, incident-specific processes and procedures, including immediate restoration of transportation, communication capabilities, utility reconstruction, community reconstruction, site remediation, medical care (to include mental health for survivors and crisis intervention teams for responders), and other activities necessary for successful long-term recovery. Consistent with the NDRF, recovery plans should also incorporate measures for mitigation, resilience, and sustainability to build a more secure, resilient installation community.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Short-Term and Intermediate Recovery Actions. The NDRF defines short-term recovery as the phase that addresses the health and safety needs beyond rescue, the assessment of the scope of damages and needs, the restoration of basic infrastructure, and the mobilization of recovery organizations and resources. These recovery actions include restarting and restoring essential services for recovery decision-making. Short-term recovery actions seek to restore lifeline systems (e.g., power, communication, water, sewage, transportation) and meet the needs of individuals and the installation community (e.g., maintain the rule of law, provide crisis counseling). Intermediate recovery follows, which involves returning individuals, families, critical infrastructure, and essential services to a functional, if not pre-disaster, state. Such activities are often characterized by temporary actions that provide a bridge to permanent measures. Short-term and intermediate recovery actions will be discussed in the EM plan.

b. Long-Term Recovery Priorities. The NDRF defines long-term recovery as that which may continue for months or years and addresses complete redevelopment and revitalization of the impacted area. It includes rebuilding or relocating damaged or destroyed social, economic, natural, and man-made environments and a move to self-sufficiency, sustainability, and resilience. Due to the long-term nature of this phase, it should be conducted following a separately developed plan, which incorporates specific mitigation measures to minimize the potential impact of a similar incident in the future. This phase is considered complete when the installation's facilities and capabilities have been restored, as much as possible, to pre-incident levels. In some cases, HHQ may determine that some capabilities will not be restored to pre-incident levels. Long-term recovery priorities will be discussed in the EM plan.

c. Recovery Functions. Key recovery functions include the following:

(1) Emergency Public Information (EPI). The need for EPI does not end immediately after the response to an emergency has been terminated. There is a continued need to exchange information with the affected public during the full range of recovery. Regions and installations will continue communication during recovery operations by providing pertinent information such as conveying impacts and analyses of the incident. Additionally, installations and Regions will provide opportunities for stakeholders from the community to provide information on community impacts, lessons learned, and other relevant information supporting local, state, and federal agencies, the media, and members of the public.

(2) Damage Assessment. DATs, CERTs and installation PW personnel may conduct physical damage assessments and assist with response. Damage assessments and recovery efforts should be coordinated with the local community. A Region damage assessment capability and limited installation debris removal capabilities should be maintained or immediately available via contract. These capabilities should support short-term recovery efforts and initial damage assessments, resource projections, and recovery planning requirements.

(a) CMFs and essential operations should be assessed early in the assessment process to determine if the systems can be rapidly returned online. The damage assessment should not

only include critical and essential facilities for mission requirements, but other office, industrial and residential structures for Navy personnel, contractors, and supported family members.

(b) Post-disaster damage assessments serve several purposes. These include determining which facilities and structures are safe for occupants to re-enter and the requirements for populations expected to be displaced for extended periods. These factors will drive temporary and long-term housing requirements.

(3) Personal Safety. Safety during the recovery process is crucial to successful operations. Recovery personnel should be equipped with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) as determined by the incident commander with the advice of Region or installation OSH and environmental personnel. Because of the difficulty in performing recovery operations in PPE, the incident commander must plan for work-rest rotation of recovery personnel and the need to request additional resources required to sustain recovery operations. These efforts must be captured in a specific site safety plan.

(4) Emergency Assistance. Emergency assistance efforts help to ensure that immediate needs are met beyond the traditional mass care services provided at the local level. These efforts include:

(a) Support for evacuations to include transportation, routing, and shelter.

(b) Provision of aid and services for special needs populations.

(c) Services for household pets and service animals.

(d) Specialized shelters.

(e) Medical shelters.

(f) Non-conventional shelter management.

(g) Coordination of donations.

(h) Coordination of voluntary agencies.

(5) Emergency Family Assistance Center. The establishment and integration of an EFAC by a REGCOM or installation CO, with appropriate satellite locations dependent upon the dispersion, or concentration of personnel, is critical to short-term and long-term recovery of the community. EFACs provide a full spectrum of support in response to a crisis and are necessary when anticipated needs are beyond the capability of the agencies primarily tasked to provide immediate crisis intervention. Installation COs will ensure:

(a) Installation EM plans contain a written statement of policy that establishes and sustains an EFAC. Installation EM plans are to be updated annually to incorporate EFAC recommendations and lessons learned following exercises, and real-world events.

(b) EFAC providers are regularly trained on installation EFAC plans and procedures.

(c) EFAC operations are exercised annually as part of the installation's annual training plan.

(d) The EFAC Director designates a central location where relief supplies may be collected and distributed. This location also supports DoD personnel and family members to obtain disaster relief assistance, support, current information from leadership, and contingency services.

(e) The EFAC serves as a central point for timely and accurate information dissemination and integration of services addressing the needs of DoD personnel and family members. It should also provide current community recovery information, such as the locations of food, water, and gasoline. The EFAC has capabilities to assist family members in communicating with deployed personnel advising them on their health and safety. The EFAC also may need to establish a 24-hour information hotline or use the Navy's Emergency Control Center (ECC) phone line to disseminate information.

(6) Temporary Housing. The National Disaster Housing Strategy is a guide for determining adequate available housing resources for temporary housing and longer-term solutions. This type of assistance may be offered in the local area following a disaster. Installations should be prepared to facilitate this assistance if offered. Assistance should include:

(a) Financial assistance for rent.

(b) Financial assistance for repairs.

(c) Loan assistance.

(d) Financial assistance for replacement.

(e) Direct housing.
(f) Construction.

(g) Referral.

(h) Identification and provision of accessible housing.

(i) Access to other sources of housing assistance.

(7) Human Services. Federal human services programs help disaster survivors recover their non-housing losses, including replacement of destroyed personal property. It also assists them to obtain disaster loans, food stamps, crisis counseling, disaster unemployment assistance, case management, and other federal or state benefits. Installations should be prepared to facilitate this assistance if offered. Human services activities include:

(a) Crisis counseling.

(b) Case management.

(c) Other needs assistance.

(d) Veterans assistance.

(e) Disaster legal services.

(8) Personnel. Response to and recovery from an incident will be labor intensive. Incident commanders must ascertain the quantities and capabilities of healthcare, response and recovery personnel, and resources. Installation commanders will take the following actions:

(a) Execute accountability procedures per reference (ar) and Standard 12 - Personnel. Personnel that require access for post-incident actions in response and recovery should have appropriate credentials and access.

(b) Conduct sustainment planning to include maintaining food, water, power, heat, security, and shelter, as well as efforts to maintain public health and safety. Coordinate with local authorities to advise the community on actions to take to assure its protection, such as restriction of movement orders, closures of businesses and schools, cancellation of public gatherings, and establishment of no-entry zones or evacuation routes.

(c) Plan for the emotional and psychological impact on responders and recovery personnel. Recovery planning must include participation of mental health services as well as Critical Incident Stress Management experts in incidents with casualties or extreme personal property loss. As with the general population, these services need to be available and provided early in the course of the disaster. Some of the issues that will need to be addressed are continuing risk communication concerns and psychological support for first responders, installation and tenant command populations, people who live on base, and the local community. A residential advisory board, including local authorities and installation personnel, may need to be formed to address these concerns.

(9) Navy Medicine Support. The MTF is required per reference (w) to prepare EM plans that address the MTF's preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities, such as casualty decontamination procedures, procedures for managing self-referred patients, procedures for on-scene casualty triage, treatment, and transport (if provided), activation procedures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and associated region, state, and local pharmaceutical stockpiles, dispensing of medical counter-measures in response to an epidemic or radiological contingency, and pharmaceutical management procedures. Per reference (w), during recovery operations onboard a Navy installation, there are varieties of essential elements in which the MTF can expect to have a significant role, including:

(a) Mass casualty treatment, including personnel decontamination.

(b) Public health support, including public health and environmental assessments, disease and vector control, potable water testing, and support for maintaining public hygiene.

(c) Public health emergency risk communications and advisories.

(d) Mental health support.

(e) Fatality management.

(f) Military installations are authorized to serve as receipt, staging, and storage sites for SNS assets, and as closed points of dispensing. These sites are capable of dispensing state, local, tribal, and territorial SNS assets to their DoD population. The H199 and H200 assemblages provide a list of required equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals that must be maintained by the MTF. In the event of a CBRN incident, activities will utilize their cache of CBRN Pharmaceutical Countermeasures (CPCs) to support designated CAT 1 and 5 personnel. MTFs should develop an integrated CPC policy with their host installation and tenant commands with CAT 1 and 5 personnel. The policy should address planning for rapid distribution, current threat levels, preparedness activities, pre- and post-incident exposure, distribution plans, provisions for security and access, storage requirements, storage location, administration and handling of CPCs, and the recurring updates to their rosters of CAT 1 and 5 personnel.

(10) Health and Environmental Considerations. Long-term environmental remediation measures are much more complex, require coordination and cooperation with jurisdictional regulatory agencies, and may include federal and state health and environmental officials. The installation CO or incident commander will conduct a health and environmental assessment involving medical, environmental and industrial hygiene personnel, including the selection and establishment of acceptable re-occupancy standards, and providing assessment and documentation of such prior to Service personnel returning to work or residences in previously contaminated work areas.

(11) Decontamination and Disposal. Decontamination during recovery is a long-term, complex operation and must address resource management, safety, long-term health issues, environmental concerns, and effect on mission accomplishment. Short-term recovery planning should concentrate on temporary containment of contamination (including used decontamination equipment and solutions) and isolation of contaminated items and areas. Installation PW may assist with temporary containment. Decontamination of equipment, terrain or facilities contaminated due to terrorism incidents will not be carried out by Navy personnel. The Region environmental program managers will coordinate with the appropriate federal agencies, including, but not limited to the EPA, to effect decontamination and remediation of equipment or a contaminated site.

(12) Support Organizations. During recovery operations, assistance will be needed from various support organizations. These include tenant commands and local and national authorities. In addition to FFR services, the organizations integral to planning and participating in recovery operations include the chaplain, PAO, OSH, industrial hygiene, MTF, Navy/Marine Corps Relief Society, United Service Organizations, Navy League, and the American Red Cross (ARC). These organizations, most notably the ARC, are critical in carrying out the successful recovery of individuals and families.

(13) Construction and Reconstruction. The NAVFAC contingency engineering business line provides contingency contracting, exercise and crisis planning, natural disaster support, remote construction, and technical reach-back support for the Navy's expeditionary forces, CNIC, Fleet commanders, and CCDRs. The nature of contingency-based business requires timely contracting. Contingency engineers use Global Contingency Construction and Global Contingency Services contracts, as well as many local contracting vehicles. Contingency engineers also support installations with the use of CERTs. These teams consist of engineers, contract specialists, and construction support personnel who provide damage assessment, construction, and contract management in response to natural disasters and other contingencies. Installations will formally request CERT capability and assistance via the Region.

(14) Religious Ministries. A religious ministry team, made up of at least one chaplain and one Religious Program Specialist (RP), provides direct support to an installation. Chaplain or RP coverage can include:

(a) Counseling and timely debriefs for first responders and victims.

(b) Assistance with mass care, mortuary affairs, and the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO) actions per reference (an).

(c) Enhancing morale and attending to spiritual needs.

(d) Coordinating other support functions to provide around-the-clock counseling, standing-up a satellite chapel and conducting deck-plate ministry, and coordinating relief team volunteers (including military dependents) with local churches directly engaged in humanitarian missions to hard-hit areas.

(e) Providing liaison support connecting outside donating entities with a base-wide collection of relief supplies.

(f) Providing volunteers for emergency call centers (if activated).

(g) Serving as a force-multiplier, especially when volunteerism is necessary to aid mission success.

(h) Maintaining the pulse of command personnel and remaining prepared to offer expert advice to the Region or installation CO, and time-sensitive services to secure critical and emergent needs of personnel, and their families.

(15) Volunteer and Donations Management. Volunteer and Donations Management refers to those volunteer services and donated goods provided by unaffiliated volunteer services or individuals and donated goods which are unsolicited and for which no established resource requirements may exist. All Region and installation EM plans must establish procedures for organizing and coordinating the receipt of unsolicited goods or services in a manner that does not interfere with ongoing response and recovery efforts. Regions and installations should look primarily to those private or NGOs with established volunteer and donation management

experience to receive and ensure proper utilization of these goods and services. Acceptance and use of voluntary services should be per reference (at). Installations will establish a donations management process and options to direct donations to a suitable organization. A donations management process will include:

(a) Pre-determining a Volunteer Management Team. The team should consist of one or two persons trained and experienced in all aspects of donations management. Team members should possess an operational knowledge of all relevant aspects of donations coordination, including management of solicited and unsolicited funds, goods, and services from concerned citizens and private organizations following a catastrophic disaster situation.

(b) Approval from Region or installation legal counsel.

(16) Financial Reimbursement.

(a) Processes and procedures must be in place to ensure that resource providers are reimbursed in a timely manner. Financial functions are usually carried out at the CNIC or Region N8 level. Procedures must include mechanisms for collecting bills, validating costs against the scope of the work, ensuring that proper authorities are involved, and accessing reimbursement programs. Emergency cost accounting is a key functional area of operations centers during an emergency. The ROC or EOC Finance and Administration section will:

1. Develop and standardize procedures to rapidly develop and manage emergency cost account codes to track all emergency-related expenses, including those incurred under support agreements and support contracts.

2. Consolidate and forward cost estimates identified during the damage assessment process as directed.

3. Prepare for and request overarching emergency funding lines necessary to consolidate multiple emergency cost account codes that may be in use by multiple installations at the same time.

(b) The Region N8, in consultation with the CNIC N8, should develop and approve installation-level procedures for expediting fiscal decisions during emergencies consistent with established authorization levels and fiscal policy. This framework should provide for maximum flexibility to expediently request, receive, manage, and apply funds in a non-emergency environment, and in emergency situations to ensure the timely delivery of assistance. The administrative process will be documented through written procedures. The program should also be capable of capturing financial data for future cost recovery, identifying and accessing alternative funding sources, and managing budgeted and specially appropriated funds.

(17) Mass Care. A key component of recovery operations is the provision of mass care to displaced or affected populace, especially CAT 2 - 4 personnel. Mass care is primarily the responsibility of the FFR department along with Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR), with public affairs and EM as supporting departments. FFR is responsible to the installation CO for

producing SOPs and ensuring it is aligned with the installation EM plan. In general, EM programs are neither resourced nor have the personnel and qualifications to support long-term sheltering operations. Most programs plan for a very limited safe haven capability until other outside agencies (e.g., ARC or NGOs) can provide more formal and sustained mass care and other services. Installations will maximize local community assistance if provided.

(a) Mass care includes sheltering, feeding operations, emergency first aid, distribution of emergency items, and collecting and providing information on victims to family members. During the response, these safe haven locations may be used to provide shelter from the effects of a disaster. During recovery, these facilities may be used on a long-term basis to feed, care for, and provide temporary or interim housing to disaster victims whose homes have been severely damaged or destroyed, or who cannot return to their homes because of damage to or debris on roads and bridges. Mass care planning assumptions include:

1. A public, nonprofit, or private-sector organization may manage, and staff the Region or installation's mass care facilities if the appropriate plans and agreements are in place, and the resources are not organically available on the installation.

2. In most areas involving local population, the ARC will serve as the principal organization responsible for operating mass care facilities during disasters.

3. If ARC services are not available locally, other public or nonprofit organizations in the community will assume responsibility for operating mass care facilities. These organizations may include such agencies as the Salvation Army, churches, schools, or local service agencies.

4. Sufficient warning time will be available to ensure that mass care facilities are opened in time to provide shelter and other services for the people that have been evacuated.

5. Many evacuees will seek shelter with friends or relatives rather than go to an established mass care facility.

6. Where available, federal, state, local, other Service, and private, or host nation will be available to support mass care operations.

(b) Mass care response is coordinated through the actions of the mass care coordinator and the shelter manager. Region and installation EM plans must:

1. Pre-identify installation facilities (e.g., Navy Gateway Inns and Suites, Navy Lodges, gymnasiums, schools, churches, nonessential buildings) suitable of providing emergency or temporary shelter or safe haven.

2. Develop process and procedures for notifying persons and organizations identified in the mass care resource list about possible need for services and facilities.

3. Address the requirements for mass care of special need populations.

4. Address the requirements for the evacuation, shelter, feeding, and veterinary treatment for animals during disasters.

(c) The mass care coordinator must be ready to make recommendations to the installation CO on the number and locations of mass care facilities needed. Close contact must be maintained with the shelter manager in order to coordinate expected census numbers and resource needs.

STANDARD 8 - PLANNING

1. Overview

a. PPD - 8 established the NPG and NPS managed by FEMA. Key documents related to the NPS are the National Planning Frameworks and the Federal Interagency Operational Plans. To support NPS, FEMA has established a National Planning System to provide a unified approach and common terminology to plan for all threats and hazards and across all EM preparedness mission areas.

(1) The National Planning System provides a planning architecture that consists of three levels of planning:

(a) Strategic level. Sets the context and expectations for operational planning.

(b) Operational level. Provides the tasks and resources needed to execute the strategy.

(c) Tactical level. Describes how to apply resources in order to complete the operational tasks within a given timeframe.

(2) The National Planning System also provides a common planning process consisting of six steps:

(a) Form a collaborative planning team.

(b) Understand the situation.

(c) Determine goals and objectives.

(d) Plan development.

(e) Plan preparation, review, and approval.

(f) Plan implementation and maintenance.

b. CNIC, Regions and installations will develop and distribute EM plans to implement the EM program requirements of references (a) and (b). Planning is a primary component of preparedness and involves a considerable level of effort. Disasters or emergencies requiring activation of the ROC or EOC are infrequent. For this reason, the Navy EM program focuses on preparedness and planning as a means to increase installation resiliency. EM plans must be scalable, flexible, comprehensive, and interoperable with all other protection related functions and program plans. These include AT, F&ES, COOP, critical infrastructure protection (CIP), CBRN response, environmental protection and response, MA, medical, and physical security. Additionally, EM plans must be aligned with other applicable federal, state, tribal, local, other services, host nation, and private sector plans. Development of the EM plan requires the support

of the entire command. This manual is consistent with the strategic-level plan described in the National Planning System.

(1) Navy Region EM plans should be consistent with the operational-level plan described in the National Planning System and HHQ directives.

(2) Navy installation EM plans should be consistent with the tactical-level plan described in the National Planning System, HHQ directives and Region guidance.

(a) Navy installation EMOs will develop two types of objective-based plans. A deliberate plan (the installation EM plan) and an incident action plan (IAP). Deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future emergencies or recurring planned events (e.g., exercises, air shows, or Fleet week). Wider stakeholder participation can be obtained to refine the plan's details due to less restrictive time constraints.

(b) IAPs are developed from the onset of an emergency, and utilize the existing frameworks and processes provided in the EM plan to define specific actions required to control the developing crisis. IAPs will be developed for any incident requiring EOC activation. Completed IAPs are to be used as archival documents to capture actions taken during that activation period. Follow-on activation periods will also require updated IAPs.

c. Execution of the EM program is not possible without a detailed plan to guide the command staff and provide the implementing instructions used during all phases of EM. EM planning is an ongoing cycle of assessing, planning, equipping, training, exercising, and evaluating.

d. EM planning considers all identified threats and hazards with the potential to impact the command. Although the threats or hazards a command is vulnerable to may vary in effect, speed of onset, and probability of occurrence, the preparedness strategies to counter these threats and hazards are similar.

e. The Navy EM program is driven by program standards and capabilities that provide consistent implementation of the five preparedness mission areas and the allocation of EM resources. The EM plan is a tool that coordinates the efforts of internal and external stakeholders during the EM program cycle and all preparedness mission areas.

2. Objectives. The goal of the Navy EM program is preparedness per PPD-8. The Navy EM program is consistent with NIMS. Additional doctrine is delivered through references (a) and (b). Use of these references during EM plan development is required to ensure consistent compliance with NIMS and DoD requirements.

3. Requirements. Navy EM plans will encompass the following elements:

a. Establish the command's missions, requirements, and operational concepts for the five preparedness mission areas.

b. Assign responsibilities, functional roles, and lines of authority, to internal command staff,

tenant commands, and other EM stakeholders, to include other service or private sector organizations.

c. Synchronize EM program planning efforts with all protection-related programs including, but not limited to, AT, CBRN, CIP, COOP, environmental, F&ES, MA, medical, physical security, and safety, as discussed in Standard 11 - Risk Management. Additionally, EMOs must seek out opportunities to include other internal and external EM program stakeholders, in a cooperative manner to achieve greater unity of effort for EM efforts.

d. Updated annually to incorporate lessons learned identified during exercises, real-world events, and RAs.

e. RM activities that includes RAs, risk reduction planning, and RM program management, as discussed in Standard 11 - Risk Management per reference (r).

f. Mitigation planning that establishes interim and long-term actions to reduce or eliminate the risks of identified hazards and threats, as discussed in Standard 5 - Mitigation.

g. A detailed demographic study of all installation personnel that provides a community profile including a breakdown of military, dependent, Civil Service civilian employees, contractors, and foreign nationals; daytime, nighttime, and weekend populations; principal work locations; principal gathering locations; and locations and number of housing, barracks, or other lodging facilities.

h. Training requirements for all personnel with EM duties as discussed in Standard 13 - Training and as prescribed by HHQ guidance.

i. Exercise and evaluation requirements, as discussed in Standard 15 - Exercise and Evaluation and as prescribed by HHQ guidance.

j. Interagency coordination guidance as discussed in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

k. The installation’s group designation and EM program management requirements as discussed in Standard 1 - Program Management.

l. Response planning that establishes actions and assigns responsibilities for carrying out those actions as discussed in Standard 6 - Response. Specific response planning considerations include:

(1) Methods for defining, shaping, and sharing a COP with local civil and military partners.

(2) Methods for providing MWN and EPI before, during, and after an incident, as discussed in Standard 9 - Public Information and Warning.

(3) Automatic actions or delegated authorities (as applicable).

m. Enabling guidance and instructions for implementing the EM program's requirements of the region or installation COOP plan as discussed in Standard 16 - COOP per reference (m).

n. Evacuation management as discussed in Standard 6 - Response that includes:

(1) Local and remote safe havens.

(2) Use of civilian shelters.

(3) Support for persons with disabilities and their service animals that include procedures for communicating emergency information and evacuation support.

(4) General animal needs management to include pets and service animals, as applicable.

(5) Procedures for evacuation orders, travel, temporary orders, and personnel accountability.

(6) Mass care functional area guidance as discussed in Standard 7 - Recovery that includes:

(a) Establishing an EFAC.

(b) Mass feeding and bulk distribution.

(c) Crisis counseling, religious support, and medical support capabilities.

(7) SIP and lockdown functional area guidance, as discussed in Standard 6 - Response.

(8) Volunteer and donations management functional area guidance.

(9) Procedures for providing external response elements or other mutual aid resources access to the installation in an emergency.

(10) Recovery planning functional area guidance that discusses short-term and long-term priorities for restoration of essential services, critical infrastructure, MEFs, and all other installation services and functions.

(11) Communications functional area guidance, as discussed in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination, that includes available communication nodes, incident command posts, mobile command posts, local and region dispatch centers, joint intelligence centers and social media.

(12) CBRN preparedness planning guidance per reference (au) and Standard 17 - CBRN.

(13) DSCA functional area guidance per references (e), (x) and other DSCA related HHQ guidance.

(14) Region and installation EM plans will follow the approved CNIC EM plan templates for structure and format.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs will:

(1) Ensure the region Emergency Manager assembles a diverse planning team that represents all protection-related programs and other EM stakeholders.

(2) Provide the EM planning team with clear commander's guidance regarding intentions, priorities, and end-state of the EM plan.

(3) Oversee the command's effort and ensure appropriate RM activities are conducted including a command RA. Use the results of the RA to inform the EM planning team, about all threats and hazards impacting the command, when updating the EM plan.

(4) Ensures the Region EM Plan is reviewed by the Region EMWG prior to approval.

(5) Review and approve the Region EM plan annually.

(6) Conduct annual exercises to validate the effectiveness of the Region EM plan. Develop AARs, lessons learned, and CAPs to document and remediate EM plan deficiencies.

(7) Ensure Region EM plans are available to the supported CCMD, CNIC N37, and assigned installations.

b. Region Emergency Managers will:

(1) Assemble a diverse planning team that represents all protection-related programs and other region EM stakeholders.

(2) Oversee the Region EM planning team's application of the commander's guidance regarding intentions, priorities, and end-state of the EM plan.

(3) Ensure RA and AHTA information is received prior to developing the Region EM plan.

(4) Develop the Region EM plan from the "whole community" perspective per the National Planning System and provide a framework for executing the five preparedness mission areas. Utilize the following planning process referred to in the National Planning Process as applicable:

(a) Form a collaborative planning team. Region and installation EM planning teams should consist of a mix of EMWG members. Other stakeholders to consider are representatives

from activities located off the installation yet under the cognizance of the region commander and EM staff from local and state municipalities.

(b) Assess and understand risk. The EM planning team must review the results of the latest completed RA for the command. EM plans will be developed to deliver capabilities that protect the command's critical assets and infrastructure, personnel and MEFs, from all hazards and threats identified in the RA.

(c) Determine goals and objectives. Using the guidance provided by the REGCOM, the EM planning team must prioritize their overarching goals and develop attainable objectives that achieve these goals. An example of a prioritized goal might be: "Increase overall resiliency of the Region." An example of a good objective that helps achieve that goal is: "Decrease the number of power outages experienced at installations."

(d) Plan development. EM planning teams should develop and analyze COAs for achieving the goals and objectives. Installations have organic capabilities available, based upon their group rating discussed in reference (b) that provides a baseline for COA development. EM planning teams are limited in considering COAs where an organic capability is not available. Gaps in EM capabilities must be identified in the beginning of the planning process to allow for the development of alternative COAs such as enhanced COOP capabilities.

(e) Plan preparation, review, and approval.

1. After all necessary data is collected and analyzed, goals and objectives prioritized, and COAs developed, the EM planning team will draft a plan using the approved CNIC N37 format and templates located in the Appendix C virtual annex. The team can improve the plan after successive rounds of meetings to add additional tables, graphs, maps, and other content. The primary metric that an EM plan is judged against is its ability to be executed. EM plans that do not provide the command with factual and validated information and COAs for protecting the Region's critical assets, personnel, and MEFs, are not considered executable.

2. Once a final draft of the EM plan is written, the Region Emergency Manager will socialize the draft plan within the command for comment. The Region Emergency Manager will adjudicate all draft plan comments made by individuals within the command before completing the final draft. At this point, validating the draft plan with drills and exercises is recommended to ensure its executability. Any deficiencies noted during the drills and exercises should be corrected prior to finalizing the draft plan.

(f) Plan implementation and maintenance. Signed EM plans must be forwarded and circulated to all stakeholders within and outside the command including tenant commands.

(g) Plan validation, update, and revision. Parts of the EM plan are validated throughout the year during exercises and real-world events. The AARs and lessons learned produced from those events will be used to update the EM plan. Reference (a) requires the EM plan to be reviewed and updated annually. Reference (av) requires all Navy instructions to be reissued every ten years.

(5) Ensure post-incident and post-exercise AARs, lessons learned and CAPs are reviewed for region EM plan deficiencies. Submit deficiencies to the EMWG and region EM planning team for remediation and track to completion.

c. Installation COs will:

(1) Ensure the installation EMO assembles a diverse planning team that represents all protection-related programs and other EM stakeholders.

(2) Provide the EM planning team with clear commander's guidance regarding intentions, priorities, and end-state of the EM plan.

(3) Oversee the command's MA effort and ensure appropriate RM activities are conducted including a command RA. Use the results of the RA to inform the EM planning team about all threats and hazards impacting the command when updating the EM plan.

(4) Ensures the installation EM plan is reviewed by the installation EMWG prior to approval.

(5) Review and approve the installation EM plan annually.

(6) Conduct annual exercises to validate the effectiveness of the installation EM plan. Develop AARs, lessons learned, and CAPs to document and remediate EM plan deficiencies.

(7) Ensure the installation EM plan is available to the REGCOM.

d. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Assemble a diverse planning team that represents all protection-related programs and other EM stakeholders.

(2) Oversee the EM planning team's application of the commander's guidance regarding intentions, priorities, and end-state of the EM plan.

(3) Ensure RA and AHTA information is received prior to developing the EM plan.

(4) Develop the plan from the "whole community" perspective per the National Planning System and provide a framework for executing the five preparedness mission areas. Utilize the following planning process referred to in the National Planning Process as applicable:

(a) Form a collaborative planning team.

(b) Assess and understand risk as described in Standard 11 - Risk Management.

(c) Determine goals and objectives.

(d) Plan development.

(e) Plan preparation, review, and approval.

1. After all necessary data is collected and analyzed, goals and objectives prioritized, and COAs developed, the EM planning team will draft a plan using the approved CNIC N37 format and templates. The team can improve the plan after successive rounds of meetings to add additional tables, graphs, maps, and other content. The primary metric that an EM plan is judged against is its ability to be executed. EM plans that do not provide the command with factual and validated information and COAs for protecting the installation's critical assets, personnel, and MEFs, are not considered executable.

2. Once a final draft of the EM plan is written, the installation EMO will socialize the draft plan within the command for comment. The EMO will adjudicate all draft plan comments made by individuals within the command before completing the final draft. Any deficiencies noted during the drills and exercises should be corrected prior to finalizing the draft plan.

(f) Plan implementation and maintenance. Signed EM plans must be forwarded and circulated to all stakeholders within and outside the command including tenant commands.

(g) Plan validation, update, and revision. Parts of the EM plan are validated throughout the year during exercises and real-world events. The AARs and lessons learned produced from those events will be used to update the EM plan. Reference (a) requires the EM plan to be reviewed and updated annually. Reference (av) requires all Navy instructions to be reissued every ten years.

(5) Ensure post-incident and post-exercise AARs, lessons-learned and CAPs are reviewed for EM plan deficiencies. Submit deficiencies to the EMWG and installation EM planning team for remediation and track to completion.

5. Concept of Operations

a. The EM plan is an unclassified document and cites its legal basis, states its purpose, mission, requirements, goals, objectives, operational concepts, defines the plan development and maintenance processes, and acknowledges planning assumptions and limitations. The EM plan also:

(1) Identifies all threats and hazards that are known to have impacted the command or have been identified as having the potential to impact the command.

(2) Addresses any existing gaps between EM mitigation or response capability and the potential threats and hazards the command is vulnerable to.

(3) Provides the framework for executing the five preparedness mission areas.

(4) Assigns responsibilities to organizations and individuals.

(5) Establishes lines of authority and organizational relationships.

(6) Describes personnel, asset, and resource protection strategies.

(7) Describes the political, military, social, and geographic conditions in which the command operates.

(8) Identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available within the region or installation, or by agreement with other organizations.

(9) Describes additional assets, resources, facilities, or capabilities, available to the command through support agreements. The EM plan discusses assets, resources, facilities, or capabilities the command makes available to other organizations through mutual aid. Copies of all support agreements will be maintained with the EM plan and made readily available within the operations center.

b. Plans Versus Procedures

(1) Planners should keep the EM plan free of unnecessary detail and tailored to the Region or installation for which it addresses. Step-by-step instructions or checklists for an individual or group should be provided in annexes, appendices, or SOPs. These will be annexed to the EM plan or referenced externally as appropriate.

(2) The EM plan provides the framework and organizational tasking to execute the five preparedness mission areas. SOPs provide the means to translate organizational tasking into specific action-oriented checklists that are used during emergency response and recovery. During SOP development, installation EMOs must deconflict EM plan requirements with tenant command EAPs.

c. Strategic Guidance

(1) REGCOMs and installation COs must provide their EMOs clear guidance for emergency response and recovery end states based upon HHQ strategic guidance.

(2) Supporting the RM effort requires EMOs to coordinate their EM planning efforts with other protection-related programs and functions to ensure unity of effort within the command.

(3) The goal of strategic guidance and RM is an analysis of the gaps between the Region or installation EM requirements; the commander’s desired end-state, and the command’s ability to effectively achieve those requirements and end-states. These gaps must be prioritized based on a combination of the desired outcomes, risk assessments, and the impacts if not addressed.

d. Emergency Management Plan Format

(1) Region and installation EM plans have minimum requirements for the information they must contain. The challenge is to organize the content of the plan in a logical order that

promotes ease of use, increases the overall readability, and still maintains executability. The EM planning team should consider the following subjects when developing their plan:

(a) Organization. Do the separate sections of the EM plan allow users to rapidly find the information they need? Can separate sections be revised without forcing a substantial rewrite of the entire EM plan?

(b) Progression. Does information flow in a logical order? Can users understand the sequencing of the content and quickly scan for the required information?

(c) Consistency. Does each section of the EM plan use the same logical progression of elements, or do the users need to re-orient themselves in each new section?

(d) Adaptability. Is information in the EM plan useful in unanticipated situations?

(e) Interoperability. Does the EM plan format support or hinder coordination with other stakeholders, including state and local government? Are these challenges easily solved by reformatting the EM plan or by making a chart of the coordination relationships (i.e., a crosswalk)?

(2) Region and installation EM plans will follow a functional approach to organizing their common response and recovery actions and tasks. This method is based upon years of experience with the common effects of the hazards and threats impacting Regions and installations. It is designed to achieve maximum use of the organic capabilities assigned to Regions and installations, the common command structure, interoperable communications, and to comply with NIMS and other federal guidelines. Because the Region or installation's goal is a coordinated response, functional-based plans should follow from a basic plan that outlines the region or installation's overall emergency organization, concept of operations (CONOPS), and commander's guidance.

(3) EM plans developed using the functional approach avoid duplication of the planning effort for every hazard and task by dividing the EM plan into three levels of specificity consisting of a basic plan, ESF or FAA, and hazard-specific appendices (HSAs). At this time, commands have the option to use ESFs or FAAs. These are supplemented by other SOPs and guides necessary for implementation of the EM plan. This method allows commands to prioritize the hazards that pose the greatest risk to a Region or installation, by using HSAs.

(4) Basic plan content. This section of the EM plan typically referred to as the "front matter," provides an overview of the remaining plan, and discusses the Regions or installation's EM organization and policies. It identifies the role of the command's staff while applying the various common functions of EM during the five preparedness mission areas. The basic plan also cites the legal authority for emergency operations; defines the relationship and reporting requirements to HHQ; defines the scope of preparedness; summarizes the situations addressed by the EM plan; explains the general CONOPS; and assigns responsibilities for emergency planning and operations. The basic plan guides the development of the more operationally oriented annexes.

(a) Elements of the Basic Plan

1. Cover Letter. The cover letter is developed and signed by the REGCOM or installation CO designating the EM plan as an official Navy instruction. This official status provides the authority to, and responsibility for, the command's organizations to perform their required tasks per the EM plan. The cover letter also discusses the tasked organizations' responsibility to prepare, maintain, train to, and exercise organizational SOPs needed to comply with and execute the requirements of the EM plan.

2. Dated Title Page and Record of Changes. The title page should bear the date of publication; a record of changes can be a chart containing a number assigned to any change, a description of the change and the affected part of the EM plan, the date of the change, the date of its actual entry into the EM plan and the signature or initials of the person responsible. These items should be included so users of the EM plan can be certain that everyone is using the most recent version of the EM plan.

3. Record of Distribution. This is a list of individuals and organizations that receive a copy of the EM plan. A long record of distribution may be treated as a stand-alone annex and placed at the end of the EM plan or kept separate as an administrative document.

4. Table of Contents. A table of contents provides a quick topical overview of the EM plan. The table of contents should list all sections of the EM plan and be supported with clearly labeled tabs for each section.

5. Purpose. The first paragraph of the Purpose section must state the purpose of the instruction and why it is being issued, which is to indicate the issuance of policies, guidelines, procedures, and responsibilities. It is influenced by the REGCOM's or installation CO's EM end-state, objectives, and mission statement. The first portion of the purpose paragraph of a revised instruction states the purpose of the series and not of the revision. Provide a separate paragraph, or a subparagraph, summarizing the changes that prompted the revision. Only major changes to policy, procedures, responsibility assignments, reporting requirements, and like matters of substance are to be summarized. Changes made to improve readability, update background information, which do not affect the substance of the instruction, need not be summarized.

6. Assumptions. Assumptions are the accepted facts necessary to fill information gaps in the EM planning process. These should be included to show the limitations of the EM plan, allowing EM plan users to foresee that flexibility in its interpretation may be necessary. Assumptions must be declarative and unambiguous. It is valid to include even obvious assumptions such as certain common hazards will occur, individuals and organizations will execute their assigned responsibilities, assistance will be available when needed, and list other expected outcomes based upon the command's organic capabilities and additional protection related programs.

7. Exceptions. Exceptions are the scenarios and actions that are not covered by the plan. Reference (b) describes exclusions relevant to the Navy EM program.

8. Applicability. This section identifies the Region or installation organizations, jurisdictions and other stakeholders, to which the plan applies. It also covers the political, military, social situation, and geographical area challenges relevant to the plan.

9. CONOPS. The CONOPS section explains the Region or installation's overall approach to application of the five preparedness mission areas. Topics should include division of Navy, federal, state, local, private or host nation inter-jurisdictional responsibilities. The activation of the EM plan should address the ROC, or EOC activation levels and their implications. Also address the general sequence of actions before, during, and after an emergency event. The use of the ICS on scene and how mutual aid requests are supported should also be included. The CONOPS will discuss command and control, MWN, COOP elements, operational concepts, and direct the reader to their appropriate annex in the EM plan for complete details. The CONOPS section will be consistent with the installation group designation.

10. Responsibilities. This section lists the organizational and positional general requirements for supporting the EM program. Task-specific requirements or procedural details will be contained in the appropriate annex. EM plans assign responsibilities to organizations and individuals in the five preparedness mission areas.

11. All tasked organizations. This section will list all organizations that have been assigned tasking in the EM plan to perform the preparedness mission area functions. Instructions for how those tasked with requirements will be organized, trained, equipped, and communicated, must be discussed in this section. EM plans must be coordinated and aligned with all tasked organizations and other related program plans. To include key operational partners such as the BUMED, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), NAVSUP, NAVFAC and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

12. Administration. The overall approach to planning, including the assignment of planning responsibilities will be discussed in this section. Statements should focus on the planning process, participants in that process, and how development and revision of different content of the EM plan are to be coordinated and assigned. Provision should also be made for a regular cycle of validation, reviewing, and updating the EM plan.

13. Logistics. This section discusses general support requirements, and the availability of services and support for all types of emergencies, which include general policies for managing resources. Support agreements are referenced and authorities for policy on augmenting staff, along with relevant liability provisions are addressed. The section will also discuss general policies on keeping financial records, incident reporting and notification requirements, tracking resource needs, and tracking the source and use of resources.

14. Authorities and references. This section will list the legal authorities that provide the mandates to conduct the various functions of the EM program. The references section will list all other instructions and documents that instruct, guide, or influence the conduct of EM functions and actions.

(5) ESF Annexes. ESFs have proven to be an effective way to bundle and manage resources to deliver core capabilities and provide a structure for building, sustaining, and delivering the response core capabilities. ESFs are groups of organizations that work together to deliver core capabilities and support an effective response. ESFs are based on specific risks and requirements of the installation and no mandatory or direct linkage to the Federal ESFs is required. Commands have the option to develop and use either ESFs or FAAs.

(6) Functional Area Annexes. FAAs discuss required common functions of the EM program applicable to all Regions and installations. The FAA will describe how the EMO and other responsible persons or organizations will perform the functions associated with establishing and sustaining the EM program. EMOs may combine certain functions into a single FAA as appropriate. The majority of these functions are discussed in detail throughout the remaining Standards of this manual as indicated in Table 8-1. The EM plan will contain FAAs for the following community profile functional areas and provide appropriate guidance to the EMO and other responsible persons or organizations for their application and sustainment:

(a) Personnel categorization.

(b) EM program implementation.

(c) Risk management.

(d) Develop and maintain the installation EM plan.

(e) Coordinate preparedness activities.

(f) Promote individual preparedness.

(g) NIMS integration.

(h) Conduct NIMS compliant resource management.

(i) Coordinate local EM activities.

(j) COOP.

(k) Coordinate incident management activities.

(l) Coordinate development of tenant command EAPs.

(m) Coordinate development of mass care and evacuation plans.

(n) Coordinate pre-incident recovery planning.

(o) Training and certification.

(p) Exercise and evaluation.
(q) AARs, improvement plans, and CAPs.

(r) Coordinate implementation and completion of CAPs.

(s) Readiness reporting.

(t) Higher headquarters assessments.

(u) Budget requirements validation and submission.

(v) EM program accreditation.

(7) Hazard Specific Appendices. HSAs discuss how the Region or installation will respond to an identified hazard that threatens the command. The scope of an HSA is specific to a single hazard or threat. All known information regarding the hazard must be discussed in the HSA including likelihood of occurrence, vulnerable assets, and populations, limitations in responding to the hazard, regulatory compliance requirements, hazard mitigation efforts, and response strategies. HSAs assume that the scale of the response to the hazard is large enough to require an EOC activation and deployment of resources. HSAs should discuss the following elements:

(a) Sense. The CDO and other installation watch standers will use a wide array of tools available to them for hazard sensing such as weather radar, open source news, threat alerts, and continuously surveying their environment for possible hazards and threats. The ROC or EOC can be a source of information regarding potential hazards.

(b) Detect. Properly trained watchstanders detect the hazard when it presents itself and correctly identify it.

(c) Alert. After detecting a hazard or threat, watchstanders alert all first responders and senior command officials, and communicate the potential, or actual impacts.

(d) Activate. Key personnel activate all appropriate response assets and the EOC. The IMT reports to the EOC and conducts ICS compliant incident management tasks until the hazard is contained and recovery is complete.

(8) SOPs and Guides. SOPs and guides provide the detailed procedures that organizations or individuals need to perform assigned tasks. They may be attached to the EM plan or referenced as deemed appropriate.

	Community Profile	Personnel Categorization	EM Program Implementation	Risk Management	Develop / Maintai Installation EM Plan	Coordinate Preparedness Activities	Promote Individual Preparedness	Integrate NIMS	Coordinate Local EM Activities	COOP	Coordinate Incident Management Activities	Coordinate Tenant EAPs	Coordinate Evacuation & Mass Care Plans	Coordinate Pre-Incident Recovery	Review Training & Certification	Review Exercise & Evaluation Reports	Review AARs, Improvement Plans, & CAPs	Complete & Implement CAPs	Conduct Readiness Reporting	Support HHQ Assessments	Validate Budget Requirements	Obtain EM Program Accreditation	Unassigned
STD - 1 Program Management			X																			X	
STD - 2 Preparedness						X	X																
STD - 3 Prevention																							X
STD - 4 Protection																							X
STD - 5 Mitigation	X																						
STD - 6 Response											X		X										
STD - 7 Recovery														X									
STD - 8 Planning					X							X											
STD - 9 Public Information & Warning											X												
STD - 10 Operational Coordination							X		X		X	X											
STD - 11 Risk Management				X														X	X	X			
STD - 12 Personnel	X	X																					
STD - 13 Training															X								
STD - 14 Equipment & Sustainment																					X		
STD - 15 Exercise & Evaluation																X	X	X					
STD - 16 COOP										X													

Table 8-1. Functional Areas to Program Standards Matrix

e. Region Emergency Management Plans

(1) Regions provide and coordinate assistance for installations needing response and recovery resources, evacuation management, multi-jurisdictional communications, policy interpretation, and a wide array of other unforeseen issues that develop during a disaster. Regions control specific response and recovery assets such as EOD detachments, DATs, nuclear weapons RTFs, JTFs, and other unique capabilities needed for large scale response and recovery actions. Region EM plans must discuss these resources and capabilities, and provide details of their management, deployment, and sustainment.

(2) The Region EM plan provides the operational framework for development of all installation EM plans. Region and installation EM plans should function in a complementary fashion.

(3) The Region EM plan also facilitates coordination for federal, state, and host nation response assets; should have complementary response and recovery coordination back to these organizations; and discusses applicable components of the National Planning Frameworks. The Region EM plan must be NIMS compliant per reference (a).

(4) As the Region EM plan is maintained and updated, the CONOPS, as well as the associated preparedness mission area tasks, must be adopted and aligned with other supporting plans.

(5) The Region EM planning process is represented in Figure 8-1.



Figure 8-1. Navy Region EM Planning Process

f. Installation Emergency Management Plans

(1) Installations develop EM plans to prepare for emergencies resulting from identified hazards or threats. The primary focus of the EM plan is sustaining and protecting installation and tenant command MEFs, personnel, and critical assets. The installation achieves a high degree of preparedness after the EM program demonstrates the ability to perform all five preparedness mission areas utilizing their available organic and external resources.

(2) Large scale emergencies that exhaust the installation's organic resources will require external assistance to continue response and recovery operations. To facilitate the provision of external support, the installation EM plan must be compatible with their Region's EM plan, and other local level supporting plans.

(3) The installation EM plan is maintained and updated by the installation EMO with the assistance of the installation EM planning team as shown in Figure 8-2.

(4) The EM plan is one of many protection-related plans the installation uses to support their operations. As such, the installation EM plan has a direct impact on these supporting plans and programs. These supporting plans must be updated and modified to support the overarching EM CONOPS discussed in the EM plan and requires continuous coordination with the program managers that own the supporting plans.



Figure 8-2. Navy Installation EM Planning Process

g. Tenant Command Emergency Action Plans

(1) Per reference (a), tenant commands onboard DoD installations must designate an EM Coordinator responsible for the development of a tenant EAP. Tenants are required to support EM program objectives, activities, and operations, including participation in training, exercises, and supporting operations.

(2) Per reference (a), the CNO will implement procedures for units that are tenants on installations, or supported commanders on joint bases to fully participate in the respective EM program.

(3) Per reference (b), tenants do not require separate EM programs. Tenant commands will assign an EM Coordinator to participate in designated preparedness efforts under the Region and installation EM programs. The EM Coordinator will ensure the tenant EAP aligns with the installation EM plan.

(4) The tenant EAP focuses on efforts vital for protecting their assigned personnel including COOP planning to sustain and restore MEFs. Critical tasks addressed at the tenant command level include integration with Region or installation MWN, training, evacuation, lockdown and SIP planning, evacuation, safe haven, and integration with Region or installation EM plans.

(5) Reference (aw) requires federal agencies to implement procedures at each federal facility. This includes training employees in emergency procedures, determining a designated official of the primary occupant agency or a designee selected by mutual agreement of occupant agency officials. Designated officials are responsible for the development of tenant EAPs, referred to as Occupant Emergency Plans per the FMR, and the staffing and training of the occupant emergency organization.

(6) Reference (l) and OSHA standards require worksites to have an EAP that covers the designated actions employers and employees must take to ensure employee safety from all expected or likely hazards. Those designated actions must include procedures for SIP and evacuation.

(7) For most tenant commands the requirements for emergency planning can be satisfied with a simple tenant EAP containing the following elements:

(a) Assignment of responsibilities in the event of an emergency (e.g., emergency coordinator, fire marshal or warden).

(b) Procedures and telephone numbers for reporting fires and other emergencies.

(c) A communications plan that includes how each facility will be notified of emergencies that occur in its area, who in the facility will make the decision to evacuate or SIP, how employees in the facility will be notified, how employees away from the facility will be notified, and for SIP scenarios, who will give the “all clear” signal to return to work or make the decision to subsequently evacuate.

(d) A facility emergency evacuation plan that specifies an assembly point away from the building.

(e) A SIP plan, which includes designated areas for SIP and guidelines for employees to prepare their own emergency supply kits.

(f) A lockdown plan that includes guidelines for employees to secure themselves in any part of the building.

(g) Instructions for the preservation or removal of valuable or classified property, and materials, if applicable, and whether this can be accomplished without undue risk to personnel.

(h) Procedures for personnel who must remain at their posts after an initial evacuation to secure or operate critical equipment or perform essential duties.

(i) Procedures to account for personnel after an emergency evacuation has been completed, or after SIP, or lockdown has occurred.

(j) Points of contact that can provide additional information or explanation of emergency plan duties.

(k) Resources for employees to obtain additional emergency preparedness information, to include the family emergency preparedness guides.

(8) COs or OICs of tenant commands will identify a designated official for each facility, which may include one or more buildings or structures. Installation COs, tenant command COs or OICs will cooperate in the development, implementation, and maintenance of the tenant EAP. This will also include the establishment, staffing and training of an occupant emergency organization.

(9) Tenant command COs or OICs or designated officials will:

(a) Develop and maintain a tenant EAP containing the applicable elements listed in paragraph 8 above. Tenant commands will update existing EAPs to ensure compliance with these requirements. Tenant commands will provide verification of review in writing or updated EAPs to the installation EMO biennially for CONUS installations and annually for OCONUS installations. Large facilities or those with special considerations (e.g., child development centers or significant quantities of hazardous materials) will require more detailed EAPs. Tenant commands that routinely host afloat or deployable units or commands will ensure that plans for shore and afloat units are mutually supporting. Planning support is available from Region and installation EM programs.

(b) Provide appropriate EAP training to all employees.

(c) Maintain an occupant emergency organization.

1. At small facilities, the officer of the day and duty section may satisfy this requirement.

2. Large facilities or facilities with multiple agencies located in large buildings may require a sizable occupant emergency organization to support their EAP during normal

working hours. This organization may be independent of or integrated with the normal duty section requirements and may involve members from other agencies or tenants.

(d) Conduct drills according to the level of risk to the facility.

h. Supporting and Related Plans

(1) AT plan. The installation's AT plan describes site-specific AT measures based upon references (g), (s), and (ab). AT programs include tenets of counter-surveillance and counterintelligence, identify an appropriate organization as the focal point for the integration of local or host nation intelligence, counterintelligence, and criminal intelligence information into AT operations. The AT plan addresses the following key elements that have implications for the development and sustainment of the EM plan: threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, criticality assessment, and risk assessment.

(2) Navy MTF EM Plan. Per reference (w), all Navy MTFs are required to develop EM plans. These plans define the support the MTF can and will provide to host Navy installations during an all-hazards incident. For the majority of incidents, Navy MTFs respond similar to any tenant command and do not provide direct EM support to the Navy installation. However, during incidents with significant medical response components such as a mass casualty or pandemic response, the MTF support to the installation can be significant. Accordingly, MEMs work closely with their host installation EMOs in developing, updating, and exercising their EM response plans. Navy installation EMOs must include the MEM as a key member of the installation EMWG and when developing integrated EM training or updating installation EM response plans, or hazard/vulnerability assessments.

(3) Mass Casualty Plan. The mass casualty response plan is developed and maintained by the installation EMO in coordination with F&ES, the supporting MTF and any local civilian medical facilities responsible for receiving trauma patients from the installation. Close coordination between all key stakeholders is necessary to develop, implement and execute an effective mass casualty plan that incorporates all the capabilities and plans for the limitations of the supporting partners. Accordingly, installation mass casualty plans must be coordinated with AT plans and include procedures for rapid access onto the installation by off-base ambulances, during all FP Conditions (FPCONs). Mass casualty response planning must also provide for close coordination with supporting dispatch centers, to track the destination of all ambulances transporting patients off the installation. The planning should also include establishing any necessary agreements between the MTF and any supporting civilian patient reception facilities, to enhance patient administration cooperation and ensure a local Navy representative is able to request and receive updates on any Navy patients admitted for care. Additional information on mass casualty planning and response is found in Standard 6 - Response, Annex I - Mass Casualty Response.

(4) Fleet Emergency Sortie Operations. It is essential that installations coordinate with Fleet and operational units throughout the planning process. Installations that host Fleet units should consider the potential impact of an incident that could cause Fleet assets to sortie from the host installation in the EM plan.

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STANDARD 9 - PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

1. Overview

a. EPI and warning is a required capability which delivers actionable hazard-related information to the Navy community and incident management responders. EPI and warning use accessible and appropriate (culturally and linguistically) methods to effectively relay information regarding any imminent threat, the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.

b. Ensuring information on threats and hazards is available to Navy personnel, strategic partners, and the public is critical to all aspects of preparedness. EPI and warning capabilities also support the five preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Every effort should be made to ensure delivered information can be evaluated as accurate, reliable, actionable, and verifiable.

2. Objectives. The process of communicating hazard-related information must be timely and coordinated through standardized procedures. These procedures will inform the protected population and the public prior to, during, and after an emergency. It will provide instruction on the precautions necessary to protect themselves, their families, and their property. Since certain communities respond better to different types of media outreach, the method of communication with the public should be tailored to best meet the specific needs of the audience. In the event of an emergency, installations will ensure the timely communication of pertinent information to include incident impacts and analyses.

3. Requirements

a. EPI Plans. EPI plans will address the following if a significant event occurs:

(1) The role of crisis response.

(2) How to identify applicable audiences.

(3) The role of risk perception.

(4) How to develop relevant risk messages.

(5) Effective techniques for communicating complex risk information.

(6) Responding to media.

b. Mass Warning and Notification (MWN)

(1) Implementation. Per reference (a), implementation of MWN systems at all DoD installations is required. As technology has advanced and the proliferation of mobile communication devices expands, the ability to provide precise and timely warning and notification has increased beyond traditional work sites and locations. Such advances in technology will allow comprehensive threat response, reduce spread of misinformation, rapid

and pervasive reach, reduction in response time, improvement in Fleet and family member accountability through receipt and acknowledgement, and provide faster communication to selected team members or units at large.

(2) Construction Standards and Requirements. Mass notification is required in all new inhabited buildings, existing primary gathering buildings and billeting per references (u) and (v). Facilities include leased, temporary, expeditionary, and permanent structures on or outside of DoD installations.

(3) System Capabilities. MWN system capabilities consist of a multi-modal mix of visible signals, sounds or sirens, landline or wireless phone calls, smart phone applications, text messaging, computer-based notification, or other communication methods. Computer Desktop Notification System (CDNS) and Automated Telephone Notification System (ATNS) messaging will be capable of targeting individuals, distribution lists, dynamic queries, buildings, geographic zones, the installation, or the entire Region. Operators will have the ability to generate, send, and track alert receipt by device and targeted personnel.

(4) System Registration. All personnel operating ONE-Net and Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) workstations are automatically registered to receive CDNS notifications in the form of a desktop pop-up window on their computer workstation. Regions, installations, and tenant commands will ensure their assigned personnel register their emergency contact information with the self-service client application to receive ATNS notifications. Per reference (a), all DoD military and civilian personnel must ensure work and after-duty hours contact information (e.g., email addresses, personal cellular phone numbers or landline phone numbers) are entered into the system and regularly updated or verified every 90 days to remain current and accurate.

(5) MWN Operations. Region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs will develop capabilities to rapidly warn and notify protected personnel impacted by hazards or threats within their AOR. Outside the U.S., its territories and possessions, this task will include warning and notification of sponsored family members or CAT 2 personnel living off-base. These capabilities should integrate with the MWN systems employed by the local community (or host nation).

(a) Time Criteria. Per reference (a), Navy alert notifications have stringent timelines regardless of geographic region.

1. Alert notifications requiring immediate action must be issued within two minutes of incident notification and verification to the affected population.

2. Within ten minutes after initiation, MWN systems must reach a target audience of 90 percent of the protected population with specific protective action recommendations and 100 percent of assigned EM resources, including first responders, first receivers, and emergency responders.

3. Within one hour after initiation, all MWN systems should reach 100 percent of the protected population.

4. Procedures and processes should be designed to reduce the time required for notification to the shortest time possible to allow as much time to take required protective actions as possible.

5. Alert notifications (e.g., duress, field reporting) originating from personnel at off-installation facilities should strive to be initiated within two minutes of incident verification, after contact is made to local emergency response forces by dialing 9-1-1.

(6) Protected population. The protected population covered by an MWN system can be broken into primary and secondary populations.

(a) Primary Population. All DoD military, civilian, and contract support personnel whose normal place of duty is within a DoD facility are considered part of the primary population.

(b) Secondary Population. Family members associated with the primary population, guests, visitors, and other potentially impacted personnel are considered the secondary population.

(7) Continuous Warning Point (CWP) and MWN System Control. All installations must designate a CWP to receive and transmit emergency warning information to C3 nodes and personnel. MWN systems will be capable of being controlled from a primary location such as a ROC or EOC and one or more alternate locations (for example the alternate EOC or ROC, Region or installation dispatch center, Security, F&ES, and emergency services). Where technically feasible, MWN system capabilities (ATNS, CDNS, and GV/IV) will be integrated and controlled from a common interface or a common workstation. Alternate or remote capabilities must also be provided for use in the event the primary location is not available. The routine operation and maintenance of this system must be supported by local SOPs that clearly define the operational parameters, release authority, routine testing, and maintenance responsibilities for the MWN system. The CWP and MWN system control location will be designated by the Region or installation.

(8) Threat Examples. MWN systems will be used to disseminate applicable alerts and warnings about conditions such as impending threats and other emergencies.

(9) Training and Exercise. Recognition and proper response to MWN is a crucial component of public awareness training for all categories of personnel. MWN system capability will be routinely exercised as a part of all EM exercises. An effective warning also provides appropriate action based on prior public awareness training or specific appropriate action for the affected CAT 2 - 4 personnel and family members.

(10) OCONUS. OCONUS Region and installation EM programs also provide notification for those CAT 2 - 4 personnel residing off-base. Notification responsibility ultimately resides with the installation CO.

(11) Interoperability. MWN systems will comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, DoD, Joint, and DON policies. In many cases, and particularly for personnel located off Navy installations, local emergency response forces off the installation provide critical (and possibly the only) support to DoD personnel. MWN systems should integrate and seamlessly share information with local non-DoD emergency response forces to the maximum extent reasonable to enhance response times.

c. Emergency Call Taking

(1) Within the U.S. and its territories, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides overarching guidance for emergency call services as directed by the 911 Act. State and local governments, professional associations, NGOs, and industry have defined standards for meeting the FCC requirements and identified best practices in implementing solutions.

(2) Per reference (aa), the Navy must ensure that installation telephonic capabilities and base communications offices are resourced, prioritized, and aligned to support emergency telephone capabilities. These include, but are not limited to, the universal 911 telephone number, enhanced-911 (E-911), emergency call routing, location information from cellular emergency calls, and location information from Voice-over Internet Protocol emergency calls for U.S. locations. Reference (aa) provides additional information about emergency calls, dispatch, and E-911.

(3) E-911 is a telephone system consisting of a network, database and E-911 equipment that uses the single three-digit number "9-1-1" for reporting security, fire, medical, or other emergency situations to a central location, while automatically associating a physical address with the calling party's telephone number. Per reference (a), where technically feasible, all installations must have the availability of E-911 services with recording capability through either government-owned and -operated support or support from civilian authorities. DoD-owned E-911 systems must include the ability to receive:

(a) E-911 calls directly from landlines on the installation.

(b) E-911 calls from wireless service providers as technology matures.

(c) Accurate physical location data including, as appropriate, a National Emergency Number Association-compliant street address or latitude and longitude. Latitude and longitude must be included for those cases of wireless calls coming from remote areas that are not in the vicinity of a geospatial feature such as a building polygon, and street centerline.

d. Incident Reporting. Reference (y) establishes the overarching requirement to operate a Navy event notification system and provides specific guidance on report types, format, routing, and timeliness of report. This standard primarily deals with those reports which are related to

public safety divisions and managed by the network of operations centers which provide timely SA to commanders and civilian leadership to enable decision support.

(1) Operational Reports (OPREPs). Per reference (y), the affected installation will submit an OPREP-3 report where national-level interest might exist or is determined. The goal is to make initial voice reports within five minutes of an incident, with a message report submitted within 60 minutes of the incident. The initial report must not be delayed gathering additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available. Situation Reports (SITREPs) may be used as follow-on reports depending on the severity and scope of the emergency. ROCs may complete the OPREP-3 reporting for their installations as necessary. Other detailed instructions for OPREPs and SITREPs can be found in reference (y).

(2) Unit SITREPs. Once the incident has stabilized to the satisfaction of the national-level chain of command, the reporting Region may be authorized to terminate OPREP-3 reporting and shift to SITREP reporting procedures. Alternatively, a SITREP can be used to report on an incident which may not garner national attention, yet requires immediate SA as well as timeliness. The list of addressees may expand or contract as appropriate to the incident. Reference (y) provides details on the process of situation reporting. Individual commanders may also provide additional SITREP guidance to their respective subordinate commanders with added criteria or specific direction.

(3) Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). CNIC CCIR guidelines and reporting are outlined in reference (z). The commander categorizes the required information which corresponds to timeliness, method, and distribution of the corresponding reports. Urgent information requires an immediate phone call while less important information can be placed in a daily report. Most reports are sent via email to a tailored distribution list.

(4) Significant Event Reports (SERs). SERs contains information which is not time-critical, not relevant to the commander’s decision-making process, and not actionable by the commander. However, SERs contain information which is required to be reported to the chain of command, information which is important to individual staff members, can indicate trend or pattern, or is notable Navy information outside the Shore Enterprise. SERs are reported per the commander’s guidance but typically on a regularly scheduled basis such as a daily operations or status brief.

(5) Other Public Safety Reports. Per reference (i), Director of Fleet Readiness and Logistics (OPNAV N46), CNIC F&ES (N30) and CNIC N37 will develop and publish criteria and associated business rules for Navy F&ES significant event notifications. This criterion will be implemented into the Navy F&ES centralized information system for efficient notification of event occurrences. Additionally, references (i) and (l) delineate specific safety-related event reporting requirements.

4. Responsibilities

a. CNIC will:

(1) Provide specific voice notifications and CCIR reports to the CNIC Commander as outlined in reference (z).

(2) Conduct annual review and update of guidance on critical reporting to include defining CCIRs and SERs.

(3) Ensure CNIC Battle Watch Captain (BWC) and CNIC SEOC personnel are properly manned and trained on a 24/7 basis to follow all monitoring reporting guidance while utilizing all available tools.

(4) CNIC HQ BWC is responsible for reporting all CCIR categories and SERs to CNIC leadership as delineated in reference (z).

b. REGCOMs will:

(1) Provide oversight for usage and implementation of MWN system SOPs within their Region.

(2) Assign administrator or publisher privileges to appropriate installation personnel within their Region.

(3) Provide CCIR reports and SERs which originate from their AOR to the CNIC BWC by the best means possible.

(4) Ensure region CCIR and SER guidance is consistent with reference (z) and include region-specific reporting criteria per the prerogative of the commander. Often after an initial voice or C4I Suite report, the incident OPREP and subsequent OPREP updates serve as the primary source of incident information to minimize the reporting effort.

(5) Ensure ROC personnel e-mail and upload all required CCIRs on C4I Suite as directed in established C4I Suite reporting procedures. These can be found on the C4I Suite Region or installation site in the Navy Enterprise Document Library or in the virtual annex to this manual.

c. Installation COs will:

(1) Provide oversight for usage and implementation of MWN SOPs within their installation. This includes the advance preparation of distribution lists and message templates for use during crisis events to reduce notification timelines.

(2) Provide message release authority for the MWN system to include pre-approval authorities to ensure timely alert dissemination under all circumstances.

(3) Provide approval authority for primary administrator and publisher rights granted to tenants and users.

(4) Approve MWN system scenarios, alert messages, groups, protocols, and procedures.

(5) Ensure assigned operators have the necessary level of access and training to utilize MWN systems on their respective installations.

(6) Ensure timely and effectual notification of installation personnel during all-hazard events impacting assigned personnel, ships within local harbors/installations, aircraft, and installation structures.

(7) Conduct and document quarterly testing on all MWN systems.

(8) Develop alternative methods to notify personnel that cannot be notified using existing MWN system capabilities to include social media and other forms of notification.

(9) Make all reports to the ROC per references (y), (z), REGCOM guidance, and other applicable references specific to their AOR.

d. Public Affairs Officers (PAOs). Region and installation PAOs are responsible for developing EPI plans of sufficient detail to ensure the prompt and accurate dissemination of information to the public, and also:

(1) Establish requirements and procedures for providing emergency information at all levels up-to and including establishing or participating in a JIC. The operational and equipment requirements for Navy participation at the JIC should be specified.

(2) Determine information needs of, and develop notification lists for, state and local governments, and the media. Coordinate methods for exchanging information during an emergency is highly encouraged.

(3) Develop internal communication protocols for verifying and approving emergency information within operations centers should be developed and documented in close conjunction with the region and installation EMWGs.

5. Concept of Operations

a. EPI. The construction and delivery of EPI throughout an incident is critical in creating and maintaining a resilient, trusting, empowered, and cooperative installation community. It includes risk communication as well as all aspects of conventional public affairs. It is an interactive process not an event. The EPI process facilitates the exchange of information and perceptions among individuals, groups, or institutions. The EPI needs to be proactive and engaging with stakeholders about their issues and concerns in order to communicate the complexities and uncertainties of risk.

(1) EPI is a science-based approach for communicating effectively in high concern, time sensitive, controversial, or emotionally charged situations. Public Affairs has a key role in communicating risk to the public and other non-service members to include media and will be an

integral part of the EPI development process. The following terms are widely accepted throughout the media and the EM community and may be used to set specific response actions in motion:

(a) "Public information" refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official. It includes both general information, crisis, and emergency risk communication (CERC) activities. CERC incorporates the urgency of disaster communication with risk communication to influence behavior and adherence to directives.

(b) "Alert" refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide situational awareness (SA) about a potential or ongoing emergency that may require actions to protect life, health, and property. An alert does not necessarily require immediate actions to protect life, health, and property and is typically issued in connection with immediate danger.

(c) "Warning" refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide direction to the public or private sector about an ongoing emergency that is occurring or imminent. A warning requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property and is typically issued when there is a confirmed threat posing an immediate danger to the public.

(d) "Watch" indicates that conditions are favorable for a hazardous event. Stay alert.

(e) "Notification" refers to any process where DoD, federal, state, local, NGOs, or associates are informed of an emergency that may require a response from those notified.

(2) The potential severity of large-scale emergencies necessitates an effective EPI process with all stakeholders to include Navy personnel, their families, the surrounding civilian communities, other federal, state, local government agencies, public, and the media.

(3) EPI is based on the integration of complementary crisis communication and risk communication theories and techniques. Crisis communication is the ability to communicate effectively with other government agencies, the media, and the public by delivering accurate and timely information. This information is designed to inform, educate, and guide the public in any necessary response actions they need to take to protect themselves, their families, and their communities. A recommendation to SIP is an example of crisis communication.

(4) In concert with crisis communication, risk communication is an interactive process not an event. The risk communication process facilitates the exchange of information and opinion (real or perceived) among individuals, groups, or institutions. Risk communication needs to be proactive and engaging with stakeholders about their issues and concerns in order to communicate the complexities and uncertainties of risk. Risk communication should be the foundation of an effective EPI program. Many federal agencies are currently exercising and implementing EPI practices based on this combination of crisis and risk communication principles.

(5) EPI Principles. The EPI principles listed below are based on study and best practices. In some cases, these fundamental EPI principles run counter to many instinctive practices. It is human nature to wait until everything is known before releasing official information. The principles provided below attempt to balance these natural instincts with other known guidance. Officials must be aware that the public must have trust and confidence in the official messages and that the media is a primary means for communicating with the public. Given that background the following are the eight basic EPI principles.

(a) Be proactive. Communicate before, during, and after an emergency. The best time to plan for EPI and build working relationships with other government agencies, the media, and citizens is before the stress of a response. Plan for communicating with the potentially affected public through engagement to determine what information will be needed before, during, and after an emergency.

(b) In an emergency, take the high ground. The first messages are the most important. Get accurate messages out quickly. Keep it simple. Be consistent. Build trust and confidence by expressing empathy and caring, competence and expertise, honesty and openness, and commitment and dedication.

(c) Craft messages carefully. Follow your public information protocols to verify and approve messages then promptly release messages to the public. Stay on message. Avoid jargon. Be careful with risk comparisons. Recognize the information needs of your different audiences.

(d) Trust people to do the right thing and acknowledge uncertainty. Do not over-reassure. Tell the truth. Deal with rumors.

(e) Give the public things to do. Give people guidance on how they need to respond.

(f) Select the right spokespersons. Spokespersons must be trained and comfortable with their role. They need to be familiar and credible.

(g) Form positive relationships with the media. Recognize the media is a primary source of public information. Understand and meet their needs for information. Rehearse media engagements when possible.

(h) Be prepared to answer questions. Anticipate questions and prepare. Stay on message. Be honest and accurate. Follow-up with information you do not have currently. Do not improvise, speculate, or say “no comment.”

b. MWN. Ensuring accurate, reliable, and actionable information on threats and hazards is available to both DoD personnel and the public is critical to all aspects of preparedness, and highlights the need for public information and warning capabilities to support the five preparedness mission areas. Mass notification provides real-time information and instructions to personnel in buildings and surrounding areas onboard installations using intelligible voice communications along with visible signals, text, and graphics, tactile, or other communication

methods. Many Service Members and their family members are already part of one or more mass warning networks related to their city, county, school, or specified area. They receive texts, emails, or voice alerts.

(1) Purpose. The purpose of mass notification is to protect life by indicating the existence of an emergency and instructing people of the necessary and appropriate response and action.

(2) Implementation. MWN systems must be implemented using an enterprise-wide approach to enable timely dissemination of alerts and warnings that may impact the protected population, both on and off-DoD installations. Navy MWN systems will consist of an interoperating family of systems which collectively support warning protected personnel within stringent time periods.

(3) System Elements. Existing and future elements may include:

(a) ATNS. The ATNS is a notification system capable of providing voice and data messages to multiple receivers, telephones, cellular phones, e-mail, and text.

(b) CDNS. An administrative broadcast across computer networks that overrides current applications.

(c) Giant Voice (GV). Outdoor announcing system using exterior speakers.

(d) Interior Voice (IV). Interior speakers, public address, or alarms.

(e) GV and IV capability will consist of networked zones that allow assets within a shared building complex to make announcements or conduct drills without interfering with adjacent command activities. The networking of these small zones will allow higher-level commands to control the system within multiple zones simultaneously.

(f) MWN capabilities also contain several legacy multi-nodal visible signals, sounds or sirens, landlines or wireless phone calls, or other communication methods.

(4) Warning Terminology. Effective warnings should use standard terminology that clearly communicates the immediacy, reliability, severity, and scope of the hazard and of the appropriate basic response. Region and installation EM programs provide on-base public notification of incidents, including detailed information on shelter, SIP, safe haven, lockdown and evacuation recommendations or declarations. The terminology should be clearly understood by the targeted population so that predetermined actions can be taken.

c. Incident Reporting. As Regions and installations provide services around the clock on a world-wide basis, those commands and their representatives have a responsibility to provide timely SA reporting to headquarters regarding events involving installation operations. This reporting supports leadership decision-making as well as headquarters notification by Navy installations.

(1) For the purposes of incident reporting, the term Navy installation includes a Navy base, Navy-led Joint base, Navy-led Joint region, Navy Operational Support Centers (NOSCs) and recruiting centers under Navy leadership.

(2) Incident reporting and documentation procedures are standardized to ensure that SA is maintained, and that EM and response personnel have easy access to critical information.

(3) CCIRs outline elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate proper support to the Fleet, Fighter, and Family.

(a) The key to effective information management is the timely submission of CCIR reports, rapid evaluation of the report, and preparation of response to the CCIR, if required. Responses can come in any number of forms to include a phone call, e-mail, message, providing a service, or direct assistance.

(b) CCIRs are those key elements of information commanders require to support decisions they anticipate. CCIR spare the commander from receiving irrelevant information and at the same time protect subordinate headquarters from receiving excessive requests for information. As such, CCIRs are periodically adjusted to address changing or evolving information needs.

(c) During a specific incident or response to a hazard, the commander may designate situational CCIRs to gain additional information, data, or metrics to assist in decision making. Situational CCIRs were utilized during major hurricanes, the Japan tsunami, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and Zika and Ebola virus reporting.

(d) CCIR report format provides flexibility to accommodate the nature of the incident and maximize the capability of available Navy systems. A CCIR report can be made by voice, email, the C4I Suite, or delivered in person. The report can contain slide(s), graphic, spreadsheet, digital photo, video, related message, actual OPREP, SITREP, or link. The exact content should be conveyed by the best and timeliest method to provide SA to the commander. A CCIR report may also be unclassified or classified and sent via the appropriate system.

d. Reporting Caveat. Nothing within this standard is intended to override existing event-specific reporting procedures or requirements as directed by Navy component commanders, fleet commanders, health service support officials or reports relating to CBRN accident or incident response.

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STANDARD 10 - OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

1. Overview. Operational coordination is another preparedness capability that supports the five main preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. It also includes the operational center organization and systems that allows Region and installation commanders to execute EM.

2. Objectives. Operational coordination is vital to effective EM planning and execution. It is essential for Region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs to understand the relationships and agreements with outside agencies and organizations that will support and assist them in the execution of their responsibilities.

3. Requirements. Other requirements discussed throughout this manual may have application to operational coordination and were not repeated in this Standard.

a. Navy Regions will:

(1) Establish, maintain, and operate a ROC per Standard-14 of this manual.

(a) Designate a ROC manager, in writing by the REGCOM, responsible for the administration, maintenance, routine operations, and use of the ROC. The ROC manager and the Region Emergency Manager should not be the same individual.

(b) Ensure the ROC has a well-defined communications plan that may include the capability to communicate with civil authorities and SOPs for monitoring incident development.

(c) Designate and maintain an alternate ROC. The alternate ROC may be co-located with a Group 1 or Group 2 installation EOC, but must utilize an effective method for separating Region and installation tasks during emergency operations in order for both staffs to meet their responsibilities.

(2) Designate CAT 5 personnel in writing assigned to the Battle Watch Team (BWT) and CAT, and trained per CNIC guidance.

(3) Establish a 24/7 contact or warning point, typically the BWT, Region duty officer (RDO), or equivalent. Designated installations supporting USFFC will maintain a 24/7 AT watch officer, who may stand watch within the ROC or any other center which provides uninterrupted access to the appropriate communications and reporting capabilities specified by USFFC.

(4) Establish, maintain, and operate a RDC.

(5) Utilize the NIMS, ICS for all incident management activities.

b. Navy installations will:

(1) Establish, maintain, and operate an EOC per Standard - 14 of this manual. Space requirements for an EOC are contained in reference (az) and will be used for planning a command and control center. All OCONUS EOCs will meet the requirements for a Base Cluster Operations Center (BCOC) or Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) as set forth in reference (ba).

(a) The installation EOC is under the operational and administrative control of the EMO when activated. An EOC manager will be designated in writing and will be responsible for the administration, maintenance, and routine operations and use of the EOC. Onboard Group 1 and 2 installations, the EMO and the EOC manager should not be the same individual. Onboard Group 3 installations, the EMO will serve as the EOC manager.

(b) Ensure the EOC has a well-defined communications plan that may include the capability to communicate with civil authorities and SOPs for monitoring incident development.

(c) Designate and maintain an alternate EOC onboard Group 1 and 2 installations.

(2) Designate CAT 5 personnel in writing assigned to the IMT and trained per Standard - 13 of this manual.

(3) Utilize the NIMS, ICS for all incident management activities.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs will:

(1) Ensure the requirements discussed in Standard 10, paragraph 3a, above are fulfilled.

(2) Provide oversight of any operations center under their cognizance.

(3) Develop operable/interoperable communications across the CAT 5 functional areas.

b. Region Emergency Managers will:

(1) Coordinate the development of agreements supporting EM response and recovery operations on behalf of their Region or installation.

(2) Maintain listings of all EM-related support agreements and validate their Region's catalog of agreements annually.

(3) Ensure that all tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), equipment, training, personnel proficiency certifications, and exercises, promote interoperability with mutual aid partners.

c. Installation COs will:

(1) Ensure the requirements discussed in Standard 10, paragraph 3b, above are fulfilled.

(2) Develop or provide input to support agreements with federal, state, tribal, local, voluntary and NGOs, private industry, or host nation partners, including EM agencies, emergency services, and other response and recovery partners, based upon their RM assessments, per references (a), (b), (e), (g), (x), and (ax),

(3) Designate at least one site for potential establishment of a JIC.

(4) Develop operable/interoperable communications across the CAT 5 functional areas.

(5) Ensure the installation operates effectively with local EM and emergency response partners. Installations will utilize the ICS among all first responders, regardless of the location and size of the incident. Installations will collaborate and coordinate EM plans, processes, and procedures with local authorities.

d. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Coordinate the development of agreements supporting EM response and recovery operations on behalf of their installation. Agreements will be routed to the Region for approval through the Region Emergency Manager. All concerned parties must maintain a copy of the support agreement for its applicable duration. Per reference (a), support agreements will be reviewed and exercised annually.

(2) Maintain listings of all EM-related support agreements and integrate them into the EM plan. The EMO must validate offices of primary responsibility for EM-related support agreements and if the ability to meet the requirements of the support agreements cannot be met. These reviews will result in continuation, cancellation, or revision of the support agreement and other agreements supporting installation exercises.

5. Concept of Operations. Successful operational coordination requires the simultaneous management of multiple lines of effort, under stressful or dangerous conditions, for extended periods. The keys to its success are advanced planning, developing relationships, and training.

a. The Operations Center. Operations centers, such as ROCs and EOCs, represent the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support incident management activities normally takes place. The incident command post (ICP) located at or in the immediate vicinity of an incident site, although primarily focused on the tactical on-scene response, may perform an operations center-like function in smaller-scale incidents or during the initial phase of the response to larger more complex events. The ICPs will be linked to the installation EOC to ensure effective and efficient incident management.

(1) ROCs and EOCs may be organized and staffed in a variety of ways. For complex incidents, they will be staffed by personnel representing multiple commands or agencies and functional disciplines and a wide variety of resources. Regardless of the specific organizational structure used, operations centers should include the following core actions: coordination;

communications; resource dispatch and tracking; information collection; analysis; and dissemination. Core functions will be operations, planning, logistics, finance, and administration.

(2) The principal functions and responsibilities of operations centers typically include the following:

(a) Ensuring that each command or agency involved in incident management activities is providing appropriate SA and resource status information.

(b) Establishing priorities between incidents and area commands in concert with the incident commander involved and supporting operations center.

(c) Acquiring and allocating resources required by incident management personnel in concert with the tactical priorities established by the incident commander.

(d) Anticipating and identifying future resource requirements.

(e) Coordinating and resolving policy issues arising from the incident.

(f) Providing strategic coordination as required.

(3) Following incidents, operations centers may be responsible for ensuring that improvements in plans, procedures, communications, staffing, and other capabilities necessary for improved incident management are acted upon.

(4) Organization and Activation. ROCs and EOCs will be organized along ICS lines of organizational structure depicted notionally in Figure 10-1.

(a) Crisis Response Organization.

1. BWT and IMT. Personnel assigned to collect and disseminate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) information. The BWT is manned continuously at the Region and is capable of supporting routine or low intensity operations. As needed, the commander may augment the BWT with additional personnel and dedicated teams.



Figure 10-1. Notional ROC or EOC Organization Chart

2. Threat Working Group (TWG). The command will establish a TWG, comprised of key staff members, to meet at least quarterly to develop and refine threat and hazard assessments and to coordinate and disseminate threat or hazard warnings, reports, and summaries. The TWG may include personnel from senior leadership, AT, EM, FP, NCIS, Medical, Director of Facilities and Environment, and, if applicable, selected tenant commands. The TWG is responsible for analyzing and providing threat or hazard recommendations to the commander. In addition, the TWG may convene at the inception of an incident (without warning) or in advance of an incident (with warning) to make recommendations on further actions.

3. CAT. The CAT is a cross-functional team trained in crisis operations and can consist of representatives from appropriate HQs and Region N-Codes. The HQ representatives come from NAVFAC, BUMED, NCIS, NAVSUP, strategic partners, and other government agencies. The Crisis Action Team coordinates and directs crises response with subordinate, adjacent, or higher commands, and other government agencies. The CAT prepares incident briefs and submits, tracks, and responds to requests for support (RFS), requests for information (RFI), resource management, and incident-related tasks. Considerations to activate CAT:

a. Lower, adjacent, higher echelon command elevated activation level.

b. Complexity of issue requires single communications node.

c. Cross staffing is not possible within timeline requirements (speed to reaction).

d. Support efforts require a 24/7 presence.

e. Work tradeoffs between personnel leaving primary jobs to man the team.

4. Operational Planning Group (OPG). The OPG conducts both deliberate planning and crisis action planning. Deliberate planning normally is focused in advance of an incident or event. Crisis action planning is focused on an incident that is occurring or imminent. For all deliberate planning, the Director of Operations (or designated representative) will activate the OPG to conduct long-range operational or special event planning. Deliberate planning is the preferred method when sufficient time allows for total participation of all affected organizations. Development of the plan (e.g., coordination among stakeholders, reviews by CNIC and Region staffs, and subject matter expert review conferences) may require many months. Deliberate planning includes the development of standing plans (e.g., Region and installation EM and FP plans, CONPLANs, specific hazard response plans), and special event plans (e.g., ship commissioning and distinguished visitor visits). The OPG may recommend the standup of the CAT, when required.

(b) Tiered Activation Concept

1. The CNIC SEOC, ROCs, and EOCs will conduct operations using four activation levels. Each activation level is task-organized by the type of event which the CAT or IMT staff is addressing. Though an immediate increase from Activation Level 0 or 1 directly to Activation Level 4 may be warranted in many situations, some emergencies will require the capability for transitional activation moving steadily up or down the scale. Refer to Figure 10-2 Activation Level vs. Threat/Risk.

2. Each Region or installation EM program will implement these activation levels within their operations centers and include the appropriate level of detail to support this concept within their EM plans. Personnel assignments should be done via title or position (vice solely individual names) whenever possible and must include a chain of succession for both sustained operations and times when the primary individual is unavailable.

(c) Activation Levels

1. Activation Level 0 (Normal). Normal operations. No emergency incident exists sufficient to warrant activation of the operations center beyond the BWT. Activation Level Normal supports FPCON Normal and FPCON Alpha operations, which may include support of Region or installation EMWG meetings, REGCOM and installation CO briefings, and TWG meetings.

2. Activation Level 1 (Watch). Enhanced operations. No emergency incident exists sufficient to warrant activation of the operations center. Activation Level 1 supports FPCON Alpha and FPCON Bravo operations. There is no installation EM program requirement for a 24/7 watch officer during Activation Level 1.

a. Typical causes for initiation and sustainment of Activation Level 1 include terrorism threat warnings, criminal or terrorism surveillance activities, special event planning, hurricane season and winter storm preparations, and similar events.

b. Some Regions or installations may have additional AT program requirements based upon CCDR or Fleet Commander requirements. Regions maintain Activation Level 1.

3. Activation Level 2 (Special). Specialized operations. Unique emergency condition exists sufficient to warrant special activation of the operations center. Activation Level 2 supports up to FPCON Charlie operations and results in increased situational awareness. There is no EM Program requirement for a 24/7 watch officer during Activation Level 2. Activation Level 2 simply provides additional planning and coordination support, including some specialized assistance from members of the EM Team. Notification will be made to those members of the EM Team who need to take action as part of their everyday responsibilities. Some Regions and/or installations may have additional AT Program requirements based upon CCDR or Fleet Commander requirements. Typical causes for initiation and sustainment of Activation Level 2 include bomb threats, biological threat warning, preliminary laboratory results indicative of a potential biological incident (terrorism or natural causes), special events, active hurricane warnings/watches posted 96-48 hours prior to landfall, and similar events.

4. Activation Level 3 (Partial Activation). Limited operations. Potential or actual emergency conditions exist sufficient to warrant partial activation of the operations center. Activation Level 3 supports up to FPCON Charlie operations and results in 24/7 situational awareness with establishment of a defined operational period and associated reports. Primary operations center staff establish necessary organizational sections, establish communications with appropriate federal, state, local, other Service, and private or host nation counterparts, and determine the current status of all emergency response and recovery resources. Typical causes for initiation and sustainment of Activation Level 3 include any evacuation involving more than 10 percent of the population, natural or technological emergencies having limited or partial impact on some or all of a population (e.g., flooding, winter storms), landfall of tropical storms, expected landfall of hurricanes (within 24-36 hours), volcano warnings, moderate to large-scale structural fires involving multiple agencies, small-scale wildfires involving mutual aid support, small-scale hazardous materials spill or release involving mutual aid or environmental spill response, and national special security events.

5. Activation Level 4 (Full Activation). Full 24/7 operations. Potential or actual emergency conditions exist sufficient to warrant full activation of the operations center. Activation Level 4 supports up to FPCON Delta operations and results in 24/7 SA with establishment of a defined operational period and associated reports. Primary operations center staff and all assigned support personnel respond to the operations center. EOC staff establishes all organizational sections; establishes communications and initiates coordination with appropriate federal, state, local, other Service, and private or host nation counterparts; begins information management support including establishment or participation in a JIC; determines the current status of all emergency response and recovery resources; and initiates resource management support for subordinate operations centers and the UC or incident command. Typical causes for initiation and sustainment of Activation Level 4 include any evacuation involving more than 50 percent of the population, earthquake, tsunami warning, tornados, expected landfall of hurricanes (within 24 hours or less), overt terrorism incident, moderate to large-scale hazardous materials spill involving mutual aid or environmental spill response, all nuclear-related events, confirmed biological incident (terrorism or natural causes), and wide-scale power blackouts.



Figure 10-2. Activation Level vs. Threat/Risk

(5) Reporting

(a) Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). Refer to Standard 9 - Public Information and Warning regarding requirements for CCIR reporting.

(b) Essential Elements of Information (EEIs). EEIs are information requirements that are most critical or that would answer priority intelligence requirements. EEIs are a compilation of generic information goals for operations centers that have been established as a baseline information gathering reference.

(6) C4I Suite. The C4I Suite portal provides the primary means to perform all-hazards (natural and man-made) response and incident management throughout the Navy Shore Enterprise and sea-shore interface. C4I Suite is also used across the Marine Corps enterprise for coordination functions including Navy and Marine Corps cross-service communications. C4I Suite is comprised of standard information displays and management tools, tailored information, and display functions and a robust integrated GIS. These capabilities form the basis for communication, sharing of threat information, incident, and status reporting, and exercising the coordination needed to meet operational requirements.

b. Region Operations Center. The ROC is a Navy Region-level operations center that provides coordinated region resources to the affected installations. The ROC will provide a scalable C4ISR capability from early warning of an incident through Region or installation response and recovery. The functions of the ROC are to gain and maintain SA and understanding to enhance the REGCOM's decision-making and support installations during an incident that overwhelms their capabilities. In cases where multiple installations require resources, the REGCOM may establish strategic priorities and allocate limited region or installation resources among incident locations. The ROC effectively provides an integration point between civilian and military response personnel.

(1) Pre-incident activities include, but are not limited to, COP development and input, resource management coordination with federal, DoD, state, local, and private (or host nation) agencies and departments, and implementation of pre-cautionary and preventive measures to deter and detect incidents and mitigate potential effects. Refer to Standard 6 - Response, paragraph 3b(2), regarding the C4I Suite COP. Post-incident activities include, but are not limited to, resource management, strategic guidance and direction, and coordination and liaison with federal, DoD, state, local, other Service, and private (or host nation) response and recovery assets, while supporting subordinate installations during emergencies.

(2) The C4ISR capability should be appropriate to its strategic area of concern and the coordination requirements dictated by the size, scope, and complexity of the Region it supports. This C4ISR capability may include a robust communications suite (including secure means) suitable for senior staff working across agencies and with echelon one and two commands. The ROC contains a suite of command and control software for planning and managing incidents tiered to meet the expected demands of the region it supports.

(3) Mission. The mission of the ROC is to support the EOC during emergencies by providing strategic coordination, direction, and resource support. Unless otherwise directed by the supported operational commander, the ROC has no EM requirement to operate on a 24/7 basis or to be staffed during working hours. In most cases, however, it is staffed by a 24/7 BWT. The ROC is a dedicated space for contingency operations as well as associated preparedness and prevention activities. All Regions either directly owning or supporting installations with assigned, organic response capabilities will have the ability to support 24/7 operations for a limited duration during an emergency.

(a) Roles of ROCs parallel those of the EOC with a proportionately larger responsibility for public information activities in places where media is based. The ROC should also support response and recovery efforts among the installations it supports.

(b) The ROC staff will also support the region AT program as agreed upon at the Region level. Functions performed by ROC staff in support of the Region AT program may include:

1. Capturing of open source suspicious activities in a common database.

2. Development of a visual COP.

3. Issuance of alerts, warnings and notifications of impending threats based on latest available intelligence and incidents reported.

4. Issuance of orders to subordinate commands to implement:

a. FPCON change.

b. Random AT measures.

c. Additional FPCON measures.

d. Additional readiness or equipment support at designated locations.

e. Gate closures.

f. Installation closures.

(4) Operations. The Region is responsible for coordination and liaison with federal, state, local, other Service, and private or host nation response and recovery assets, within their geographic AOR. The Region may also delegate liaison authority to installations. The ROC staff executes operational control over all assigned Region assets and may reallocate those assets on its own volition to support affected installations during an emergency.

c. Emergency Operations Center. The installation EOC provides for coordination of information, resources, and immediate response and recovery activities to support incident

commanders and installation COs. The EOC supports the incident command during emergencies with resource management support, and the installation commander with a C4 capability in order to perform AT and FP measures for the installations. In addition, conduct EM operations with local services and other government agencies; maintain, sustain, and report readiness of the installation capabilities; execute resources among incident locations to recover degraded capabilities; provide operational support to the fleet; and be prepared to provide rapid response force in support of emergent requirements; DSCA missions and homeland support; and homeland defense missions.

(1) The EOC coordinates support for the incident commander or ICP in all functional areas and follow-on elements. The EOC supports all functional-area response and controls installation support elements so that tasking or requests from the incident site are supported and keeps HHQ informed. Each EOC will use the ICS organizational structure to provide a collaboration point and operations center for installation staff.

(2) Each installation should have an EOC appropriate to the size, scope, location, and requirements of the specific installation. The EOC is responsible for coordination and liaison with local, other Service, and private response and recovery assets. From the EOC, the installation CO exercises operational control of installation forces and allocates and prioritizes resources. A significant variety of capability, reflecting the assigned Required Operational Capability Level construct, exists among installation EOCs.

(3) Mission. The mission of the installation CO and EOC personnel is to support the incident commander or UC command during incidents by providing necessary resources, coordination, and assistance. An EOC has no requirement to operate on a 24/7 basis or to be staffed during working hours every day unless directed by the Fleet commander. If an EOC is a dedicated space, then it is a workspace dedicated to contingency operations as well as associated preparedness activities. Many EOCs are shared-use spaces, which support a daily function possibly unrelated to EM or AT, and which are configured to support contingency operations only when required. All installation EOCs supporting assigned organic response capabilities will have the ability to support 24/7 operations for a limited duration during an emergency.

(4) Operations. The IMT is responsible for coordination and liaison with local or private response and recovery assets adjoining or near the installation. As necessary, the installation CO may establish strategic and operational-level objectives when multiple incidents may compete for limited resources. As directed by the installation CO, the IMT executes operational control over all assigned installation assets and may reallocate those assets to support affected areas during an emergency. The EOC mission revolves around three priorities: coordination, resource management, and information management.

d. Other Operations Center Types

(1) A base cluster is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control. The base cluster commander is responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within the base cluster and for integrating defense plans of bases into a base cluster defense plan. The base cluster commander normally has tactical control of forces

assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of local base defense. A BCOC is a command and control facility that serves as the base cluster commander's focal point for defense and security of the base cluster.

(2) A BDOC is a command and control facility with responsibilities similar to a BCOC. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts. The installation CO establishes a BDOC to serve as the focal point for FP, security, and defense within the base boundary. The nature of the BDOC depends on the combination of forces involved and may include other Services, multi-national host nation, or other U.S. agencies, depending on the combination of forces located at each particular base. Multi-Service, other agency, host nation, or multi-national representation should be part of the BDOC when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly involved in the overall base defense effort or they are a major tenant organization to the base. Through the BDOC, the installation CO plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts and coordinates and integrates security operations with the BCOC as appropriate.

(a) The BDOC conducts 24-hour operations and its primary functions include but are not limited to the following:

1. Provide the command and control organization necessary to conduct coordinated base security operations.

2. Prepare plans to implement the installation CO's overall base defense guidance.

3. Plan and execute LE, AT, and physical security operations per published guidance.

4. Conduct an FP working group and a TWG.

5. Monitor the current status of assigned, attached, and tenant unit forces and resources and provide information to aid, allocate, and move forces and material to meet base defense requirements.

6. Identify and communicate any base defense shortfalls to the base cluster commander or joint security coordinator and Service or applicable functional component command.

7. Keep the installation CO informed of the current base security situation.

8. Ensure the participation of all units within the base perimeter in conducting active and passive security measures. Monitor and direct guard forces as necessary.

9. Assess potential conflicting interests and operational demands of base forces inherent when operating in multi-Service or multi-national environment.

10. Develop and execute a reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure proper security from standoff threats within base boundaries and coordinate with the area commander or base cluster commander for the area outside the base boundary.

11. Establish and maintain connectivity with higher-level staff (BCOC or joint security coordination center).

12. Prepare security-related operational reports as required; maintain a staff journal and display and file necessary items to record operational activities of the command.

13. When necessary, coordinate with the appropriate area commander or tenant commander to ensure that base security actions do not conflict with ongoing or planned combat or stability operations.

14. Plan and coordinate the base fire support plan.

15. Identify and share base emergency response and area damage control capabilities to include medical support, combat engineering, EOD, and firefighting.

16. Evaluate actions to identify operational deficiencies and develop methods to improve combined operational effectiveness to include coordinating training and exercising base security measures.

e. Incident Command. The response actions at the incident scene are led by the incident commander and governed by ICS principles. However, the NIMS and ICS do not allow for the potential that the echelon above the incident commander (the elected official in civilian jurisdictions) could have command authority over the incident commander. This chain of command does exist in the Navy, with the installation CO exercising authority over the incident commander. Therefore, NIMS and ICS guidelines may not always apply in terms of the authorities that an installation CO can wield. An example of this relationship is the possibility that the installation CO can direct changes in an incident commander's strategic objectives if it serves the greater good of the installation.

f. Incident Command System

(1) Installation EM plans must include processes for managing incidents that incorporate the following ICS principles: common terminology, modular or flexible organization and span of control.

(2) Management by Objectives. The incident commander is in charge of the incident site, and is responsible for all decisions to manage the incident, including tactical planning and execution. All levels of a growing ICS organization must have a clear understanding of the functional actions required to manage the incident. Management by objectives is an approach used to communicate functional actions throughout the entire ICS organization. It can be accomplished through the incident action planning process.

(3) Incident Action Planning Process

(a) Incident Action Plan (IAP). The ICS places considerable emphasis on developing effective IAPs. An IAP is an oral or written plan, produced by the incident commander, containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. An IAP includes the identification of operational resources and assignments and may include attachments that provide additional direction. Every incident must have a verbal or written IAP except for hazardous materials incidents, which require a written IAP. The IAPs include the measurable strategic operations to be achieved and are prepared around a timeframe called an operational period. The use of IAPs by incident commanders is highly encouraged when involving more than one jurisdiction, when more than one functional area is activated or if the incident extends beyond one operational period. IAPs will be required for each EOC activation period.

(b) Per the ICS, the on-scene commander and EOC may use the "Planning P" cycle shown in Figure 10-3 for incidents that will exceed one operational period. An operational period is the period of time scheduled for executing a given set of operational actions. The length of the operational period is established during the Command and Staff Meeting and is reviewed and adjusted throughout the life cycle of the incident. The timing required for this cycle may be confused with a standard eight-hour workday. It is possible and common for one operational period to contain two or more shift changes.



Figure 10-3. Incident Action Planning Process

g. Unified Command (UC). The UC is a management structure that brings together the incident commanders of all major organizations involved in the incident to coordinate an effective response. The UC links the organizations responding to the incident and provides a forum for these entities to make consensus decisions. Under the UC, the various jurisdictions or agencies and non-government responders may blend together throughout the operation to develop common strategy without relinquishing any agency's authority.

h. Center Management System. CMS operations and coordination centers are locations from which staff provide centralized and coordinated support to the incident command, on-scene personnel, and other coordination centers beyond what can be provided at the scene. These locations exist across the Nation and at all levels of government. The most common operations centers within the CMS for Regions and installations are the ROC and the EOC. These Navy centers provide centralized and coordinated multi-agency support to tactical incident management.

i. Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Groups and Systems. MAC Groups typically consist of agency administrators, executives, or their designees. A MAC Group acts as a policy-level body during incidents, supporting resource prioritization and allocation, and enabling decision making among elected and appointed officials. In some cases, staff in EOCs or other operations centers may provide support to a MAC Group. The primary functions of MAC systems are to support incident management policies and priorities, facilitate logistics support and resource tracking, inform resource allocation decisions using incident management priorities, coordinate incident related information, and coordinate inter-agency and inter-governmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies.

j. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The EMAC coordinates MAAs and partnerships between states. The EMAC may be used for the sharing of any response or recovery capability a member state has that may be shared with another member state. The entry point into the EMAC for Region and installation EM programs is through the state EM agency’s designated contact. The EMAC is not for the coordination, deployment and utilization of military equipment or personnel.

k. Communications Planning

(1) Well-planned, fully coordinated, interoperable, timely, and accurate communication that takes place consistently throughout the EM process can help to ensure effective planning, mitigation, response, and recovery. This focus applies to communication between and among responders as well as communication with the base populace.

(2) While communications planning in most organizations is an N6 function, EM also plays a role in the process given its equipment capabilities, its big picture view of the installation or Region, and its command and control mission. As general guidance, a communications plan should address:

(a) Communications paths available.

(b) Purpose of information paths, network, or "nets," (e.g., message traffic, voice communications, data tie, command conference).

(c) Prioritizations of each network given multiple possible available paths (required for resiliency).

(3) ICS Form 205. As part of the IAP process, an ICS 205 Communications Plan form should be generated. Traditionally, this form focuses on radio networks and planning. As the daily use of Region and installation radio networks is well understood, much of this planning is readily available with responder organizations already having a good understanding of their primary, tactical and back-up networks. Expansion of this system in an emergency can be coordinated by the EOC with additional ELMR networks ("zones" and "talk groups") being set up using existing or additional ELMR radios and documented via the ICS 205 Form. Although the ICS 205 Form can be leveraged for more than just radio planning, the process is a bit cumbersome and is by design, incident-specific, thus it is recommended that the larger and more permanent communications planning effort be documented in some sort of separate plan within each Region.

l. Joint Information Systems. Public information, education and communications plans help ensure public safety information is coordinated and communicated in a timely and accurate manner. JISs consist of the processes, procedures, and systems to enable this communication to the public, responders, media, and other stakeholders. Public information processes are coordinated before an incident and include the plans, protocols, procedures, and structures used to provide public information.

m. Joint Information Center (JIC). The JIC is a central location that facilitates operation of the JIS. JICs may be established at incident sites or as components of an operations centers. When activated, the JIC becomes the central hub of public information and public affairs to include the standard functions of press releases, media inquiries, media availabilities (e.g., press statements, interviews, press conferences), countering false information, and EPI. EPI is an ongoing process designed to engage and inform personnel potentially affected by an emergency.

n. Navy 9-1-1 Dispatch. Per reference (aa), Navy dispatch centers provide tactical level operations support for first responders. Dispatch centers are identified separately from ROCs and EOCs in reference (b), but should be co-located with these operations centers whenever possible.

(1) Navy dispatch centers will provide emergency and non-emergency call-taking and fire and intrusion detection system alarm monitoring. Dispatch will also provide CAT 5 personnel support in the form of responder reach-back capabilities during emergencies and notification of an emergency to the receiving MTF or hospital.

(2) The Region Emergency Manager will assume operational and administrative control of the RDC when assigned. A Dispatch Manager will be assigned in writing, trained, and certified as appropriate and report directly to the Region Emergency Manager.

(3) A local dispatch center (LDC) will be established and operated at all installations when dispatch services are not provided by an RDC. The installation EMO will assume operational and administrative control of the LDC when assigned. A Dispatch Manager will be assigned in writing, trained, and certified as appropriate and report directly to the EMO.

o. Base Support Installations (BSI) and Incident Support Bases (ISB). BSIs and ISBs are related but independent aspects of civil-military coordination.

(1) A BSI is designated military installation of any Service or defense agency that provides resource support to a DoD civil support response effort. BSIs are assigned as such by NORTHCOM or U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). An installation may be selected as a BSI because of its proximity to the incident site and major transportation nodes; its ability to function as a primary logistics hub; or its ability to provide life support services to include billeting, food service, fuel, contingency, contracting, medical support, and FP. In an effort to provide BSI support with only critical specialized capabilities, the Navy will maximize use of existing capabilities, installations, and infrastructure in the vicinity of the domestic operational area as delineated within reference (e).

(2) An ISB is a temporary federal location for positioning resources to be assigned or transferred to a state staging area or a local point of distribution. The ISB is staffed and manned by FEMA region personnel. FEMA requests the use of a DoD installation as an ISB through the Defense Coordinating Element. The primary functions of an ISB are the receipt and follow-on distribution of critical lifesaving and life sustaining commodities to disaster survivors. Support provided to civil authorities will be reimbursable and will be funded per applicable laws, DoD directives and existing interagency agreements, unless otherwise directed.

(3) BSI and ISB Selection. Regions will not pre-designate BSIs or ISBs or enter into agreements that automatically commit certain installations for BSI or ISB duties. Consideration of any installation for BSI or ISB duties will be situation dependent and primary consideration will be given to preserving military mission effectiveness. However, this does not preclude the Region or installation EM programs from providing capability information to DoD, DHS or FEMA for planning purposes. The REGCOM, through the region DSCA coordinator, may nominate a BSI or ISB to assist DoD or federal response and recovery operations. Installations directly affected by the disaster will not be considered for designation as an ISB or BSI except in extraordinary circumstances. Installations selected as BSIs or ISBs are expected to continue military mission operations in addition those imposed by the BSI or ISB mission. Installation COs should be prepared to request personnel, materiel, and equipment augmentation from the REGCOM. CNIC assists USFFC in coordinating BSI or ISB requests with CONUS Navy Regions.

(4) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI). JRSOI is the critical link between deployment and employment of response forces in the domestic operational area. Key to JRSOI is the reception of resources and subsequent staging at the BSI or ISB. The installation designated as an ISB or BSI is not responsible for JRSOI of arriving forces. JRSOI is executed in coordination with the deploying force, usually a JTF. The installation supports the

JTF commander per the mission orders received. The deploying force will utilize organic assets when possible to assist and expedite reception and staging operations. Depending on the size and scope of the deploying response force the BSI or ISB may require additional equipment and personnel with specialized capabilities to conduct JRSOI. Installations must identify any shortfalls in equipment, personnel, or other resources through the region.

p. Support Agreements. Support agreements are written arrangements without the legal ramifications of a contract between two or more entities, public and private, to render human or materiel resources or services when resources of one party are not adequate to meet the needs of an emergency. These support agreements may include MOUs, MOAs, MAAs, inter-service support agreements, SOFAs, and pre-incident contracts. These agreements should outline cooperative measures where Navy CAT 5 personnel may assist the civilian community in response to and recovery from natural and man-made emergencies. Region and installation legal counsel assists in the preparations and performs a legal review of all support agreements before execution.

(1) Support Agreement Limitations. Response actions taken in support of approved, written agreements do not involve the application of the immediate response rule under DSCA as detailed in reference (e). Therefore, support agreements will not commit or obligate operational forces under the authority of the Fleet commander or equivalent command to any response actions without specific written permission to do so by the Fleet commander (or equivalent operational commander) and CNIC. All overseas locations must go through the local Office of the General Counsel prior to leaving the installation or region to coordinate their efforts with the appropriate DOS officials.

(2) Validation. It is incumbent on the Region to verify the validity of each support agreement and to establish appropriate contingency plans if the supporting agency does not have an effective business continuity plan. The Region also must have knowledge of the mutual aid agency's fulfillment priorities in relation to each installation and Region's needs in the event of resource, supply, and manpower shortages.

(3) Templates. Agreement templates are available through the region Support Agreement Manager (RSAM). All agreements will be prepared and processed per reference (ax) and region-specific support agreement instructions. The RSAM can provide assistance with agreements in general and the installation or Region JAG office should perform a legal review of all agreements before execution.

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STANDARD 11 - RISK MANAGEMENT

1. Overview. RM, per reference (r), involves the application of a standardized process to identify, assess, and manage risk to enable decision making that balances risk and cost with assuring the mission. RM allows the commander to decide how best to employ resources to reduce risk.

2. Objectives. The goal of the Navy EM and RM process is to identify and implement a standardized method for identifying and managing risk to assets that support the execution of Navy missions, essential functions, and capabilities Navy-wide. RM, as it is discussed in this standard, should not be confused with operational risk management (ORM). ORM methods are applied during the conduct of military operations and are focused on improving safety for personnel engaged in those operations. RM is focused on identifying and reducing existential risks to installation MEFs and METs, CMFs and critical assets.

3. Requirements

a. Regions will: Annually assess and identify risk to region MEFs and METs, critical assets and supporting infrastructure, per references (g) and (r).

b. Installations will:

(1) Annually assess and identify risk to installation MEFs and METs, critical assets, and supporting infrastructure per references (g) and (r).

(2) Ensure coordination, synchronization, and integration of RM processes into individual protection-related programs per reference (r).

(3) Tenant commands onboard Navy installations must be included in the RM process. Where the Navy is the Service or base operating support (BOS) integrator at an installation or cooperative security location with multiple Services as tenants, all other Service and agency tenants must also be included in the host installation's RM processes.

c. Tenant commands will:

(1) Identify the critical infrastructure supporting their operations and mission execution.

(2) Navy commands with stand-alone facilities not located onboard a Navy installation will conduct RM activities as part of their annual self-assessment, per references (g) and (r).

(3) Navy tenants onboard standalone facilities will coordinate with and support the host facility's RM activities.

(4) Under the joint basing concept, all supported tenants will follow the supporting installation's RM processes.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs will:

(1) Implement the following key activities:

(a) Ensure the integration of scenarios for MEF and MET protection related plans are incorporated into annual exercises.

(b) Develop and conduct annual program reviews for the Region and subordinate installations.

(c) Provide subordinate installations with appropriate policy, advocacy, and oversight, to ensure successful execution of RM requirements per reference (r).

(d) Ensure installations synchronize plans for COOP and emergency response with their tenant commands.

(e) Develop supporting instructions, procedures, and plans, to implement the guidance and policies discussed in this standard.

(2) Ensure the requirements discussed in paragraph 3 are fulfilled.

b. Installation COs will:

(1) Coordinate plans for COOP and emergency response with tenant commands.

(2) Ensure the requirements discussed in paragraph 3 are fulfilled.

5. Concept of Operations. The RM process assesses hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities to installation MEFs and METs, the CMFs where they are conducted, and critical assets. After risk is assessed, mission owners must determine what mitigation measures are needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level. This mission-based approach allows alignment and prioritization of protection efforts across protection-related programs. The Navy RM process is complex and is why this information is provided in an 'Overview' section for familiarization, and an 'Expanded' section for RM practitioners.

a. RM Process Overview. The Navy RM process is depicted in Figure 11-1 and an overview of each step is discussed below.

Figure 11-1. Navy Risk Management Process

(1) Risk Assessment (RA). Conducting an RA involves the collection and evaluation of information needed to determine the overall risk posture to missions and associated assets. The RA fuses the processes and capabilities of various protection related programs into one unified effort. The assessments discussed in Standard 8 - Planning support the development of the EM plan. The Navy RA process is depicted in Figure 11-2 with a discussion of each of its steps.



Figure 11-2. Navy Risk Assessment Process

(a) Criticality Assessment (CA). The CA involves: identifying MEFs and METs; the mission commander's intent; the assets required to conduct the MEF or MET; and ranking the assets in order of criticality based upon the anticipated impact to MEFs or METs should the asset become degraded or destroyed. Assets are people, physical entities (e.g., ships, facilities, network servers), and information.

(b) All-Hazard Threat Assessment (AHTA). The AHTA is used to identify a comprehensive list of threats and hazards and the likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat or hazard. The AHTA process is supported by a working group and conducted annually, or more frequently as the threat and hazard environment changes

(c) Vulnerability Assessment (VA). A VA examines salient features of a command's systems, assets, applications, and interdependencies, to identify potential susceptibilities to the threats or hazards identified during the AHTA.

(d) Risk rating. A risk rating is a quantifiable value produced by combining the values derived from the CA, AHTA, and VA. After the CA, AHTA, and VA data is entered into the approved system, a risk rating value is automatically calculated for each critical asset, threat or hazard and vulnerability data pairing. Developing risk ratings provides the working group with a prioritized list of critical assets to support their risk planning efforts. The risk rating formula:

$$\text{Risk Rating} = \sqrt[3]{\text{CA x AHTA x VA}}$$

(2) Risk Planning. A coordinated response to the risk information developed during the RA is required to reduce that risk to an acceptable level. This effort is supported by the working group, mission, and asset owners, HHQ, and other mission stakeholders; it is a recurring cycle requiring continuous management and command oversight. Risk planning involves the following:

(a) Risk reduction planning. Commanders must implement effective and efficient risk reduction COAs that involve efforts to implement risk remediation measures before an event occurs or after receipt of a warning of an impending event that could adversely impact missions and assets, as well as mitigation measures that are implemented after an event has occurred. The Navy risk reduction planning process is depicted in Figure 11-3 and involves the following steps:



Figure 11-3. Navy Risk Reduction Planning Cycle

1. Risk Reduction Plan (RRPs). RRPs are developed to assist commanders with decision making and to document the identified risk. Proposed risk reduction COAs are documented in the RRP or other approved plan.

a. Capability assessment. The capabilities required to reduce the consequence of a specific threat or hazard to a specific asset, function, mission, or the installation as a whole, must be compared to the organic, shared, or external capabilities that exist and are available for use. The capability assessment is used in the development of COAs for the RRP or other approved plan.

b. Cost benefit analysis. The cost of various risk mitigation COAs must be compared and contrasted against the anticipated benefits of the COA to determine the best application of limited resources.

c. COA analysis. Once all proposed COAs and costs are known, commanders must decide on the most effective and economical approach to reducing risk. In some cases, multiple COAs are incorporated into the associated and now completed RRP or other approved plan.

2. Develop the corrective action plan (CAP). The CAP is the over-arching plan that brings together the various RRPs, or other approved plans, and associated COAs into a commanding officer prioritized plan. The CAP must contain the details of each COA required to remediate identified risks; including, personnel, assets, threats, and hazards, timeframe for implementation, resource requirements, and additional information concerning the commanding officer's risk reduction decision. The CAP will contain metrics for measuring success and timeline milestones for driving remediation actions. The commanding officer has three options to address identified risk:

a. Acknowledge risk. When appropriate, commanders may choose to acknowledge risk if the impact of loss or the anticipated reduction in risk is not significant enough to justify the cost or the minimal benefit of the proposed risk reduction countermeasure. Acknowledged risk must be documented in the approved system.

b. Transfer risk to HHQ. When the recommended risk remediation COA cannot be implemented immediately, commanders will prioritize remaining COAs to compete for funding solutions. Unfunded COAs reported to HHQ via the approved system are vetted for current year funding, the planning, programing, budget and execution process, or the working group and supporting processes.

c. Mitigate risk. The commander may execute mitigation through local projects using available local or Region funding for maintenance, sustainment, restoration, and modernization, and as submission to unfunded priority lists. Other mitigation improvements might include local efforts to improve emergency response plans, individual, team or unit training or relevant exercises.

(b) Additional Risk Planning

1. Risk prioritization. Identifying mission and asset owners in the approved system increases the level of stakeholder participation in the risk prioritization process. This informs the chain of command by maintaining continuous situational awareness of the risk environment to the Navy enterprise. HHQ decision makers can respond to developing trends as risk data continues to update. Commanders must be vigilant in updating RA data in the approved system to ensure full disclosure of their vulnerabilities allowing the community to respond accordingly.

2. Other plans. Risk reduction planning is augmented by other installation response plans which are normally implemented before, during, or after an event; or when a warning of an impending event is received.

3. Program review. The RM program is reviewed for compliance and effectiveness annually.

b. Risk Management Process Expanded. The outline of the Navy RM process discussed in paragraph 11.5.1. provided a brief overview of the program. The Region Emergency Manager and installation EMO provide all relevant EM data necessary to complete the RA. The detailed steps for conducting the RM process are provided as follows:

(1) Working Group. The RM process is an interdisciplinary collaborative effort that involves the support of all protection-related programs; including, AT, CBRN, CIP, COOP, CS, EM, ER, F&ES, force health protection (FHP), LE, and physical security. These programs all contribute a significant part to the RM process that is driven by their internal guidance and instructions, and focused on their unique functions. Additionally, mission owners, asset owners, tenants, and other RM stakeholders will contribute to and support the working group. The working group is responsible for:

(a) Coordinating the command's RA efforts to ensure seamless execution across all protection-related programs.

(b) Documenting all MEFs, METs, defense critical assessts (DCAs), mission owners, asset owners, threats and hazards, vulnerabilities, risk remediation COAs, and acknowledged risk, in the approved system.

(c) Updating and maintaining current RA data and risk ratings in the approved system.

(d) Leveraging and coordinating with other existing processes and activities such as POM development forums; and the CNIC, Region, or installation Shore Mission Integration Group (SMIG); to provide commanders greater decision- making support regarding risk, capabilities, gaps, supporting programs, and resource priorities.

(e) Supporting and conducting annual command self-assessments including a command exercise. Commands will verify compliance with the current Joint Staff assessment benchmarks, and other approved Navy directives. Document all discrepancies and develop a CAP to correct these issues.

(f) Supporting and conducting HHQ assessments annually.

(g) Updating local program specific plans, policies, and guidance, to support a unified effort for RM that complies with reference (r) and other supporting DoD or DON RM instructions or guidance.

(2) Risk Assessment. All commands or those commands that have interdependencies to support other commands that have approved MEFs, METs, or DCAs will conduct an RA per reference (r) and the following amplifying instructions:

(a) Criticality Assessment. A CA identifies missions, function, and associated standards and conditions for mission and function execution, and identifies assets whose loss or unavailability will result in mission failure or severe degradation (mission impact).

1. Conduct mission analysis. The CA will require a thorough analysis of MEFs identified by the command's COOP plan, METs assigned via CNIC and supported NCCs, and other assigned missions, functions, and tasks. Commanders must also assess vertical and horizontal interdependencies with tenants and other stakeholders, and evaluate these linkages for consideration during the CA.

a. Perform the mission decomposition and required capability identification process per reference (bb).

b. Perform the MEF identification process discussed in Standard 16 - COOP of this manual. If already completed, refer to the command's combined MEF list contained in the COOP plan.

c. Develop inventory of mission supporting assets.

2. Commander's guidance. Develop the commander's guidance per reference (r). The intent is to develop a mission statement that identifies the commander's priorities for achieving mission success given the current conditions within which the command must operate.

3. Critical asset identification. Determine task critical assets (TCAs) from inventory of mission supporting assets per references (r) and (bb). Collect baseline elements of information and enter into the approved system. Ownership of the asset is not a relevant factor in determining whether an asset is critical to the execution of a mission, task, or function. Critical assets can be owned by the Navy, other DoD components, other governmental entities, or the private sector.

4. Asset criticality rating. Ensure that assets supporting multiple missions are linked in the approved system to produce an accurate criticality rating. This rating reflects an evaluation of the total mission impact of asset missions, tasks, and functions. This criticality rating is automatically produced when mission and mission impact data is entered into the approved system.

(b) All-Hazard Threat Assessment (AHTA). Conduct an AHTA per references (a) and (r). The AHTA is focused on threats and hazards that may or will impact the installation in whole or part, and serves as a baseline of threats and hazards during annual updates. Documenting the portions of the installation susceptible to flooding is important, but determining if a critical asset is located in a hardened structure which is vulnerable to flooding, is the ultimate goal of the RA.

1. Review external official hazard information sources to include, but not limited to:

a. Local government hazard studies.

b. HAZMAT inventories.

c. Local Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act tier 2 chemicals list.

d. Ordnance stockpiles.

e. Floodplain studies.

f. National Weather Service or Fleet Weather Center products.

g. SOPs for hazardous operations such as flight operations or ammunition loading.

h. Region hazard summary.

i. The Strategic National Threat Assessment – Department of Homeland Security.

2. AHTA Support Responsibilities. Review internal records documenting all incidents involving a hazard that negatively impacted MEFs, METs, or DCAs onboard the installation, (or would have impacted them if not for the response capabilities organic to the installation).

a. The installation Fire Chief will provide an Enterprise Safety Application Management System (ESAMS) National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) report of all known incidents involving hazards that impacted or threatened to impact the installation's MEFs, METs, or DCAs annually or as incidents occur. The Explosives Safety Officer will review the emergency withdrawal distances for

nonessential personnel that are intended for application in emergency situations. Emergency withdrawal distances depend on fire involvement and on whether or not the hazard classification, fire division and quantity of explosives are known.

b. The installation Environmental Officer will provide a report of all known incidents involving hazards that impacted or threatened to impact the I nstallation's MEFs, METs, or DCAs annually or as incidents occur.

c. The installation Security Officer will provide a Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center (CLEOC) report of all known incidents involving hazards that impacted or threatened to impact the installation's MEFs, METs, or DCAs annually or as incidents occur.

d. The installation staff will review all damage assessment reports, AARs, OPREP-3s, and SITREPS regarding previously documented incidents involving hazards that impacted or threatened to impact the installation's MEFs, METs, or DCAs, and archive as required.

e. After recording all known instances of a specific hazard, the EMO will incorporate relevant information of the hazard into the applicable HSA of the installation EM plan. Include information such as frequency of hazard occurrence; at-risk MEFs, METs, or DCAs; likely impacts; and response capabilities and shortfalls. Additionally, the hazard data will be loaded into the approved system.

3. Consider the full range of known or estimated natural, technological, and human-caused hazards and threats, including terrorist capabilities and possibilities of non-hostile incidents. The hazard and threat assessment process is not limited to historical incidents and should include changes to the hazard and threat environment.

4. Integrate threat information prepared by the intelligence community in coordination with federal, state, local law enforcement, and other nearby military installations, as appropriate, and in accordance with restraints and procedures identified in references (ad).

5. Evaluate each hazard and threat for probability and update the values in the approved system.

(c) Vulnerability Assessment (VA). A staff member will conduct a VA per references (r), (g) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) guidance. Enter VA values into the approved system.

(d) Risk ratings. Risk ratings are automatically calculated by the approved system once all CA data is entered. Accuracy of the ratings increases after all mission and asset interdependencies and vested stakeholders are identified and attributed accordingly in the approved system.

(3) Risk Planning. After the working group has conducted a thorough analysis of the RA data provided for each DCA, it should begin the risk reduction planning effort to implement effective risk remediation COAs.

(a) Develop RRPs or other approved plan for each identified at-risk asset or mission. RRPs or other approved plans contain one or more COAs designed to address and reduce identified risk to assets and missions.

1. Elements included in the RRP or other approved plan:

a. Executive summary.

b. Mission details.

c. Threat and hazard details.

d. Asset vulnerability details.

e. Initial risk rating.

f. Proposed risk reduction COA and estimated reduction in risk.

g. Classify all RRPs or other approved plans per HHQ guidance.

2. Conduct a capabilities assessment to determine the capabilities required to reduce the consequence of a specific threat or hazard to an asset, function, mission, or the entire installation. As part of the assessment, include organic, shared, or external capabilities that exist and are available for use.

3. Conduct a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed risk reduction COA. The following elements must be considered for this analysis:

a. Doctrine: policy, procedures, guidance, and agreements with internal and external tenant commands and agencies.

b. Organization: structure and location.

c. Training: formal, informal, and situational.

d. Material: physical, cyber, financial resources, and redundancy.

e. Leadership: education, knowledge, and experience.

f. Personnel: who is affected.

g. Facilities: physical, access, security, and resilience.

4. Conduct a COA analysis. After all COAs have been vetted, and the costs-benefits analysis is completed, commanders must choose which COAs offer the most cost-effective reduction in risk for identified vulnerable assets and missions. Use of the approved system will assist commanders in assessing options and determining the best COAs to implement. The goal is to find the correct balance of reduced risk to the asset or mission, with resource requirements necessary to reduce risk.

(b) Develop the CAP. The CAP must include details on how the risk generated by the hazard or threat will be corrected, or at least reduced to an acceptable level. Following command approval of the RRP or other approved plan, implement the action steps, and track all CAP milestones to measure the success of risk reduction to all identified at-risk assets and missions. Plan effectiveness is assessed through the command's annual exercise program or through a HHQ RA. Elements of the CAP include:

1. Information about the asset or mission, such as the owner, location, risk rating, or COOP capabilities.

2. Detailed information regarding identified hazards or threats to assets or mission to include, historical record of past occurrences, or the probability of future occurrence.

3. Detailed actions for correcting the vulnerability, such as, who will be involved, how it will be corrected, and the timeframe for completion.

4. Information regarding the command's decision-making process for risk reduction such as, resource requirements, constraints and limitations, and assumptions.

(c) Acknowledgement of risk. Commanders have several options in weighing risk. Where appropriate, risk can be acknowledged, or actions directing the implementation of risk reduction measures can be made. The command can also defer making a risk decision by forwarding the risk assessment information to their HHQ for decision, funding, or other considerations. Risk may be acknowledged by the command when the impact of loss, or the anticipated reduction in risk, is not significant enough to justify the cost or the minimal benefit of the proposed risk reduction countermeasure. Also, the command may acknowledge risk temporarily where resources are not currently available to support the desired risk reduction courses of action. In these cases, documenting acknowledgement of risk in the approved system is the first step to be undertaken to identify the acknowledged risk up the chain of command.

(d) Transfer risk to HHQ. Commanders will prioritize proposed risk reduction COAs that cannot be implemented at their level for current year or POM funding solutions. When effective and efficient countermeasures cannot be implemented immediately, commanders will prioritize any remaining risks to compete for funding solutions. HHQ risk-informed decision making involves a chain of command-driven process in which a risk-related unfunded resource requirement is submitted to HHQ for current year funding, via the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process,

or via the working group and supporting processes. RM personnel at all levels within the Navy will continuously update their RAs to alert the commander to emerging threats and associated vulnerabilities which need to be addressed.

(e) Local mitigation efforts. The commanding officer may execute mitigation through local projects. Some examples include local or Region funding (e.g., ST, SRM, OMN, IPL, RPL funds) for facility, infrastructure, or equipment mitigation projects. Other mitigation improvements might include local efforts to improve emergency response plans, individual, team or unit training or relevant exercises.

(f) Additional Risk Planning

1. Risk prioritization. Identifying mission and asset owners in the approved system increases the level of stakeholder participation in the risk prioritization process. This informs the RM chain of command by maintaining continuous situational awareness of the risk environment to the Navy enterprise. HHQ decision makers can respond to developing trends as risk data continues to update. Commanders must be vigilant in updating RA data in the approved system to ensure full disclosure of their vulnerabilities allowing the RM community to respond accordingly.

2. Other plans. Risk reduction planning is augmented by other installation response plans which are normally implemented before, during, or after an event; or when a warning of an impending event is received.

3. Program review. The RM program is reviewed for compliance and effectiveness annually.

(4) Additional Requirements

(a) Coordinate asset and mission owner risk priorities. The priorities of the actual asset or mission owners cannot be overlooked. Tenant commands with identified asset or mission risk must be consulted as risks are prioritized. Use of the approved system must be used to assist commanders with risk prioritization and mission impact analysis.

(b) Risk response plans. The eventuality of the hazard or threat occurring requires additional plans that support the response and recovery actions of the installation. The following additional plans are required per HHQ guidance and must be synchronized with the installation's RM efforts:

1. Emergency response plans. These plans are developed and maintained by EM, F&ES, physical security, LE, AT, and tenants, and guide the installation's first responder and mission owner response actions prior to and during an emergency.

2. Security response plans. These plans address actions when threat or hazard indications and warnings necessitate an escalation in security response capability or other

security measures. Security response and protection measure priorities will be identified for locations with critical assets, including those owned by tenant commands. Examples of these plans include:

a. Augmentation security force plan.

b. Random AT measures implementation plan.

c. FPCON implementation plan.

3. COOP plan. These plans are required for commands with MEF sustainment requirements. COOP is a highly effective risk reduction option that provides MEF and asset owners the capability to relocate their MEF sustainment operations to an alternate location adding multiple redundant layers of risk response.

4. Reconstitution plan. Installations and other mission owners should develop the basic framework for MEF reconstitution and maintain the plan within their COOP plan. These plans can be updated and revised after COOP is initiated and reconstitution efforts begin. This plan identifies the prioritization of critical infrastructure restoration. Priority of restoration will consider infrastructure supporting critical asset operations.

(c) Risk review. The minimum periodicity for reviewing and updating a mission or asset RRP or other approved plan is annual. This administrative cycle does not preclude commanders from continuously reviewing and updating an RRP or other approved plan, as changes in the risk environment evolve. Hazard and threat probabilities of occurrence are not static. Commands must be proficient at-risk review to support situational updating RRPs, or other approved plan, when indications or warnings of an impending hazard or threat necessitate. Also, when risk reduction efforts successfully eliminate an identified risk, RRPs, or other approved plans, must be updated to allow for the application of limited resources towards other identified risks.

(d) Risk rating updates. The minimum requirement for reviewing and updating all installation MEFs and critical asset risk ratings is annually or when changes in the criticality, threat and hazards, or vulnerability occur. As the RM program matures, progress will be made towards reducing risk, which induces continuous fluctuations in risk ratings for the inventory of missions and assets. Commands must remain flexible when managing their risk and incorporate RM activities into their daily business activities to ensure timely updates to risk ratings and proper stewardship of limited resources.

(e) RM program and plan review. This is also an annual requirement after the RM process review is complete. Conducting an exercise to validate the RM program and planning effectiveness is required and should provide immediate feedback to commanders. This marks the final and most important step in the RM cycle.

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STANDARD 12 - PERSONNEL

1. Overview. NIMS states that a key resource management activity for effective organizations is the establishment of a credentialing and accountability process for personnel. Reference (a) directs DoD components to establish a comprehensive, all-hazards personnel categorization process in order to develop effective and sustainable protective strategies to support preparedness planning. Per reference (b), personnel categorization processes ensure all personnel residing on an installation are trained, exercised, and informed of their roles during an emergency. It also ensures personnel with specific needs or mission requirements are identified by the installation EM plan and obtain the support they need during an emergency.

2. Objectives

a. Readiness. Personnel programs are foundational to accounting for and deploying personnel in response to an emergency. The goal is to enable commands to categorize, credential, certify, and account for all military and civilian personnel during an emergency.

b. Resilience. Installation EM programs will emphasize individual and family preparedness to optimize Navy family resilience to potential disaster consequences through the Ready Navy emergency preparedness public awareness program. Ready Navy is designed to increase the ability of every person and family on or near Navy installations to plan and prepare for all types of hazards. Ready Navy's key target audiences are personnel and family members throughout the Navy enterprise who are assigned to Navy installations worldwide, including all tenant commands, military, civilian, and contract personnel.

3. Requirements

a. CNIC will:

(1) Administer the Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System (NFAAS).

(2) Administer TWMS.

(3) Per reference (ar), facilitate two enterprise-wide PA exercises per year.

b. Navy Regions will:

(1) Conduct personnel categorization of all Region personnel per this Standard. Regions will designate their CAT 1 (1-A, 1-B, and 1-C) personnel in writing to support the continuation of MEFs.

(2) Be prepared to conduct PA within the established geographic area of interest when in receipt of an Order to Account message per reference (ar).

(3) Validate tenant command MEFs and CAT 1 personnel lists and provide an annual report to CNIC N37, by 1 July, of any tenant commands that did not support this reporting requirement.

(4) Provide an annual list of Region EM and installation EMO personnel accountability points of contact (POCs) to CNIC N37 and Navy Personnel Command (NPC).

c. Navy installations will:

(1) Conduct personnel categorization of all installation personnel per this Standard. Designate CAT 1 (1-A, 1-B, and 1-C) personnel in writing and provide CAT 1 personnel lists by billet to the installation EMO in order to support the continuation of MEFs.

(2) Be prepared to conduct PA when in receipt of an Order to Account message per reference (ar).

(3) Report all tenant MEFs and CAT 1 personnel lists to the Region annually by 15 May with non-reporting tenants annotated.

d. Tenant commands onboard Navy installations will:

(1) Conduct personnel categorization of all command personnel per this Standard. Commands will designate their CAT 1 (1-A, 1-B, and 1-C) personnel in writing and provide CAT 1 personnel lists by billet to the installation EMO in order to support the continuation of MEFs.

(2) Report all MEFs to the host installation to ensure essential operations are sustained during an emergency.

(3) On order, be prepared to muster all command personnel, including those assigned on temporary duty (TDY), and report PA summary data to the installation per local guidelines.

e. Off installation Navy commands: On order, Navy commands, detachments, units, and other independent offices, not located on board a Navy installation will be prepared to muster their personnel and report PA summary data to the appropriate ROC or installation EOC via their ISIC, or utilize alternate PA methods per reference (ar).

4. Responsibilities

a. CNIC will, in anticipation of or during an evacuation incident, consult with the affected NCC and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (OPNAV N1) to determine whether PA reporting or an order to account will be required. Accounting methodology might also be dependent on the availability of NFAAS at any designated evacuation location.

b. REGCOMs will, during PA events, consolidate reports from installations and from off-installation commands within their AOR. Update reports daily until all personnel are accounted for or otherwise directed.

c. Installation COs will:

(1) During PA events, report personnel accounting data to the ROC. Update reports daily until all personnel are accounted for or otherwise directed.

(2) During evacuation events, ensure all evacuees are mustered upon arrival at a designated safe haven or shelter per reference (ar).

d. Installation EMOs will maintain awareness of personnel categorization for the entire installation populace. EMOs should maintain lists, either through TWMS or other means, for all CAT 1 and 5 personnel including tenants, and total numbers of CAT 2, 3, and 4 personnel.

e. Tenant commanders will:

(1) During PA events, report personnel accounting data to the installation EOC. Update reports daily until all personnel are accounted for or otherwise directed.

(2) During evacuation events, ensure all evacuees are mustered upon arrival at a designated safe haven or shelter per reference (ar).

f. Off installation Navy commanders will:

(1) During PA events, report personnel accounting data to the ROC. Update reports daily until all personnel are accounted for or otherwise directed.

(2) During evacuation events, ensure all evacuees are mustered upon arrival at a designated safe haven or shelter per reference (ar).

g. All Shore Enterprise organizations will:

(1) Ensure supervisors assign and track categorization of personnel using TWMS.

(2) Ensure CAT 1 and 5 personnel lists that include DoD civilians and contractors are validated by the parent command's human resources office or contracting department to ensure position descriptions or contracts identify emergency or mission essential personnel.

(3) Ensure assigned personnel are properly trained, equipped, organized, and where applicable, prepared to operate in a hazardous environment, per their assigned personnel category requirements.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Personnel Categorization. All personnel working at, residing on, or visiting a Navy installation, are categorized to establish appropriate EM training, protection, and credentialing, based on prioritized responsibilities during an emergency. The following personnel categories are established:

(1) CAT 1. Military, civilian, or DoD contractor, mission essential personnel who perform MEFs, essential operations, or other essential services, supporting critical operations that must be continued under all conditions without disruption or be continued within 12 hours of a disruption. These personnel are identified by billet code vice by name. MEFs require assignment of CAT 1 personnel and must be validated by the command's ISIC. CAT 1 consists of three sub-categories:

(a) Sub-category 1-A. Critical operations personnel are required to perform selected MEFs under all circumstances, 24/7, without interruption or up to 12 hours, at which time the MEFs may be transferred to an alternate site. These personnel are identified by billet code vice by name. CAT 1-A personnel may not be able to relocate during an emergency and must be prepared to operate in place in any environment including a CBRN environment.

(b) Sub-category 1-B. Essential operations personnel who are able to temporarily interrupt performance of essential operations and relocate to an alternate site to resume MEFs or essential operations no later than 12 hours after initial disruption. These personnel are identified by billet code vice by name.

(c) Sub-category 1-C. Essential services personnel support CAT 1-A and CAT 1-B personnel, either from their primary worksite or relocate to an alternate site within 12 hours after MEF disruption. These personnel are identified by billet code vice by name. Emergency first responders supporting pre-planned response or recovery efforts may remain designated as CAT 5 personnel. Examples of these essential services include:

1. Facilities management.

2. Public works.

3. Harbor pilots and tugboat operators.

4. Engineering.

5. Security.

6. Other services directly supporting a MEF.

(2) CAT 2. Other non-essential U.S. personnel, such as:

(a) U.S. military family members residing on or off a Navy Installation.

(b) Non-essential U.S. military personnel, Navy civilian employees, and other persons covered in this manual.

(c) Navy contractor (and sub-contractor) employees other than those performing essential Navy services (designated CAT 1 or 5).

(d) Employees of other USG agencies who perform duties on a Navy installation.

(e) Other USG contractor (and sub-contractor) employees who perform duties on a Navy installation.

(3) CAT 3. Other non-essential personnel supporting U.S. military operations, such as:

(a) Non-U.S. citizens who are employees of the Navy or a Navy contractor (or sub-contractor) and who are not included in CAT 1 or 5.

(b) Foreign military personnel employed by the host nation government or by contractors of the host nation government.

(4) CAT 4. Allied and coalition nation non-essential personnel, including host nation personnel and third country nationals that the U.S. may assist pursuant to an international agreement approved by DOS or as directed by the SECDEF, such as allied, coalition military forces, and government officials, and emergency response personnel.

(5) CAT 5. Essential or emergency responders who are U.S. military personnel, DoD civilians, host national, third country national, or contractor personnel able to conduct safe and effective emergency response operations appropriate to their level of training. CAT 5 personnel may include:

(a) EM personnel, F&ES personnel, HAZMAT teams, port and air operations personnel, Navy Security Force (NSF), emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, EOD teams, MTF providers, PHEOs, emergency call-taking and dispatch staff, ROC and EOC staff, emergency response teams (ERTs), fire brigades, mass care personnel, mortuary affairs personnel, and oil and hazardous substance spill response teams.

(b) OSH, industrial hygiene, public works, explosives safety, public affairs, supply or logistics individuals, family assistance, day care, contract security personnel, and any other personnel designated to perform response or recovery tasks in support of the EM program.

b. Credentialing. Credentialing validates the identity and attributes of individuals or members of response and recovery resources against national and DoD-specific competency standards and supports effective management of these critical assets. Credentialing supports effective access control to an incident site and application of verified common qualifications across organizations. Identification requirements will be aligned with existing installation access control policy and can be implemented in the common access card (CAC) to identify appropriate emergency personnel. Nationally, FEMA has developed a system of accepted standardized qualification requirements for recognition in federal emergencies. CNIC is developing a standardized credentialing system for the Navy. Position specific training and qualifications are the criteria by which credentials should be issued. Navy Regions are encouraged to develop credentialing criteria that meets local needs for their installations.

c. Personnel Protection

(1) CAT 1 and 5 personnel will receive specialized collective and individual protection capabilities from parent organizations to sustain their assigned MEFs (CAT 1) or support emergency response (CAT 5). CAT 1 and 5 personnel must be assigned specific duties in writing by the parent organization and entered into ESAMS. Installations will coordinate with tenants to ensure all CAT 1 and 5 personnel have established access routes and permissions to access their designated CMFs both prior to and during emergencies during all FPCONs. Installations will coordinate with adjoining civilian jurisdictions to develop plans that allow movement of CAT 1 and 5 personnel to their installation during an emergency that requires local authorities to restrict movement of personnel.

(2) CAT 2, 3, and 4 personnel will be provided public awareness training and will be protected primarily through evacuation, safe haven, lockdown, and SIP procedures.

d. Accountability

(1) During an emergency, a rapid accounting of installation personnel is required to target DR efforts and to restore operational capability for area commands. Accountability may be directed by an Order to Account from higher authority. An Order to Account is an official order requiring execution of PA reporting procedures. It is usually published via message, however, receipt via any means is sufficient to require compliance. PA will be conducted per reference (ar). The current PA tool in use for accountability is NFAAS. NFAAS is an event-based system used by the Navy following a disaster, or other incident to help the Navy determine how and where assigned personnel and their family members are located.

(2) Following the decision to execute PA reporting, the NCC will establish a geographic area of interest in coordination with CNIC and NPC, and release an Order to Account to facilitate rapid and accurate execution at the onset of the PA process for catastrophic events within the NCC AOR which could involve one or more evacuation areas. In cases where the PA tool is not available, the results of unit musters will be provided to the CNIC-identified PA reporting points of contact for compilation and further transmission through the EOC and ROC process. The NPC ECC can be contacted at NPC.CAT.CAPTAIN@navy.mil or ECC.WATCH.COMMANDER@navy.mil or via phone at (877) 414-5358.

(3) PA Categories. Personnel must be accounted for per the following categories:

(a) Navy Active Duty members including Navy Reserve Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel.

(b) Navy Reserve members on Active Duty.

(c) DON civilian employees in Navy activities (this does not include CONUS foreign nationals).

(d) Navy non-appropriated funds (NAF) employees (this does not include foreign nationals OCONUS.

(e) Navy contractors (U.S. citizen contractors assigned and residing OCONUS or in U.S. territories locations only).

(f) Navy Selected Reserve members (Navy Reserve in a drilling status not on Active Duty).

(g) Family members of active duty and FTS.

(h) Family members of Navy Reserve on Active Duty.

(i) Family members of DON civilian employees in Navy activities in one of two cases:

1. Receiving evacuation benefits due to an event on U.S. territory.

2. Living in foreign OCONUS locations in the same household as an employee assigned to an activity at the foreign OCONUS location.

(j) Family members of Navy NAF employees in one of two cases as defined in reference (ar).

(k) Family members of U.S. citizen contractors assigned and living outside U.S. territory residing in the same household.

(l) Family members of Navy Selected Reserve members and those family members reflected in Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) without an ID card, (e.g., children under 10 years old).

(4) Personnel Status

(a) Total Assigned. Total personnel assigned to the command in each category above. Accounted for and unaccounted personnel combined will match this total.

(b) Accounted For. A person's status and whereabouts have been confirmed by a commander, supervisor, or if they received medical treatment or were transported by the incident commander, first responders, Chaplain, shelter, or hospital staff. Service Members may not report themselves but may have other officials not in their chain of command report their location. Sometimes personnel are moved to shelters or locations without a means to contact their chain of command, therefore, shelters and hospitals should retain a roster of victims. Family members can be accounted for by affirmation of the sponsor in addition to the three methods below. The Navy will consider its personnel accounted for when any of the following occur:

1. The person is physically present.

2. The person has been contacted or has made contact by telephone or other means.

3. The person is in an official status of unauthorized absence, desertion, deceased, or missing.

(c) Unaccounted For. All personnel not in an "Accounted For" status. For the purposes of this Standard, this definition does not relate solely to hostile action.

(d) Unreported. Those personnel that have not had their status updated in NFAAS. This category will not be reported from individual units or muster and accountability POCs. Commands that make reports that omit personnel assigned to that unit tracked by NFAAS will be asked to resolve discrepancies. Unreported personnel are a subset of "Unaccounted For."

(e) Evacuated. Subset of "Accounted For" that enables identification of those personnel who are not residing at their permanent address. If personnel are reported in this category, updated locator information is required for input into NFAAS. If the permanent address in NFAAS is not correct, but personnel are residing at their actual permanent address, update the address in NFAAS and the source systems, and do not account for as 'evacuated.'

(f) Deceased. Subset of "Accounted For" that enables identification of deceased personnel. This status is only to be used for personnel deceased as a result of the incident as verified by a Personnel Casualty Report (PCR), DEERS, or other official means. All personnel status reports, casualty reports, and CACO requirements for deceased personnel must still be accomplished. Reports of deceased personnel in NFAAS are not a substitute for these requirements.

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STANDARD 13 - TRAINING

1. Overview

a. This standard discusses the methods to implement and sustain an effective EM training program that supports and enables the Fleet, Fighter, and Family. By focusing on Navy Mission Essential Tasks (METs) through the use of the Navy Warfare Training System, REGCOMs and installation COs assess their operational readiness to respond to all hazards and threats that may arise.

b. Requirements for EM training are aligned with references (bc) and (bd) to ensure Shore training and readiness is sustained at levels complimentary to Fleet requirements at all times. In contrast to Fleet assets with fluctuating readiness levels tied to deployment cycles, installation training should produce a continual high state of readiness to support urgent Fleet tasking and conduct effective emergency response and recovery operations.

2. Objectives. The overall objective for Navy EM training is to improve installation resiliency and sustain operational readiness.

3. Requirements. The Navy EM training program will meet the requirements of references (a), (b), (au), (bc) and (bd). Training standards are aligned with existing OSHA, NFPA, and DoD standards and guidelines. Per reference (a), all CAT 1 and CAT 5 personnel should be credentialed for their assigned positions. Training for CAT 5 personnel should result in certification of the individual, whenever possible.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs will:

(1) Ensure all Region EM staff complete their assigned EM training requirements indicated on the EM duty task list (DTL).

(2) Utilize ESAMS for all EM DTL assignments, documentation of training completion, and for maintaining awareness of training status of assigned personnel.

b. Region Emergency Managers will:

(1) Manage EM-related training requirements within their respective programs.

(2) Ensure EM personnel use ESAMS and TWMS for tracking, recording, and maintaining applicable EM training requirements.

c. Installations COs will:

(1) Ensure installation EM staff complete their assigned EM training requirements indicated on the EM DTL.

(2) Utilize ESAMS for all EM DTL assignments, documentation of training completion, and for maintaining awareness of training status of assigned personnel.

d. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Manage EM-related training requirements within their respective programs.

(2) Ensure EM personnel use ESAMS and TWMS for tracking, recording, and maintaining applicable EM training requirements.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Individual Training

(1) On-line FEMA independent study courses are the preferred training delivery method for ICS training requirements. All EM staff members are assigned FEMA courses per the EM DTL.

(2) Responder training will be accomplished in the most cost-effective manner using a combination of computer-based, classroom and field training.

(3) CAT 1 Personnel Training

(a) Training requirements for this category of personnel will depend on mission requirements and the unique response requirements of local hazards and threats an installation expects to encounter. Some CAT 1 personnel may be required to receive protective equipment training that will allow them to continue sustaining mission essential functions (MEF) in a hostile environment.

(b) All CAT 1 personnel should receive Region or installation COOP plan training as part of their task specific training. If issued individual protective equipment (IPE) or personal protective equipment (PPE), personnel must be enrolled in the Medical Surveillance and Respirator Protection Programs and attend the appropriate respirator and protective equipment training. Active Duty personnel at OCONUS installations are provided with IPE; all other personnel can only be issued National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) CBRN-compliant PPE. Non-Active Duty personnel can be issued only NIOSH CBRN-compliant PPE.

(4) CAT 2 - 4 Personnel Training. CAT 2 - 4 should become familiar with, and understand the potential for, emergencies that could affect the Region or installation. It is important for these personnel to be able to respond quickly to instructions issued by the appropriate authorities and to have public awareness training.

(5) CAT 5 Personnel Training. This section identifies specific training requirements to ensure that EM personnel are properly trained to prepare for, respond to, and recover from an emergency. All first responders will receive additional training to meet applicable U.S. Department of Transportation, EPA, OSHA, and other state, local, or provincial OSH requirements. Navy F&ES and NSF CAT 5 training is the responsibility of those departments.

(a) CAT 5 personnel are required to receive the most comprehensive training of any group since they are the backbone of an effective emergency response. CAT 5 personnel must be well trained in operations and procedures that will enable them to work safely in hazardous environments. All CAT 5 personnel will receive training at the awareness, operations, technician, specialist, or incident command level. In addition, these personnel will receive training in each of these areas:

1. Appropriate EM task training and certification within the civilian EM community. The CNIC EMO course focuses on professional skills unavailable through existing Region or installation training programs.

2. Risk communication training related to the risk they may be exposed to during response and recovery operations. This training must also include detailed explanations on PPE and CAT 5 protection strategies during an emergency.

3. Warm and hot zone operations training for all personnel conducting operations in the warm or hot zone of a CBRN incident.

4. Other specialized training such as EOC operations, evacuation, mass care, debris management, damage assessment, and technical rescue operations, as appropriate. These requirements must be identified in Region and installation EM plans and programmed accordingly by the responsible functional area.

5. All ROC and EOC personnel will receive ICS and task-specific training to include watchstation computer and software familiarization, position duties, and turnover procedures. Individual or team training will be conducted every three years, or after a turnover of command personnel greater than 50 percent. The CNIC EOC IMT and ROC Operations Courses (CIN: S-540-1000 & S-540-1005) are the only training solutions that meet this requirement. These courses are delivered via CNIC mobile training teams and ensure all installation IMT and region Crisis Action Teams meet standardized and aligned team training requirements validated by CNIC N37.

(6) Tracking and Reporting. Tracking is required to ensure qualifications are maintained and to monitor personnel for transfer replacement. Per references (a) and (b), lead functional areas for each MET will track training provided to personnel and report training per reference (ae). The EMO will maintain awareness of all EM training status. While individual supervisors are responsible for ensuring that personnel are tracking their training requirements, the EMO is the lead coordinator for the installation's response capability.

(7) Dispatch Center Training Requirements. Dispatch center training requirements are identified in reference (aa).

(8) Public Awareness Training. Public awareness training can be accomplished by video or computer-based training and may be augmented with written materials, e.g., newspaper articles, posters, and refrigerator magnets.

(a) All personnel are required to complete public awareness training that addresses hazard awareness, region or installation MWN system, evacuation, sheltering, lockdown, SIP, and safe haven procedures. As a best practice, emergency preparedness training is provided to all personnel during indoctrination and safety stand-downs.

(b) Ready Navy is the proactive Navy-wide emergency preparedness and public awareness program. It is designed to increase the ability of every person and family on or near Navy installations to plan and prepare for all types of hazards. The Ready Navy program provides a standardized method and resource center for Navy family preparedness. Ready Navy contains required training modules for all Navy military, civilian and contractor personnel that must be completed annually. Requirements may vary by organization.

b. EM Professional Development. CNIC encourages Region Emergency Managers, installation EMOs, Region and installation EM staff, ROC managers, and EOC managers to seek professional certification through the Navy Certified EM (NCEM) program. The NCEM certification demonstrates to the Navy EM community an enhanced level of professional development and expanded expertise of EM skills and knowledge. CNIC N37 has established a development pathway that leads to NCEM certification. The certification framework distinguishes among experience levels and types of emergency managers, essential to advancing professional development. The certification process includes:

(1) Civilian personnel must acquire the General Schedule (GS) Qualification Standards Emergency Management Series, 0089. Military personnel must provide signed designation letter as emergency manager, ROC manager, EOC manager, or EM staff.

(2) Completion of the applicable DTL for Region Emergency Manager or installation EMO.

(3) Completion of the necessary independent study coursework and providing the Professional Development Series certificate from FEMA.

(4) Attend and successfully complete the applicable team training course, ROC Operations course or the EOC/IMT course, and provide certificate.

(5) Attend and successfully complete the emergency manager course, and provide certificate.

(6) Complete the PQS NAVEDTRA 43600 H, Operations Center (Shore), and provide final signature page.

(7) Must have a minimum of three years of experience for civilian personnel and a minimum of two years of experience for military personnel as a U.S. Navy Region Emergency Manager, installation EMO, ROC or EOC manager, ROC or EOC staff member, or EM staff member (HQs, Region or installation-level).

(8) Upon completion, applicants will request certification by CNIC. Applicants will e-mail via scanned copy or mail, all necessary documentation to their Region Emergency Manager. The Region Emergency Manager will validate then forward all documentation with an endorsement letter to CNIC N37. For Region Emergency Managers, their Region Director of Operations (N3) will validate all documentation and forward it with an endorsement letter to CNIC N37. Upon receipt of the endorsement letter and documentation, CNIC will officially certify as a Navy emergency manager. The certification is valid for five years. Re-certification requires updating of the appropriate DTL to include completion of any new training and position-related coursework. Re-certification will be valid for another five years.

c. Integrated Training. Per reference (bc), Region and installation training teams plan, coordinate, develop, schedule, and manage, integrated training events for region and installation personnel. The Region Emergency Manager and the installation EMO will identify Region and installation integrated EM training requirements and serve on their respective planning board for training (PBFT).

(1) The region training team will include an EM staff representative and assess the C3 mission area training at the Region level, assess integrated training conducted by the installation training teams for all mission areas, and assess any additional Region mission area training as required. The intent is to standardize the conduct and assessment of integrated training events involving multiple mission areas.

(2) The installation training team will include an EM staff representative and assess installation integrated training per CNIC and Region guidance. The intent is to standardize the conduct and assessment of integrated training events involving multiple areas such as AT, EM, Safety, and F&ES.

(3) Per reference (bc), resources are available for the Region Emergency Manager or the installation EMO to develop informal training to include web-based courses and correspondence courses. This training must include both initial and sustainment training. Training plans should include identified CAT 1 and 5 personnel from tenant commands.

(4) The required integrated annual training events are identified in Standard 15 - Exercise and Evaluation.

(5) Regions and installations will use the ORM process for all training events or evolutions and comply with reference (be) when the training event or evolution meets the threshold for designation as high-risk training.

(6) Regions and installations will review their tenant command EAPs that involve high-risk training (firefighting, LE, security, and disaster preparedness) periodically and fully exercise them annually. All emergency responders will participate in the annual exercises where

practicable. Tenant command high-risk training events will meet the minimum requirements of reference (be). Regions and installations will maintain documentation of training for three years.

d. EM DTL. The Navy EM DTL defines EM training requirements and establishes both required and recommended training for all EM-related positions. The EM DTL is available in the ESAMS and is depicted in Table 13-1.

Emergency Management Duty Task List

Training Requirement / Assigned Position	CNIC Headquarters EM Staff	Region Leadership (REGCOM, ED, COS, CMC)	Installation Leadership (CO, XO CMC)	Region/Installation CDO/SDO	ROC Crisis Action Team	EOC Incident Management Team (EOC/IMT)	Region Emergency Manager	Installation Emergency Management Officer (EMO)	Region Operations Center (ROC) Manager	Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Manager	Geospatial Information Specialist	Region EM Staff	Installation EM Staff	Region/Installation Public Affairs Officer (PAO)	CBRNE Coordinator	RTF Commander	RTF Staff
IS-3 (Series), Radiological Emergency Management							X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
IS-11 (Series), Animals in Disasters: Community Planning							X	X		X		X		X			
IS-29 (Series), Public Information Officer Awareness							X	X		X				X			
IS-42 (Series), Social Media in Emergency Management							X	X		X		X	X	X			
IS-75 (Series), Military Resources in Emergency Management	X						X	X		X		X			X		
IS-100 (Series), Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS)	X	X[A]	X[A]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IS-103 (Series), Geospatial Information Systems Specialist							X				X				X		
IS-120 (Series), An Introduction to Exercises							X	X		X							
IS-130 (Series), How to be an Exercise Evaluator	X						X	X	X	X		X					
IS-139 (Series), Exercise Design and Development	X						X	X		X		X	X				
IS-200 (Series), Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response	X	X[A]	X[A]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IS-201 (Series), Forms used for the development of the Incident Action Plan							X	X	X	X			X				
IS-230 (Series), Fundamentals of Emergency Management	X						X	X	X	X		X	X				
IS-235 (Series), Emergency Planning							X	X		X		X	X				
IS-240 (Series), Leadership and Influence							X	X		X							
IS-241 (Series), Decision Making and Problem Solving							X	X		X							
IS-242 (Series), Effective Communication							X	X		X							
IS-244 (Series), Developing and Managing Volunteers						X[I]	X	X		X							
IS-271 (Series), Anticipating Hazardous Weather & Community Risk	X						X	X	X	X		X	X				
IS-288 (Series) The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emergency Management					X[I]	X[I]	X	X	X								
ICS-300 [G] (Series), Intermediate Incident Command System for Expanding Incidents	X						X	X		X					X[G]		

Emergency Management Duty Task List

Training Requirement / Assigned Position	CNIC Headquarters EM Staff	Region Leadership (REGCOM, ED, COS, CMC)	Installation Leadership (CO, XO CMC)	Region/Installation CDO/SDO	ROC Crisis Action Team	EOC Incident Management Team (EOC/IMT)	Region Emergency Manager	Installation Emergency Management Officer (EMO)	Region Operations Center (ROC) Manager	Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Manager	Geospatial Information Specialist	Region EM Staff	Installation EM Staff	Region/Installation Public Affairs Officer (PAO)	CBRNE Coordinator	RTF Commander	RTF Staff
IS-324 (Series), Community Hurricane Preparedness							X	X	X	X		X					
IS-325 (Series), Earthquake Basics: Science, Risk, and Mitigation							X	X	X	X		X					
IS-326 (Series), Community Tsunami Preparedness							X	X	X	X		X					
IS-362 (Series), Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools (OCONUS)							X	X		X		X					
IS-366 (Series), Planning for the Needs of Children in Disasters					X[I]	X[I]	X	X		X		X	X	X			
IS-393 (Series), Introduction to Hazard Mitigation							X	X		X							
ICS-400 [G] (Series), Advanced Incident Command System for Command and General Staff - Complex Incidents	X						X	X	X	X			X		X[G]		
IS-405 (Series), Overview of Mass Care/Emergency Assistance					X[I]	X[I]	X	X	X	X		X					
IS-520 (Series), Introduction to Continuity of Operations Planning for Pandemic Influenzas							X	X	X	X		X					
IS-546 (Series), Continuity of Operations Awareness Course	X						X	X	X	X		X					
IS-547 (Series), Introduction to Continuity of Operations	X						X	X	X	X		X					
IS-552 (Series), The Public Works Role in Emergency Management					X[H]	X[H]											
IS-554 (Series), Emergency Planning for Public Works					X[H]	X[H]											
IS-556 (Series), Damage Assessment for Public Works					X[H]	X[H]											
IS-558 (Series), Public Works and Disaster Recovery					X[H]	X[H]											
IS-559 (Series), Local Damage Assessment					X[H]	X[H]											
IS-632 (Series), Introduction to Debris Operations					X[H]	X[H]											
IS-633 (Series), Debris Management Plan Development					X[H]	X[H]						X					
IS-700 (Series), National Incident Management System (NIMS) An Introduction	X	X[A]	X[A]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IS-702 (Series), NIMS Public Information Systems							X	X				X		X		X	X

Emergency Management Duty Task List

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IS-703 (Series), NIMS Resource Management							X	X	X	X		X	X				
IS-800 (Series), National Response Framework, An Introduction	X	X[A]	X[A]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
IS-830 (Series), Introduction to NRF Incident Annexes							X	X	X	X		X	X				
IS-836 (Series), Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex							X									X	X
IS-908 (Series), Emergency Management for Senior Officials [A]	X	X	X														
IS-922 (Series), Application of GIS for Emergency Management							X	X			X						
IS-1160 (Series), Damage Assessment Operations Training					X[i]	X[i]											
IS-2000 (Series), National System Goal and System Overview	X						X	X		X		X	X				
IS-2001 (Series), Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)	X						X	X	X	X		X					
IS-2200 (series), Basic Emergency Operations Center Functions	X			X[F]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X[F]		
IS-2500 (Series), National Prevention Framework an Introduction	X						X	X		X		X					
IS-2600 (Series), National Protection Framework an Introduction	X						X	X		X		X					
IS-2700 (Series), National Mitigation Framework an Introduction	X						X	X		X		X					
IS-2900 (Series), National Disaster Recovery Framework an Introduction	X						X	X		X		X					
Echelon level COOP Plans (Provided by Region EM/Installation EMO)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Course: CIN S-540-1000 Emergency Operations Center/Incident Management (EOC/IMT) Team Trainer [C]			X	X[F]		X		X		X			X[F]	X[F]	X[F]		
Course: CIN S-540-1001 Emergency Manager (EM) Course	X						X	X	X	X							
Course: CIN S-540-1005 Region Operations Center (ROC) Operations Team Trainer [C]	X	X		X[F]	X		X		X			X[F]		X[F]	X[F]		
Course: CIN S-540-1013 EM for Senior Leaders (EMSL)	X	X	X														
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Phase 1 Course [B]	X[D]						X[D]	X[D]			X[D]	X[D]				X[D]	X[D]
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Phase 2 Course [B]	X						X					X					

Emergency Management Duty Task List

Training Requirement / Assigned Position	CNIC Headquarters EM Staff	Region Leadership (REGCOM, ED, COS, CMC)	Installation Leadership (CO, XO CMC)	Region/Installation CDO/SDO	ROC Crisis Action Team	EOC Incident Management Team (EOC/IMT)	Region Emergency Manager	Installation Emergency Management Officer (EMO)	Region Operations Center (ROC) Manager	Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Manager	Geospatial Information Specialist	Region EM Staff	Installation EM Staff	Region/Installation Public Affairs Officer (PAO)	CBRNE Coordinator	RTF Commander	RTF Staff
Personal Qualification Standards for Operations Center (Shore) NAVEDTRA 43600		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X[F]		
HAZMAT Level I – DoD IFSAC Awareness							X	X	X	X			X		X		
HAZMAT Level II – NFPA 472 Operations Level [E]															X		
Joint Service Mask Leakage Tasker (JSMLT) (OCONUS Only)															X		
(NETOPS) NR 101DL																X	X
(NWIRT Basic) NR 150																X	X
The National Emergency Management Basic Academy	X																
Respirator User Training and Protection Fit Testing [D]															X		

Table 13-1. Emergency Management Duty Task List

Symbol Key:

X - Required Training
A - Required training for those NOT attending the EM Senior Leaders (EMSL) Course; G0402/ICS-402 are incorporated into the EMSL Course.
B - DSCA Courses apply to CONUS, Hawaii, and Guam ONLY.
C - Periodicity - Every three years.
D - Periodicity - Annual requirement.
E - HAZMAT Level II – NFPA 472 Operations Level - Don/Doff Respirator and PPE ONLY.
F - Required position-specific training based on Operations Center assignments.

Emergency Management Duty Task List

G - ICS 300 and ICS 400: Required position-specific training for Incident Commander position assignment; listed as recommended for all others.
H - Required for Public Works personnel assigned to EOC-IMT or CAT.
I - Required for N9 personnel assigned to EOC-IMT or CAT
J - Required for Military personnel designated as CBRNE coordinators at OCONUS locations .

Note: FEMA Independent Studies (IS) Courses are updated frequently; completion requirement is one time only, regardless of series/equivalency; unless specified otherwise. Additional information regarding the HAZMAT Awareness Level 1 course may be found at http://totalforcevlc.golearnportal.org/portal.php. Changes to the DTL will be promulgated via notices and or change transmittals. Local and RDC training requirements are listed in CNICINST 3440.18 (Series).

STANDARD 14 - EQUIPMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

1. Overview. The Navy EM program will maintain the minimum Region and installation equipage as required by references (a), (b), (g), (q) and (au). This manual consolidates and establishes equipment standards necessary to support response requirements, enable CAT 1 personnel to maintain critical operations, and allow CAT 5 personnel to conduct safe and effective operations at their appropriate level of training and response capability. Detailed requirements for Navy installation CBRN response equipment are discussed in reference (bf). EM equipment requirements for Group 1, 2, and 3 installations are available on the virtual annex to this manual. The tables in the annex serve as a useful tool for region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs in determining the required equipage to complete assigned tasks.

2. Objectives. The objective is to standardize Region and installation EM equipment requirements to ensure interoperability, efficient procurement, economical sustainment, and enhance training.

3. Requirements

a. ROC

(1) The ROC will employ the equipment capabilities shown in Table 14-1, as required for their operations. The ROC may have modeling and simulation capabilities shown in Table 14-1 depending on the availability of trained operators and the presence of Group 1 installations within their area of responsibility.

(2) The ROC shall have a well-defined communications plan that may include the capability to communicate with civil authorities and SOPs for monitoring incident development.

b. Installation EOC. The EOC will have the equipment capabilities as specified in Table 14-2.

Capability	Description
Primary Space Requirement	Secure, dedicated space(s) w/ separate command suite
Secondary Space Requirement	Shared alternate ROC
Non-Secure Voice (Landline)	Multiple, dedicated phones (Dedicated switch/priority)
Secure Voice (Landline)	Multiple Secure Terminal Equipment (STE) phones
Non-Secure Voice (Radio)	Enterprise Land Mobile Radio System (ELMRS)
Non-Secure/Secure Voice (Satellite)	No EM program requirement
Non-Secure Computer Systems	Dedicated Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) computers
Secure Computer Systems	Dedicated Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)computers
Public Safety Network (PSNet)	Multiple PSNet Zero Client Workstations
Dispersion Modeling System	ALOHA/CAMEO/MARPLOT
Geographical Information Systems (GIS)	3D electronic maps/Fully GIS capable
Scanner System	Dedicated scanner
Non-Secure Video-Teleconference (VTC)	Dedicated non-secure VTC
Secure VTC	Secure VTC
Non-Secure Fax Machine	Non-secure, dedicated fax machine
Secure Fax Machine	Secure, dedicated fax machine
Defense Message System (DMS)	Dedicated access to unclassified and secure DMS
Video Displays	PowerPoint projectors and wall-mounted plasma/flat-screen TVs
Cable Access	Dedicated cable access (24/7)
Closed-circuit TV (CCTV) Systems	Video feed from AT CCTV systems
Electrical Generator	Dedicated generator

Table 14-1. ROC Capabilities

	Group 1 EOC	Group 2 EOC	Group 3 EOC
Primary Space Requirement	Secure, dedicated space(s) w/ separate command suite	Dedicated space	Shared space
Secondary Space Requirement	Shared alternate EOC	Shared alternate EOC	No EM program requirement
Non-Secure Voice (Landline)	Multiple, dedicated phones (dedicated switch/priority)	Multiple, dedicated phones (shared switch)	Shared or dedicated phones
Secure Voice (Landline)	Multiple dedicated STE phones	Multiple dedicated STE phones	Single, shared STE phone
Non-Secure Voice (Radio)	ELMRS	ELMRS	As determined by region
Non-Secure/Secure Voice (Satellite)	Non-secure satellite phone (as provided by N6)	Non-secure satellite phone (as provided by N6)	Non-secure satellite phone (as provided by N6)
Non-Secure Computer Systems	Dedicated NIPRNET computers	Dedicated or shared NIPRNET computers	Shared NIPRNET computers
Secure Computer Systems	Dedicated SIPRNET computers	Dedicated or shared SIPRNET computers	No EM program requirement
IMS System (as applicable)	Navy IMS system	Navy IMS system	Navy IMS system
Public Safety Network (PSNet)	PSNET zero-client workstations	PSNET zero-client workstations	PSNET zero-client workstation (optional)
Geographical Information Systems (GIS)	3d electronic maps/ fully GIS capable	Multi-echelon capable 2d electronic maps	Multi-echelon capable 2d electronic maps
Scanner System	Dedicated scanner	Dedicated or shared scanner	Shared scanner (optional)
Non-Secure VTC	Dedicated non-secure VTC	Dedicated or shared non-secure VTC	Non-secure VTC (optional)
Secure VTC	Secure VTC	Secure VTC (optional)	No EM program requirement
Non-Secure Fax Machine	Non-secure, dedicated fax machine	Non-secure, dedicated fax machine	Non-secure, shared fax machine
Secure Fax Machine	Secure, dedicated fax machine	Secure, dedicated or shared fax machine	No EM program requirement
Defense Message System (DMS)	Dedicated access to unclassified and secure DMS	Dedicated or shared access to unclassified DMS	Shared access to unclassified DMS
Video Displays	PowerPoint projectors and wall-mounted plasma/flat-screen TVs	PowerPoint projectors and TVs	Shared PowerPoint projector and shared access to TVs
Cable Access	Dedicated cable access (24/7)	Dedicated or shared cable access	Shared cable access
Closed-Circuit TV (CCTV) Systems	Video feed from at CCTV systems	Video feed from at CCTV systems	No EM program requirement
Electrical Generator	Dedicated generator	Dedicated or shared generator	Shared generator (optional)
Deployable/Backup Communications System Capability	Mobile/satellite communications (satcom) / voice / data	Mobile / satcom / voice / data	Mobile / satcom / voice / data

Table 14-2. Installation EOC Capability Matrix

4. Responsibilities

a. CNIC will develop and maintain a standardized equipment list (SEL) and the appropriate tables of allowances (TOA) for regions and installations. CNIC N6 will review the SEL when developing their approved equipment lists and TOAs for specific installations.

b. REGCOMs will identify and categorize personnel per Standard 12 - Personnel, determine mission requirements and develop a program for procuring, distributing, and maintaining appropriate equipment, and providing necessary training.

c. Region Emergency Managers will coordinate with the CNIC EM Program Manager and CNIC N3S to identify consolidated Region requirements and match these requirements to the latest approved TOA.

d. Installation COs will identify and categorize personnel per Standard 12 - Personnel, determine mission requirements and develop a program for procuring, distributing, and maintaining appropriate equipment, and providing necessary training.

e. Installation EMOs will maintain a current consolidated inventory of all CBRN-specific PPE on the installation and ensure end-users are aware of their responsibility to perform necessary maintenance at time of issue, if applicable.

f. BUMED is responsible for medical equipment and materials, including pharmaceuticals.

5. Concept of Operations. The primary assumption in the development of equipment standards is that Navy F&ES, NSF, and EOD teams are operating with proper CBRN specific equipment requirements appropriate for their particular job and assignment.

a. The Navy EM program is not responsible for employment and maintenance of PPE or any other equipment utilized during routine operations. End-users are responsible for maintaining their own equipment.

b. Equipment breakdown, failure, or misuse immediately exposes the worker to potential hazards. Misapplication or improper maintenance of protective devices can pose potentially serious consequences for the user. For this reason, proper equipment selection, maintenance, training, and mandatory enforcement of equipment use are key elements of an effective equipment program.

c. SELs. The SEL provides voluntary guidelines for developing and acquiring EM-related equipment. The Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability establishes and coordinates local, state, and federal standardization, interoperability, and

responder safety, to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any incident by identifying requirements for CBRN response equipment. The SEL is organized into the following categories:

(1) PPE

(2) Operational equipment

(3) Interoperable communications and information systems

(4) Detection

(5) Decontamination

(6) Medical

d. No equipment will be provided to personnel without the appropriate training on how to use and maintain the equipment and how to employ the equipment within the context of an event for which personnel are trained and, as appropriate, certified to respond to or recover from an incident. The installation CO will ensure that the appropriate training is provided.

e. EM equipment standards will include both government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions to equipment requirements.

f. Any variations in equipment configurations must be submitted via a Configuration Change Request (CCR), with an accompanying configuration management plan that addresses the proposed change in configuration.

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STANDARD 15 - EXERCISE AND EVALUATION

1. Overview. Exercises provide realistic conditions during which units coordinate, implement, and evaluate plans and requirements. Exercises should be executed to meet or exceed minimum requirements. During execution, performance data, key issues, and associated observations and recommendations or lessons learned will be collected. Exercise participants will be encouraged to provide evaluations and feedback. CNIC follows the seven types of exercises detailed by the HSEEP: tabletop exercises, functional exercises, full-scale exercises, drills, games, seminars, and workshops. Examples of these exercises may be found in the virtual annex.

2. Objectives. The objectives for exercises and evaluations is to train, validate, and improve readiness for EM personnel and programs.

3. Requirements. Regions and installations will:

a. Establish an exercise program per references (a), (b), (bc) and (bd), and develop multi-year exercise plans with annual updates to aid in scheduling and planning efforts. Region and installation-specific EM exercises must include elements within applicable EM plans to ensure that personnel and plans are prepared to perform their role during an emergency event.

b. Assess and validate EM capabilities, clarify, and familiarize personnel with roles and responsibilities, improve inter-agency coordination and communication, highlight capability gaps, and identify opportunities for improvement.

c. Exercise and evaluate multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and multi-jurisdictional emergencies based on risks from identified hazards and threats, including incidents with cascading impacts.

d. Include participation of appropriate leaders and decision makers in the installation EOC as well as, whenever possible and appropriate, supporting ROCs. Include, as appropriate, leaders from federal, region, state, tribal, local, voluntary, and NGOs, private industry, and host nation partners.

e. Per reference (a), members of the installation training team that design, conduct, and evaluate EM exercises should be trained in HSEEP compliance. Information on HSEEP is available online at the DHS website. Reference (bd) also contains a capabilities and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology and terminology for CNIC exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

f. Minimum annual integrated training event requirements are identified in references (a) and (b), and further specified in references (bc) and (bd).

g. Per references (a) and (b), utilize an all-hazards approach when developing exercises, to include at least one natural disaster or man-made exercise, including terrorism, and one CBRN or HAZMAT exercise per year. As a best practice, exercise design should be based on the current hazard and vulnerability assessments for a Region or installation.

h. Review tenant command EAPs that involve high-risk training (firefighting, law enforcement, security) periodically and fully exercise them annually. All emergency responders will participate in the annual exercises where practicable. EAPs will meet the minimum requirements of reference (aw). Regions and installations will maintain documentation of training for three years.

4. Responsibilities

a. Installation COs will ensure participation in the annual DoD National Preparedness Month Campaign sponsored by FEMA.

b. Installation EMOs will document integrated exercises by posting surveys on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) preparedness website. These surveys should be posted after the exercises are conducted throughout the year.

c. The installation EM training team will:

(1) Develop and conduct EM training, exercises, evaluation plans considering Navy mission essential tasks (NMETs), and assist in the development of lessons learned.

(2) Assess the following components of the EM plan and EM capabilities:

(a) Activation of local support agreements.

(b) Execution of incident reporting protocols, internal (installation personnel, tenant organizations) and external (HHQ, federal, region, state, tribal, local, private industry, or host nation partners).

(c) Warning coordination, MWN, and EPI. At a minimum, MWN systems must be exercised twice a year to validate accuracy of personal contact information and efficacy of notification systems.

(d) C3 capabilities.

(e) Evacuation management and mass care operations.

(f) SIP and lockdown.

(g) First responder, first receiver, and emergency responder operations.

(h) Medical, veterinary, and public health response and recovery operations, including disaster mental health and mass casualty management.

(i) COOP capabilities.

(j) Tenant EAP activation and integration with the installation EM plan.

(k) Mass care support response.

(l) EAPs for facilities located off-installation. They must be exercised a minimum of once a year and include engagement with supporting local emergency response forces (if practical).

d. Exercise planners will establish specific, measurable, achievable, relative, and time-specific objectives for each exercise to support NMET assessment and will use those objectives to define exercise characteristics that drive the development phase of exercise design.

5. Concept of Operations

a. The Training Cycle. Installations and regions utilize a three-year shore operations training and certification cycle to validate C3 and NSF readiness. The process includes a self-assessment period where assist visits and outside assistance is available. This period ends with a CART. The assessment phase follows which concludes emphasizes resolution of issues identified in the CART and ends with a FEP and ultimate certification.

(1) CART. CART is a CNIC conducted installation assessment to evaluate NSF plans; installation pre-planned responses; SOPs; and installation training teams' proficiency. The CNIC EMPA will also occur during CART and will evaluate the installation EM program's operational and administrative effectiveness. Evolutions and drills will integrate C3 elements for the EOC and IMT. Installations will document deficiencies and develop a CAP.

(2) FEP. FEP is a CNIC conducted assessment of the installation's interoperability across select functional areas involving installation protection, C3, and emergency response. CNIC certifies an installation's readiness after successful completion of a FEP. If an installation's FEP is unsuccessful, Region Training and Exercise (N36) staff and program directors will provide additional support and oversight in order to correct deficiencies prior to re-attempting FEP certification.

(3) For all integrated training events, the ROC or the EOC will be activated as appropriate. The installation training team will conduct an assessment, and personnel from two or more mission areas will participate. The training events will execute scenarios that demonstrate cause and effect relationships between installations and capability areas. The cycle of EM program exercises does not limit or modify the existing exercise requirements of other programs, such as AT, F&ES, NSF, and Navy medicine. Overarching scenarios for the major exercises will be coordinated by CNIC N36 and may include NPSs. Exercise scenarios will be designed based on the highest hazard probability and relative risk factors.

b. Exercises

(1) EM exercises may be combined with existing exercise requirements provided that the resulting event exercises all identified CAT 5 functional areas simultaneously, in addition to the personnel assigned to the EM staff and the EOC and ROC, where applicable.

(2) When authorized post-event by the next higher echelon, actual management of a real-life emergency may meet some or all of the EM exercise requirements within this standard.

(3) Exercises will be designed to achieve the following:

(a) Ensure the safety of people, property, operations, and the environment involved in the exercise or test.

(b) Evaluate the program.

(c) Identify planning and procedural deficiencies.

(d) Test or validate recently changed procedures or plans.

(e) Clarify roles and responsibilities.

(f) Obtain participant feedback and recommendations for program improvement.

(g) Measure improvement compared to performance objectives.

(h) Improve coordination among internal and external teams, organizations, and entities.

(i) Validate training and education.

(j) Increase awareness and understanding of hazards and the potential impact of hazards on the entity.

(k) Identify additional resources and assess the capabilities of existing resources, including personnel and equipment needed for effective response and recovery.

(l) Assess the ability of the team to identify, assess, and manage an incident.

(m) Practice the deployment of teams and resources to manage an incident.

(n) Improve individual performance.

c. Evaluation and Assessment. An evaluation provides a single datapoint of an organization's exercise performance. An assessment applies the REGCOM's or installation CO's judgment of those collective data points to determine the organization's capability to perform in the future. In other words, evaluation looks backward at a

specific incident, while assessment looks forward to readiness. Exercises are conducted to evaluate performance so an assessment of capability can be made.

(1) Per references (a) and (b), the installation training team conducts and assesses installation integrated exercises per CNIC and Region guidance and direction, and standardizes the conduct and evaluation of integrated exercises involving multiple activities (i.e., first responders and NSF). Likewise, Region training teams conduct and assess C3 mission area training at the Region level and evaluate integrated training conducted by installations for all mission areas. The intent is to standardize the conduct and evaluation of integrated exercises involving multiple areas. The installation training team will include subject matter experts in EM including first responders who are familiar with HSEEP exercise evaluation and improvement planning.

(2) Exercises and real-world events must include a thorough and objective evaluation process. During an exercise and upon its conclusion, the evaluation team, functional participants, and leadership will evaluate performance against relevant capability, identify deficits, and institute after-action reporting. Exercise evaluation teams will:

(a) Include personnel in sufficient numbers and with the necessary resources to periodically evaluate exercises.

(b) Evaluate the capability to respond to and recover from emergencies using an all-hazards approach.

(c) Be trained, certified, and credentialed per CNIC policy and, at a minimum, to the level of those they are evaluating.

(d) Be encouraged to complete HSEEP practitioner training.

(3) Reference (bc) contains a series of exercise evaluation guides (EEGs) to be used to evaluate exercise performance of EM plans. Annex C virtual annex will provide the examples for use.

d. After Action Reports (AAR). EM programs must include an AAR to incorporate corrective actions. At the end of each exercise or real-world event, Regions and installations will conduct a formal review among participants and observers of EM actions. The actions are evaluated on successful performance, outcomes achieved, lessons learned, and areas of needed improvement. Because of the evaluation, an AAR is developed.

(1) The AAR includes specific recommendations for changes in practice, timelines for implementation, and assignments for completion.

(2) When the AAR is completed, a corrective-action plan is developed and implemented, and the results are incorporated into the annual EM plan review and update process.

(3) AARs must result in lessons learned that are prioritized based on CNIC guidance and incorporated into the EM program. AARs will be maintained for at least three years and provided to HHQ when requested.

STANDARD 16 - CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

1. Overview. COOP is a federal program established by PPD-40. The program functions in tandem with the Continuity of Government (COG) program. Both programs are designed to ensure the preservation of the nation's Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the continuing performance of the eight National Essential Functions (NEF), discussed in PPD-40, under all conditions. All Executive Branch departments and agencies are required to support the federal COOP and COG programs by ensuring uninterrupted continuity of their primary mission essential functions (PMEF). COOP and EM are two separate programs. COOP is the organization's ability to continue MEFs with little or no interruption during and in the aftermath of an emergency. The Navy COOP program consists of integrated policies, plans, and procedures that support the Defense Continuity Program. This Standard will address EM related requirements that support COOP.

a. Federal COOP doctrine and guidelines are established in PPD-40, Federal Continuity Directives (FCDs) 1 and 2, and Continuity Guidance Circulars (CGCs) 1 and 2, developed by DHS.

b. The SECDEF and the SECNAV have released authoritative, directive, and instructional implementing guidance contained in references (bh), (bi) and (bj). These references serve as the foundational guidelines for Navy Regions and installations for COOP planning. If necessary, planners should refer to FCD 1 & 2 for COOP doctrine when developing detailed elements of the Region or installation COOP plan.

c. Navy Region and installation COOP plans are separate from Region and installation EM plans. COOP and EM plans are complimentary, supporting, and tandem efforts that increase the overall resiliency of the Region or installation. The COOP plan shall be developed per reference (m), and in coordination with the protection related programs identified in Standard 11 - Risk Management (RM), that enable operational capability to continue with limited or no impact to mission execution should an emergency or other disruption occur. COOP planning is one element of the RM program and is required for all DON critical infrastructure.

d. Navy COOP requires a fluid planning process best achieved and implemented through incorporation into daily operations and activities to sustain critical functions. In a crisis, COOP plans provide commanders the tools needed to focus their efforts on sustaining critical missions they perform, and defer their non-essential functions until the crisis ends.

e. COOP plans are scalable and flexible. MEFs that are conducted in their primary locations, known as CMFs, should remain in those locations as long as it is safe and feasible to do so. Incidents that disable, or threaten to disable a CMF may force a relocation of the MEF to an alternate CMF. No-notice incidents that disable a MEF before it has been relocated may force devolution of the MEF to an alternate organization in a geographically dispersed location.

2. Objectives. The focus of DON COOP planning is to ensure the sustainment of critical missions and functions that support the SECNAV and SECDEF COOP and COG responsibilities. Region and installation planners achieve this goal by identifying the MEFs performed by their

organization that directly contributes to the DON and DoD MEFs. In addition, they must develop plans and processes to sustain their MEFs under all conditions. MEFs developed by the command must be validated by the ISIC.

3. Requirements. COOP preparedness and planning for the Navy Shore Enterprise must be pursued with unity of effort. The following requirements are applicable to all Navy Regions and installations.

a. Planning. Per reference (m), every command and organization within the Navy will implement a COOP program unless their COOP planning is included by the next higher authority in their chain of command or they do not have functions required to be maintained through the first 30 days after an event, as approved through CNIC and the CNO.

(1) All Navy COOP plans will be comprehensive and executable with or without warning, under all conditions, hazards, and assume worst case scenarios. Executability is enhanced when COOP practices are incorporated into daily business practices.

(2) COOP plans will be logically organized to address the four phases of COOP: readiness and preparedness, activation, continuity operations, and reconstitution.

(3) COOP planning will utilize the RM process during all phases to identify and assess potential hazards, determine what levels of risk are acceptable, and prioritize the allocation of resources.

b. MEF Identification

(1) Shore Enterprise MEFs. To further support the unity of effort concept in Navy COOP planning, and to ensure the support and alignment of all CNIC Regions and installations with DON MEFs, CNIC establishes the following minimum MEFs to be performed by all regions and installations:

(a) Command and Control (C2). CNIC HQ must maintain assured communications and C2 from CNIC down to the lowest echelon within the Shore Enterprise and back again to sustain the CNIC MEFs and provide the lateral and upward support required by other echelon 1 and 2 commands. All Navy Regions and installations will identify C2 as mission essential.

(b) Personnel Accountability (PA). Regions and installations could not sustain MEFs without the mission essential personnel (MEP) assigned to support them. Navy Regions and installations will identify PA as mission essential. PA will be executed per Standard 12 – Personnel.

(c) Navy Dispatch Center Operations. Navy Regions that conduct 9-1-1 dispatch at the Region level will identify this function as mission essential. Installations that conduct 9-1-1 dispatch at the local level will identify this function as mission essential. Per reference (b), Navy Regions are required to consolidate emergency dispatch services within their AOR. RDCs and installation LDCs are the designated Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for their supported

installations and Regions. These PSAPs provide dispatch services for Navy installations, streamline C2 during crisis events, and standardize processes and levels of service. Navy REGCOMs and installation COs could not consistently conduct C2 over their response resources during a crisis event without the communications capabilities provided by a dispatch center.

(2) Per reference (b), installation tenant commands will report their MEFs and CAT 1 personnel to their host installation to align BOS requirements and operations on an annual basis. Installations will identify MEFs that support their REGCOM's MEFs (and any supported CCDRs if applicable) as well as interdependencies with tenant MEFs. These MEFs will be reported to their Region annually. Regions will identify MEFs that support CNIC MEFs and the critical support functions performed for the installations under their cognizance. These MEFs will be reported to CNIC annually.

c. Mission Essential Personnel. The CAT-1 MEP that support MEFs on a daily basis must be identified and properly classified per reference (b), and tracked in TWMS. This formal classification enables MEP to access an installation or Region HQ during heightened FPCONs. Also, these personnel should be assigned to the emergency relocation group (ERG) that would relocate the MEF to a continuity facility. Certain MEP assigned to support a MEF such as IT professionals, may not require assignment to the ERG if the alternate continuity facility has the same skilled personnel assigned there, and are available to support the ERG in a crisis.

(1) ERG members are selected and assigned based upon their positional authority as it relates to the ERG position, subject matter expertise, and ability to deploy. Junior personnel that normally would not have the authority or experience to independently resolve serious issues associated with the MEF should not be assigned to an ERG.

(2) MEP that support an ERG must be assigned their duties in writing to ensure the individual is aware of the 24/7 duty requirements and other important responsibilities associated with the position. ERG members must be available to deploy to an alternate continuity facility on short notice for up to 30 days of sustained operations.

(3) MEP must satisfy all training and security requirements prior to their assignment to the ERG. ERG members must also maintain assured communications, via primary and alternate means, with their command to ensure timely receipt of a COOP activation message.

(4) The organization supporting the MEF must develop position descriptions that discusses the detailed requirements of the ERG position and provide them to the individuals assigned to the position.

(5) All ERG positions require a primary and alternate individual assigned to support 24/7 operations at an alternate continuity facility.

(6) Federal civilian employees must have ERG support requirements documented in their official position descriptions and provided with an ERG designation letter further describing these duties and requirements.

(7) Commands that utilize contractors as MEP that support an ERG must have provisions documented in their service contracts that legally binds them to provide these specific services during a crisis per reference (bi). Contractors will also be provided with an ERG designation letter further describing these duties and requirements.

d. Continuity Facilities. Per reference (bj), commands must identify primary and alternate continuity and reconstitution facilities for each MEF. Dual-use facilities are the preferred method for achieving this requirement if possible. Regions and installations with multiple MEFs that can sustain more than one MEF at a continuity facility are encouraged to do so. Regions and installations are not required to provide continuity facilities or other continuity capabilities for tenant commands. Use of an installation facility by a tenant command as a continuity facility will be at the discretion of the installation CO and documented by a MOA between the two commands.

(1) Regions and installations identifying continuity spaces for use as an alternate EOC will consult references (u) and (bk) for detailed requirements. Planners must consider current AT standards for CMFs when identifying continuity facilities.

(2) Regions and installations will develop MOAs or MOUs when identifying continuity facilities owned by other DoD components, with the facility owner to ensure it is available and ready to support the ERG when activated.

(3) Regions and installations will coordinate access requirements in advance with continuity facilities that are secure sites and require security clearance for access.

(4) Region and installation COOP plans will contain transportation, lodging, and general travel guidance for ERG members deploying to a continuity facility.

(5) Minimum requirements for all DoD continuity facilities include the following:

(a) Must be immediately available and accessible to support MEF sustainment, continuity, and reconstitution operations under all hazard conditions, or during a no-notice attack.

(b) Must be fully operational within 12 hours of activation.

(c) Must have access to food, water, and other supplies necessary to support ERG operations for up to 30 days.

(d) Must have adequate space, power (including backup), infrastructure, life support, and network connectivity (secure and non-secure) to support the ERG and their equipment needed to sustain the MEF.

e. Continuity Communications. Regions and installations that activate COOP and relocate their ERG, must maintain continuous communications with their ISIC, installations, ERG, tenants, continuity stakeholders, and other non-essential personnel during and after completion of a MEF relocation.

(1) Continuity site communication requirements must meet the interoperability standards of references (bi) and (bj), and be robust, redundant, and recoverable. Also, Regions and installations will ensure that interoperable communications are established with local government and civil authorities within their AOR. Critical support requirements for IT and telecommunications capabilities must be identified and included in COOP planning documents.

(2) Regions and installations will designate and enable ERG members and other staff members that support the ERG for telework to ensure maximum flexibility of MEF sustainment capabilities.

(3) Regions and installations will develop internal processes to communicate their operating status to all personnel per reference (bj) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance.

(4) Regions and installations will develop methods for communicating guidance on pay, leave, and other human resources issues to all affected personnel during a crisis or national emergency.

f. Essential Records. Management and retention requirements for essential records are discussed in reference (bj) and must be accessible to the ERG at all continuity sites per references (bi) and (bj). Proper essential records management transcends the support of MEFs since virtually all departments and programs at the Regions and installations create, manage, and retain records that meet the definition of essential per reference (bl).

(1) Region and installation administration officers are the subject matter experts (SMEs) for records management and are best suited to lead the essential records effort, develop the command's essential records plan, and support the CPO in identifying and documenting the essential records needed to support MEFs.

(2) Region and installation COOP plans will include the following elements of essential records planning:

(a) Essential records identified for MEF sustainment and reconstitution must be available for use by the ERG at all continuity and devolution sites. Plans must describe how records will be made available and how they will be retrieved (i.e., hardcopies, portable media, command share drive).

(b) Procedures for routine backup and duplication.

g. Succession and Delegations of Authority. C2 and critical decision making at all levels of the chain of command are vulnerable to a no-notice attack or other unforeseen hazards. U.S. Naval Regulations establish the conditions under which a commander is succeeded and the qualifications of the person who succeeds. References (bi) and (bj) establish the following additional COOP planning requirements for implementation of succession to a key MEF sustainment position:

(1) Key positions within the ERG must have a documented succession plan that preserves the perpetuation of those positions and the functions they perform. The line of succession to each key position, including the REGCOM and installation CO, must be three persons deep. Personnel identified as successors must be qualified in all respects to assume the responsibilities of the position and provided with clear guidance and procedures to ensure a legal and smooth transition.

(2) Designated successors must be provided written delegations of authority from the key individual to be succeeded that stipulate the conditions, authority, and limitations of the responsibility assigned to them.

(3) All successions to REGCOM or installation CO positions must be reported to the commander's ISIC and to the CNO per reference (y).

h. Devolution. Per reference (bj), Regions and installations will establish devolution procedures for the transfer of MEFs to another command, and/or facility for an extended period of time until the primary team can re-establish command and control.

i. Reconstitution. Per reference (m), COOP plans will incorporate information that is critical to the reconstitution effort to include identification of:

(1) Facilities requirements for the resumption of MEF activities.

(2) Contact information for organizations responsible for supporting the commands reconstitution efforts, (e.g., CNIC and OPM).

(3) Contractors, vendors, and real estate professionals.

j. Security. COOP plans may contain highly sensitive details regarding critical missions and military operations. MEF data sheets will contain information regarding critical assets, critical resources, CMF locations, and continuity facility locations. ERG rosters will contain information about key personnel. Although most of this information may be common knowledge and unclassified by itself, combining the information together provides adversaries with valuable knowledge of a command's protection strategies, mitigation efforts, tactics, and MEF sustainment procedures. This information is required to be classified per references (bi) and (bk).

k. Activation. Commanders must have access to the best information and advice possible to decide if COOP activation is the correct course of action for a developing crisis.
Region and installation COOP plans must contain an executive decision-making process that provides unambiguous steps to aid commanders weigh the risk of activation or not.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs and installation COs will:

(1) Designate an Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for the management of the COOP program.

(2) Designate in writing a CPO within the OPR who is accountable to the commander for the overall management, readiness, and compliance of the COOP program.

(a) Installations will forward their OPR and CPO information annually to the Region OPR.

(b) The Region Emergency Manager and the installation EMO will not be assigned as CPO.

(3) Ensure team training for the ERG is conducted on a periodic basis to include a full COOP activation exercise annually. The annual exercise must include a test of the ERG alert, notification, deployment, and MEF operations at one of the designated continuity facilities.

(4) Ensure ERG members receive individual training on their roles and responsibilities in support of the ERG, work options, deployment and evacuation procedures, emergency contacts, security, and drive away kit requirements.

(5) Per references (m) and (bj), designate a reconstitution manager to coordinate the development of post-event reconstitution procedures that allow for recovery and resumption of normal operations in coordination with facility and personnel management offices.

(6) Manage the allocation of limited resources cautiously using a risk-based strategy to ensure their availability when needed

b. Region Emergency Managers and installation EMOs will develop a COOP FAA that aligns with, and supports their command's COOP plan. Region and installation COOP plans will follow the CNIC provided installation COOP plan templates available on C4I Suite.

c. Region and installation CPOs will:

(1) Ensure the COOP plan is reviewed, updated, reissued, and certified compliant at least every two years, or sooner as needed. Updated plans must be forwarded to the component command's ISIC OPR.

(2) Ensure that completed and signed COOP plans are disseminated to all command COOP stakeholders, tenants, and ISIC.

(3) Establish a system of metrics to evaluate their COOP plan and certify their program's readiness using the latest CNIC provided COOP assessment tool annually.

(4) Ensure COOP plans contain provisions for personnel, physical, operational, and information security per existing local and HHQ policies.

(5) In coordination with the Region or installation EMWG, will conduct a MEF analysis using the methods discussed in FCD 2.

(6) In collaboration with the EMWG, develop MEF data sheets that document all resources, personnel, critical assets, activities, services, IT support, essential records, infrastructure, facilities, logistics, and essential supporting activities (ESAs) that are required to sustain a MEF. All MEF data sheets must be classified per references (bi) and (bk). The mission decomposition method is a valuable tool for assessing MEFs to determine the critical elements required to keep them functioning.

(7) The CPO will identify a command human resources (HR) representative that is responsible for coordinating civilian employee matters for personnel assigned as MEP.

(8) The CPO will document and report all costs required to acquire, operate, and maintain COOP related capabilities and facilities to the command's ISIC OPR.

(9) In coordination with the designated supply officer, develop procedures for expending funds, executing contingency contracts, and emergency procurements during a continuity event.

(10) Develop testing, training, and exercise (TT&E) plans that ensure individual ERG member readiness to perform the MEF sustainment duties required of their ERG positions under all hazard conditions.

(11) Ensure all COOP training, exercises, and AAR development will follow prevailing security requirements to protect the unintentional release of information regarding COOP methods and procedures.

(12) Track the completion of all individual ERG members required training and report the status to their commanding officer monthly.

(13) Ensure that ERG position descriptions identify the security clearance requirements for MEF support by ERG members and access to continuity sites.

d. Region and installation reconstitution managers will designate SMEs from the command's staff to support reconstitution cell operations such as damage assessment, construction, real property management, finance, HR, and manpower.

e. All Region and installation ERG members will:

(1) Complete all required COOP training per Standard 13 - Training and all other departmental training required for proficiency in their specific ERG position.

(2) Travel to and receive orientation at all continuity facilities designated to support the MEF that the individual is assigned to, prior to being assigned to the ERG roster.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Additional Planning Guidance. Planners will review their organization's mission instructions as a starting point for compiling a list of candidate MEFs. MEFs developed by the command must be validated by the ISIC.

(1) Navy Region and installation planners must ensure their COOP programs are properly aligned to support the DON MEFs discussed in reference (bj).

(a) Planners will assess the criticality of each candidate MEF by examining the consequences of non-performance of those functions. The criticality assessment is used to confirm or eliminate functions as mission essential. Candidate MEFs are prioritized in order of criticality based upon the criticality assessment. Candidate MEFs developed by the command must be validated by the ISIC.

(b) Supporting justification for assigning a function as mission essential must be ascertained to support the development of sustainment requirements and to ensure the commander assigned the MEF has the proper legal authority needed to ensure it continues uninterrupted. Justifications may be constitutional, legislative, presidential, DoD or DON policies or directives.

(c) Certain MEFs that can sustain an interruption of less than 12 hours without negative impacts should be prioritized lower than MEFs determined to require uninterrupted sustainment.

(d) A short title that summarizes what the MEF such as "Port Operations" or "Strategic Weapons Physical Security" will be assigned to the MEF.

(2) Regions and installations providing direct support to DoD CCDRs must ensure their COOP plan addresses these support requirements and interdependencies and consider these requirements as candidate MEFs.

(3) COOP events involving pandemic diseases present special challenges for regions and installations. Region and installation planners may need to consider alternative COAs to protect MEP, and all other personnel to sustain mission effectiveness. Commands should be prepared to initiate protective actions recommended by government healthcare professionals; self-quarantine, social distancing, telework, and leveraging ERG members in unaffected areas.

b. Activation and Continuity Operations. Arguably the most critical element of a functional COOP program is the activation process. Commanders must have access to the best information possible to decide if MEF relocation is the correct COA for a developing crisis.

(1) Region and installation COOP plans must contain an executive decision-making process that provides unambiguous steps to aid commanders weigh the risk of activation or not. Figure 16-1 provides a notional example for a decision matrix.



Figure 16-1. Notional COOP Decision Matrix

(2) For a no-notice event, the impacts might be severe enough to prevent a commander's ability to activate COOP. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that Region and installation CPOs develop active and passive COOP activation guidance for ERG members. When commands are properly prepared, a well-trained ERG member will have the presence of mind to self-deploy to the appropriate continuity facility under the right conditions. Region and installation CPOs must ensure:

(a) Plans identify who is authorized to activate COOP and deploy the ERG.

(b) Plans contain guidance and procedures if the SECDEF directs all or specific commands to activate COOP.

(c) ERG members are provided with specific guidance on how the command will communicate the activation order to them, and what their requirements are for maintaining the capability to receive activation alert notifications. Plans must describe how the command will comply with the requirement to provide alert and notification to all personnel, 24/7, under all conditions, with or without warning.

(d) ERG members are instructed on maintaining a drive away kit and what to include in it.

(e) ERG members are instructed to immediately begin developing situational awareness about the impacts of the event that triggered the COOP activation within their specific area of expertise, and be prepared to assist key decision makers.

(f) Plans describe how the ERG will maintain 24/7 communications with stay behind personnel (if any) once they have begun continuity operations at the continuity facility.

(g) COOP activation procedures are aligned with the Region or installation EM plan emergency building evacuation, assembly, and mustering procedures.

(h) ERG members are provided a situation briefing upon arrival at the continuity facility that discusses the current level of support available to them at the site, and the status of the incident that triggered the COOP activation.

6. Administration

a. Region and installation COOP plans will be reviewed and updated at least every two years, or sooner as required.

b. Region and installation CPOs will forward their updated plans to their ISIC CPO after their promulgation. Changes to the MEP roster will be kept current and forwarded to the ISIC whenever a change is applied.

c. All Regions and installations will exercise their COOP plans and certify them as compliant on an annual basis. COOP plans that are evaluated as non-compliant will be reported to the command's ISIC immediately along with a corrective action plan to remedy all deficiencies.

7. Definitions. The following definitions apply to the COOP standard:

a. Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Continuity Facility. A continuity facility is an alternate facility where MEF sustainment is continued during a crisis.

c. Continuity of Government. A coordinated effort within the federal government's executive branch to ensure that MEFs continue to be performed during a catastrophic emergency. COG is dependent on effective COOP plans and capabilities.

d. Continuity of Operations. An organization's ability to continue its MEFs with little or no interruption during, and in the aftermath of an emergency. COOP planning includes preparatory measures; response actions; relocation of MEFs to alternate continuity facilities; protecting

personnel and critical infrastructure; devolution of MEF sustainment to alternate commands (if required); and reconstitution of normal operations back to their primary locations.

e. Crisis Management. Offensive and defensive measures to identify, acquire, and plan for the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and resolve a natural or man-made threat.

f. Critical Mission Facility. The facility or location where MEFs are normally conducted during routine operations. CMF are normally located onboard DoD installations (e.g., aircraft hangars, ports, and C2 centers). A CMF is a facility or a location. Infrastructure supporting a CMF is defined as critical infrastructure.

g. Devolution. Devolution is the transfer of statutory authority and responsibility for MEFs from a primary organization to an alternate organization, at a geographically dispersed location, until such time that the primary organization can resume the MEF sustainment responsibility. Devolution MOAs must be developed in advance to support the legal transfer of authority between two commanders if not directed by U.S. Navy Regulations.

h. Emergency Relocation Group. An ERG is a deployment-ready team of MEP in military, military reserve, federal civil service, or contractor status selected to conduct continuity operations in support of their organization's MEFs. Each ERG member may serve in a unique position designed specifically to support the requirements of the MEF they are tasked with sustaining.

i. Enduring Constitutional Government. A cooperative effort among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the federal government, coordinated by the President, to preserve the capability to execute constitutional responsibilities in a catastrophic crisis. ECG is the goal and its objective are the preservation of the constitutional framework under which the nation is governed. ECG is dependent on effective COOP and COG capabilities.

j. Essential Records. Information systems and applications, electronic and hardcopy documents, references, and records needed to support MEFs during a continuity event. The two basic categories of essential records are emergency operating records, rights, and interest records. Emergency operating records are essential to the continued functioning or reconstitution of an organization. Rights and interest records are critical to carrying out an organization's essential legal and financial functions and are vital to the protection of the legal and financial rights of individuals who are directly affected by that organization's activities.

k. Essential Supporting Activities. ESAs are the many activities that must be performed in order to support the Region's or installation's performance of its MEFs. ESAs are common to most commands (e.g. paying staff, ensuring computer systems are operating), but do not accomplish the command's mission. ESAs are facilitating activities that enable the command to perform MEFs; they are important and urgent, but accomplishing the ESAs does not complete the mission or deliver the services the command is required to accomplish.

l. Mission Essential Functions. The specified or implied tasks required are derived from statute, executive order, or other appropriate guidance. In addition, those activities must be

performed under all circumstances to achieve DON missions or responsibilities in a continuity threat or event. Failure to perform or sustain these functions would significantly affect the DON's ability to provide vital services or exercise authority, direction, and control.

m. Reconstitution. Restoration of MEFs and associated CMF to their pre-event design, function, and location.

n. Risk. Probability and severity of loss linked to threats or hazards per reference (ai).

o. Risk Management. A continual process or cycle where risks are identified, measured, and evaluated; countermeasures are then designed, implemented, and monitored to measure performance, with a continual feedback loop for decision-making input to improve countermeasures and consider tradeoffs between risk acceptance and risk avoidance. Effective RM practices and procedures assist organizations in accomplishing continuity objectives. Region and installation RM is focused on mitigating threats and vulnerabilities to essential missions and should not be confused with ORM which is focused on increasing safety and reducing risk to inherently dangerous military operations or training events.

STANDARD 17 - CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

1. Overview. Installation CBRN protection consists of measures taken to anticipate, recognize, warn, evaluate, control, respond to, and recover from CBRN events in order to preserve life, prevent human suffering, mitigate an incident, protect critical assets, and maintain critical missions. The key elements of installation CBRN protection are detecting, assessing, warning, defending, and recovering per reference (bg).

2. Objectives. The objectives for Navy installation CBRN protection are compliance with and adherence to national level and DoD policies regarding CBRN preparedness, protection, response, and recovery.

a. PPD-8: National Preparedness was released in March 2011 with the goal of strengthening the security and resilience of the U.S. through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. PPD-8 defines five preparedness mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. It also mandates the development of a series of policy and planning documents to explain and guide the Nation's approach for ensuring and enhancing national preparedness.

b. The National Planning Frameworks, which are part of the NPS, set the strategy and doctrine for building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities identified in the NPG. They describe the coordinating structures and alignment of key roles and responsibilities for the whole community and are integrated to ensure interoperability across all mission areas. The frameworks address the roles of individuals; non-profit entities and NGOs; the private sector; communities; critical infrastructure; governments; and the Nation.

c. The NRF describes not only how the federal government organizes itself to respond to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other catastrophic events, but also the importance of the whole community in assisting with response efforts. It includes 14 ESF annexes, with ESF-10 Oil and Hazardous Materials addressing response to a CBRN incident when activated, to include National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program and Facility Response Plan requirements. The NRF also includes incident annexes applicable to CBRN to include biological, nuclear, radiological, terrorism, and catastrophic incidents.

d. Per reference (bm), the SECDEF has signed the standing domestic CBRN response execution order (EXORD). The EXORD directs DoD to maintain and be prepared to provide a domestic CBRN response capability and delegates limited approval authority to NORTHCOM and PACOM to provide a rapid and flexible federal response for domestic CBRN emergencies and disasters.

3. Requirements

a. Navy Regions and installations will align their CBRN preparedness efforts with the standards established in reference (au).

(1) Standard 1, CBRN Planning. The DoD Components will incorporate planning for CBRN incidents into the installation EM plan required by reference (a), using DHS planning scenarios.

(2) Standard 2, CBRN Risk Management. The installation's all-hazards RM activities should include CBRN RM policies, processes, and procedures that require annual threat and hazard assessments, vulnerability assessments, and capability assessments pursuant to reference (a) and this manual.

(3) Standard 3, CBRN Training. Installation COs and their designated staff, individuals who may serve as incident commanders, technicians and specialists, operations personnel, responders, employees, and the base populace, will be provided CBRN education and training as outlined in enclosure (4) of reference (au).

(4) Standard 4, CBRN Exercises. Realistic CBRN exercises appropriate to the installation's threats, mission, and vulnerabilities should be conducted per reference (a). In planning for CBRN exercises, installations will consider the national planning scenarios developed by DHS, which depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios.

(5) Standard 5, CBRN Capabilities. A large-scale CBRN incident can quickly exhaust installation equipment, resources, and capabilities, requiring support from other DoD installations, local, tribal, state, or federal and host nation consequence management capabilities. The establishment of support agreements during CBRN preparedness activities is critical. Of equal importance are the identification, acquisition, and sustainment of a basic level of CBRN capabilities geared toward preventing and protecting an installation from CBRN incidents, as well as promoting mitigation, effective response, and efficient recovery.

b. Per reference (q), all Navy Regions and installations will:

(1) Be prepared to support civil authorities for CBRN incidents within the U.S., territories, and possessions.

(2) Be prepared to respond to and protect Navy personnel and installations from the effects of a CBRN event by implementing multi-layered approaches of active and passive deterrence, including dedicating resources to consequence management.

(3) Maintain CBR-D capabilities required to support deterrence and enhance conventional warfighting through defensive means.

c. Regions and installations will not procure CBRN EM-related equipment without the written consent of the CNIC EM program manager.

d. Installation tenant commands will:

(1) Develop an EAP that covers the designated actions employers and employees must take to ensure employee safety from all likely hazards, including CBRN terrorist events.

(2) Develop a communication plan is required that includes the following details: how each facility will be notified of CBRN events that occur in its area; who in the facility will make the decision to evacuate versus implement SIP procedures; how employees in the facility will be notified; how employees away from the facility will be notified; and for SIP scenarios, who will give the "all clear" signal to return to work or make the decision to subsequently evacuate.

4. Responsibilities

a. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for the coordination of DoD assistance to federal, state, and local officials in responding to threats involving CBRN related materials or technologies. This includes assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, and high-yield explosives, and related materials and technologies.

b. The CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) is a national multi-component military organization designed to save lives and minimize human suffering in the aftermath of a CBRN event. It is geographically dispersed, incorporating National Guard capabilities in every state, to enable the most rapid, state-directed initial response. The CRE, composed of organizations ranging from platoon size through two-star commands, responds in a building approach from state to regional to federal response based on the size of the CBRN incident. The CRE functions everyday through the State and territory National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) responses to local events, such as a chemical industrial accident, but stands ready to respond to multiple large CBRN incidents or a catastrophic incident that could cause mass casualties on a national scale.

c. CNIC is the Budget Submitting Office (BSO) for CBR-D requirements and equipment necessary on Navy CONUS and OCONUS installations and will:

(1) Manage CBR-D equipment policy, guidance, and requirements for all in-service common CBR-D capabilities for all Navy Regions and installations to minimize risks and hazards identified within the Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat Assessment (equip, track, train).

(2) Ensure OCONUS Navy installations are outfitted with their full complement of CBR-D equipment.

(3) Per reference (q), ensure non-expeditionary Navy tenants at OCONUS Navy installations, and Navy personnel assigned to OCONUS non-Navy installations in high threat areas are outfitted with a full complement of CBR-D equipment per approved Region allowances (Note: OCONUS non-Navy tenant commands will be responsible for meeting combatant command (CCMD) CBR-D equipment requirements and the management of the same, unless they are covered by a support agreement which specifies separate CBR-D support equipment.).

(4) Act as the CBR-D ensemble sizing and quantitative fit testing sponsor for Regions and installations (covered under the CNIC BSO), non-expeditionary Navy tenants (covered by a support agreement), and remotely-assigned Navy personnel (also covered by a support agreement), which specifies CBR-D support for those units.

d. CNIC N6 will assume responsibility as the shore CBR-D program manager (equip, track, guidance).

(1) CNIC N6 will program, plan, budget, and sustain Navy Region and installation CBR-D capabilities, as well as develop equipment TOAs.

(2) Per direction from applicable warfare sponsors, CNIC N6 will plan, budget, and sustain CBR-D capabilities for shore-based operational forces.

(3) CNIC N6 provides technical expertise, systems engineering support, and acquisition and fielding capabilities for CBRN response and recovery, blast mitigation and waterside protection.

e. NAVSEA provides technical expertise, systems engineering support, and acquisition and fielding capabilities in CBRN protection and detection, explosives detection, attack assessment, early warning, security surveillance, counter-bomber systems, and intrusion response.

f. Region Emergency Managers will:

(1) Be responsible for supervising the procurement of all CAT 5 CBRN PPE within their geographic AOR. The Region Emergency Manager will utilize installation EMOs and assigned personnel to assist in the ordering, management, issue, and storage of such equipment.

(a) GOTS and COTS equipment used to detect the presence of, protect against the effects of, or remove or reduce the hazard of HAZMAT are procured, maintained, employed, and inventoried per Public Law 103-160 and applicable joint CBRN programs as well as Navy guidance. PPE worn by first responders, first receivers, and emergency responders will comply with OSHA regulations, NFPA standards, and NIOSH guidelines, as appropriate, and references (bn), (bo), and (bp).

(b) End users are responsible for employment and maintenance of PPE and any other equipment utilized during routine operations (i.e., structural firefighting ensembles or non-CBRN-specific HAZMAT team equipment), physical security equipment, or any other equipment utilized on a routine basis by any responder.

(2) Manage military IPE, commonly referred to as Mission-Oriented Protective Posture gear, consists of a complete ensemble of suit, gloves, over boots, M50 gas mask, and M61 filter canisters.

(a) The EM program is not resourced to provide military IPE to Navy Regions and installations for use during consequence management (CM) operations within the U.S., its territories and possessions, or within any overseas location where the use of military IPE is not specifically mandated in writing by the appropriate theater CCDR or higher authority.

(b) The employment of military IPE by Navy Regions and installations during CM operations is not permitted unless required in writing by the theater CCDR or higher authority.

(c) In these specific cases where employment of military IPE is mandated, the Region Emergency Manager will forward the appropriate requirements documentation to the CNIC N37 EM Program Director and CNIC N3S. The Region Emergency Manager will include a written estimate of immediate and recurring resource requirements, both material and manpower, to support such equipment. It is not expected that U.S. civilian personnel, including contractors and dependents, will employ military IPE before or during CM operations. Combat units and combat personnel temporarily assigned to meet urgent domestic or foreign CM requirements will continue to employ military specific CBRN respiratory protection capabilities. These capabilities will be considered appropriate for the delayed response times and large-scale operations that these forces are called upon to conduct in support of civil authorities.

(3) Manage fixed detection systems for CBRN agents that may include, but are not limited to, Joint Portal Shield, Dry Filter Units, and M-22 Advanced Chemical Agent Detector Alarms.

(a) The EM program is not resourced to provide fixed detection systems to Navy Regions and installations for use during CM operations.

(b) Fixed detection equipment may be provided to Navy Regions and installations through two specific methods; fielded by relevant Joint programs, or theater CCMDs or higher authority may require the employment of such systems by designated installations.

(c) In these specific cases where employment of fixed detection systems is mandated, the Region Emergency Manager will forward the appropriate requirements documentation to the CNIC N37 EM Program Director and CNIC N3S. The Region Emergency Manager will include a written estimate of immediate and recurring resource requirements, both material and manpower, to support such equipment.

(4) Manage portable detection equipment. Presumptive identification systems consist of both military and civilian systems. Only presumptive identification systems will be fielded through the EM program. Presumptive identification systems for CBRN agents or materials used during CM operations will only be used by response personnel trained to HAZMAT technician standards.

(5) Manage decontamination equipment. All decontamination equipment employed during CM operations will utilize either water or soap and water together. No chemical decontaminants will be purchased or used without written approval from CNIC N3S. The only exceptions to this restriction will be those overseas installations that are required by CCMDs to employ chemical decontaminants in support of wartime missions.

g. Installation COs will:

(1) Assess the capabilities of the installation to respond to and recover from offensive and defensive HAZMAT incidents against the risk to the installation’s mission.

(2) Develop and implement a CBRN-Defense (CBRN-D) plan per references (s) and (br). Per reference (q) the CBRN-D plan shall include ensuring the basic level of CBRN-D proficiency is attained for individual and select team personnel.

(3) Consider reference (af) when conducting civilian personnel categorization. References (g) and (au) provide CBRN threat-specific guidance on personnel categorization. Reference (af) provides guidance for the DoD civilian workforce that are emergency essential personnel required to remain at their assigned station after other civilians have evacuated.

(4) Provide CBRN education and training to their designated staff, individuals who may serve as incident commanders, technicians and specialists, operations personnel, responders, employees, and the base populace, as outlined in reference (au). At installations in high threat areas CBRN-D training will be provided to all newly reporting personnel and annually thereafter to ensure proficiency per reference (q).

h. Installation EMOs. EMOs are responsible for ensuring that assigned CAT 5 personnel properly employ and maintain assigned EM-related CBRN PPE.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Preparedness

(1) Installations may not have the resources to support a separate CBRN program developed exclusively for preparing, responding, and recovering from CBRN incidents. Therefore, installation CBRN protection must fit into the framework of an installation all-hazards EM program to be effective.

(a) Per reference (b), an EM plan is a plan for preparing for mitigating the potential effects of, responding to, and recovering from all man-made and natural emergencies, including CBRN incidents.

(b) Support agreements with civil first responders and emergency responders, including local EM agencies, should outline cooperative measures where Navy CAT 5 personnel may assist the civilian community and vice versa in response to and recovery from natural and man-made emergencies, including CBRN incidents.

(c) Within the U.S., its territories, and possessions, other Service coordination should include EM coordination with the DOS, U.S. Army or Air National Guard WMD-CST, Defense CBRN Response Force, other National Guard or Reserve units with EM-related missions, and nearby military installations operated by the other U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), per reference (a).

(2) CBRN Coordinators. Due to certain mission specific requirements, contract personnel are authorized to assist designated region EM programs over a specified time-period in order to address CBRN-specific hazards within their programs. They provide expertise in planning, training, equipment fielding, inventory management, and planning limited exercises. These contract personnel are specialists in CBRN preparedness and will provide only those services identified within their scope of work for the period of time identified by the office resourcing their position. These positions will directly support the region Emergency Manager or the assigned civil service or military region EM staff member.

(3) Tiered CBRN Response Capability. This construct was designed solely for the development of CBRN preparedness and response capabilities and is based upon the installation's relationship to the National Military Strategy. Under this construct, those installations which are more important to the National Military Strategy would maintain a higher level of emergency response capability.

(a) Group 1 installations have a technician level response capability to effectively respond to and contain, identify, and mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made emergency, including a CBRN event. Also included is the ability to conduct offensive operations within a contaminated environment during a CBRN event.

(b) Group 2 installations have an operations level response capability to effectively respond to and contain the effects of a natural or man-made emergency, including a CBRN event. Included is the ability to conduct defensive operations outside of the contaminated environment during a CBRN event.

(4) COOP: MEFs and their supporting CMFs may receive specialized collective and individual protection capabilities from supporting DoD or Joint Staff programs in order to sustain critical operations at the primary CMF despite the presence of contamination from an accidental or terrorist release of CBRN agents or materials.

(5) Coordination with federal, state, local, and host nation partners is a key component to ensure proper command and control channels are established.

b. Prevention and Protection

(1) The installation CBRN protection process relies on the persistent detection of threats in an integrated, shared understanding of the operational environment, and timely dissemination of accurate decisions, warnings, and tasking that enable DoD installations and facilities to protect themselves against specific attacks and threats per reference (bg). Some installation CBRN protection capability requirements include:

(a) Detect and identify CBRN incidents on an installation.

(b) Issue a warning and report a CBRN attack and the presence of contamination.

(c) Protect personnel, maintain critical military missions, and resume essential operations.

(d) Provide appropriate medical protection, diagnosis, and treatment for CBRN effects.

(e) Be compatible with existing installation power and communication systems.

c. Response

(1) MWN. Region and installation EM programs are responsible for on-base public notification of CBRN events, including detailed information on the shelter, SIP, safe haven, and evacuation recommendations or declarations. Overseas Region and installation EM programs are also responsible for those CAT 2 - 4 personnel residing off-base. Standardized CBRN alarm signals will be used on OCONUS bases per reference (br).

(2) Reporting

(a) In the event of a terrorist CBRN incident, the installation will send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE report directly to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to the supported CCMD.

(b) The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over all acts of terrorism within the U.S., its territories, and possessions. REGCOMs and installation COs must utilize established notification and reporting procedures by notifying the cognizant NCIS field office when contacting federal law enforcement agencies. Terrorist event locations will be treated as federal crime scenes.

(c) A SOFA governs incidents on U.S. installations in foreign countries. DOS is the lead federal agency for consequence management overseas. Consult with the cognizant JAG office with questions about country-specific SOFA provisions.

(3) Incident Command System (ICS). A 24-hour operational period is considered an effective planning cycle for efficient response to technological hazards and CBRN terrorism events.

(4) Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). CBRN incidents may occur without warning and at a time and location that will produce chaos, confusion, and casualties. In a no-notice incident, local emergency services and, possibly, state, and federal agency personnel will be the responders. Notification from local responders to a nearby DoD military command may trigger an immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. The major functions performed by CBRN CM response units are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining public confidence in the government ability to respond to a CBRN incident. TTPs for a CBRN response are provided per reference (bq).

(5) F&ES, along with established HAZMAT teams where available, will establish command and control, responder accountability, fire suppression, technical rescue, victim and

patient extrication, atmospheric monitoring and detection, establishment of control zones, establishment of entry and or exit control procedures, environmental sampling to determine type and level of contamination, initial triage (depending on provision of emergency medical services), technical team decontamination, and mass decontamination of ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients.

(6) Per reference (bq), DoD personnel responding to a CBRN incident may be responsible for CBRN CM or crisis planning and may be required to execute plans across the conflict spectrum. Reference (bq) is the planning tool for planning, resourcing, and executing CBRN CM in support of domestic or foreign agencies responding to a CBRN incident.

d. Recovery. The recovery phase begins when the immediate hazards are contained or controlled during the response phase. CBRN first responders will likely continue support to complete any remaining mitigation of the immediate hazard. This could include supporting reconnaissance, decontamination, incident assessment and providing advisory assistance. The operational role for a CBRN responder changes during the recovery phase. During recovery operations, survey operations may continue in the hot zone while supporting technical decontamination.

RESPONSE ANNEX A: EVACUATION

1. Overview. When hazards threaten the safety of personnel onboard a Navy installation or within the surrounding community, evacuating them to safety is the preferred protection strategy. The majority of the following discussion on evacuation focusses on a large-scope or total evacuation. Small-scope or localized evacuations are discussed briefly to provide context for the protection strategies available to the on-scene incident commander.

2. Objectives. The objective is to provide commanders guidance and decision-making support when considering evacuation as a protection strategy during an emergency. Evacuations are costly, disruptive, and carry their own separate risks. The decision to order an evacuation is measured against these risks versus the risk of the hazard's impact. Once the decision to evacuate is made, success is dependent on the installation's preparedness, planning, and the individual level of training for all personnel affected by the evacuation.

3. Requirements. Regions and installations will develop and conduct evacuation management operations consistent with the following CNIC policy and guidance. Regions and installation will:

a. Develop an evacuation FAA to the EM plan consistent with the command's organic and externally provided response capabilities.

b. Conduct personnel categorization of all DoD and civilian personnel onboard a Navy Region or installation (including tenant commands) per Standard 12 - Personnel. Personnel categories will be used to identify the specific personnel protection requirements necessary for sustaining MEFs. Categorization of OCONUS civilian personnel will be per Standard 12 - Personnel and reference (b). DoD civilian expeditionary workforce personnel will be categorized per reference (af).

c. Develop personnel protection strategies. The EM program will protect CAT 2 - 4 personnel through the use of evacuation, safe haven, SIP, and lockdown capabilities. The EM program will support the ability of CAT 1 personnel to sustain MEFs per Standard 12 - Personnel. CAT 1 personnel are mission-essential personnel who perform MEFs, essential operations, or provide essential services of such significance that operations must be continued under all conditions with either no disruption or a disruption lasting no more than 12 hours. CAT 1 personnel include U.S. military, DoD civilians and DoD contractors.

d. Provide evacuation entitlements. All personnel affected by an official military evacuation order are eligible for reimbursement of authorized travel related expenses incurred during evacuation.

(1) The decision of local civil officials to evacuate the municipality under their cognizance is not a sufficient justification for reimbursement of travel expenses if the authorized military official has not ordered an evacuation.

(2) For DoD civilian employees and their family members residing off-installation, reimbursement of travel related expenses may be authorized if they are ordered by the appropriate military authority to evacuate to a safe haven or designated place outside the normal commuting area.

(3) Personnel ordered to evacuate to a safe haven are eligible for reimbursement of travel, lodging, and per diem expenses up to the maximum distance allowed, and for the period of time stipulated in the evacuation order.

(4) Military or civilian employees who remain at their residence are not entitled to any reimbursement.

(5) Military family members required to evacuate will be reimbursed by Military Personnel Navy funds since they are legally authorized to receive an entitlement.

(6) Military and civilian personnel required to evacuate are considered to be in a travel status and should cite their local operating fund account numbers in their temporary duty orders.

(7) Evacuated employees working on an intermittent schedule will be paid evacuation pay based on an approximation of the number of days per week normally worked.

(8) Installations and tenant commands are responsible for issuing evacuation orders for their own personnel. However, CNIC may be directed to execute a mass evacuation for all personnel onboard an installation for a large-scale disaster. CNIC N8, when directed, will be the designated CNIC HQ N-Code to facilitate mass evacuation orders and will provide additional guidance to the affected installation commander.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs will:

(1) Exercise evacuation authority. The REGCOM is the primary authority for ordering evacuations after consultation with the installation CO. Once evacuation authority is granted, the installation CO will issue the evacuation order to assigned military and civilian personnel. Per the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) other evacuation authorities are as follows:

(a) Foreign OCONUS. The employing command or agency has authority to evacuate military and civilian employees. The decision to evacuate military and civilian dependents from an OCONUS foreign area rests with the DOS or the SECDEF.

(b) CONUS and non-foreign OCONUS areas.

1. The following officials are responsible for authorizing or ordering an evacuation for military and civilian personnel, as well as their dependents:

2. SECDEF or designated representative.

3. The Secretary of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, or the Secretary's designated representative.

4. The head of a DoD component or designated representative.

5. The commander of a U.S. installation or designated representative.

6. The commander, director, head, chief, or supervisor of an organization or office.

(2) Develop evacuation plans, capabilities, and preparedness to implement evacuation requirements, as applicable.

b. Region Emergency Managers will: In coordination with the EMWG, conduct evacuation planning and coordination. Participants would include tenant commands, civil authorities, and other service counterparts.

c. Installation COs will:

(1) Develop evacuation plans, capabilities, and preparedness to implement evacuation requirements, as applicable.

(2) When ordering an evacuation, identify a specific safe haven, or designated place, to speed accountability, expedite mission reconstitution, provide effective assistance for evacuees, and prevent excessive travel costs. If evacuation orders do not specify a designated safe haven, and personnel leave the location of their primary duty station, they may be entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses for the area they evacuated. If a safe haven is designated, anyone traveling elsewhere will be entitled to travel allowances not to exceed the maximum allowable distance for the area where the safe haven is located.

d. Installation EMOs will:

(1) In coordination with EMWGs, conduct evacuation planning and coordination.

(2) Ensure participants include tenant commands, civil authorities, and other service counterparts.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Evacuation types. For planning purposes, two types of evacuation are considered:

(1) Mandatory/Ordered. This evacuation is an ordered, non-elective evacuation. Only designated CAT 1 and 5 personnel may remain at the installation to fulfill specific mission requirements.

(2) Voluntary and Authorized. When danger to personnel is remote but loss of services is possible, a voluntary evacuation may be authorized. Release of DoD civilians must be per established HR procedures.

b. Scope of evacuation. For planning purposes, two scopes of evacuation are considered:

(1) Localized. An area of the installation is impacted by a hazard that requires creating a buffer zone to isolate the hazard and prevent personnel exposure to it. The buffer zone is normally established by the on-scene incident commander and coordinated with the installation EOC. Also, a local evacuation may by conducted in anticipation of a hazard impacting a vulnerable area such as a low-lying area prone to flooding.

(2) Total. The installation, the surrounding community, or a larger region of the CONUS or host nation encompassing many installations, is impacted or threatened by a large hazard capable of causing significant damage and loss of life. Evacuation of an entire installation or multiple installations may be necessary to protect personnel stationed in this area.

c. Applicability. The order to evacuate an installation, Region, or geographic area of interest applies to Service Members and family members, and DoD civilian employees and family members, who work at or live within the area defined by the evacuation order. CAT 1 and 5 personnel may be required to remain behind to sustain MEFs and other essential supporting activities per the installation EM plan.

d. Evacuation location classification. Per the JTR, determining if military and civilian family members should travel to the nearest available accommodations, a safe haven, or a designated place, is based upon the anticipated duration of the evacuation. Member and dependent allowances are also based upon the evacuation duration.

(1) Safe haven. Negative impacts to the primary duty station are anticipated to be moderate and personnel may not be able to return within a short timeframe. Family members are entitled to allowances while traveling to and residing in a safe haven.

(2) Designated place. Negative impacts to the primary duty station are anticipated to be major and personnel are not able to return. Family members will be permanently assigned to a designated place.

e. Evacuation decision making. The commander that is deciding to evacuate must consider several factors: current threat environment, type, scope, severity, expected duration of the hazard, meteorological conditions, PPE available, and availability of

shelters and supplies. Information from vulnerability and risk assessments, and modeling and simulations must also be considered in selecting options for evacuation. Other sources of evacuation decision support are:

(1) Destructive weather. The following tropical cyclone conditions of readiness (COR) are ordered based on the expected onset of destructive winds:

(a) COR 5 - Must be maintained as the minimum state of readiness from 1 June through 30 November (Northern Hemisphere). Destructive force winds are possible within 96 hours.

(b) COR 4 - Destructive force winds are possible within 72 hours.

(c) COR 3 - Destructive force winds are possible within 48 hours.

(d) COR 2 - Destructive force winds are anticipated within 24 hours.

(e) COR 1 - Destructive force winds are occurring or anticipated within 12 hours.

(2) Hostile threat. Indications of an impending hostile threat as reported by any credible threat reporting source or as reported through CNIC-ROC-installation reporting chain, may require evacuation as a protection measure. Localized security events such as a bomb threat, or an active shooter, could require a mix of protection strategies involving security cordons, lockdown, evacuation, or SIP.

(3) HAZMAT. A HAZMAT event onboard or external to the installation may require localized evacuation of personnel within the isolation zone of the HAZMAT event epicenter, and downwind of that location. The on-scene incident commander or local authorities will coordinate this with the installation EOC. The installation's All Hazard and Threat Assessment should contain pertinent information of all HAZMAT stored onboard and outside the installation. HSAs of the installation EM plan must discuss the response and recovery actions required for a HAZMAT event and reference the applicable sections of the EM plan Evacuation FAA.

f. Evacuation planning. Region and installation evacuation plans must be developed in advance and will discuss the following requirements:

(1) Regions and installations located OCONUS will develop Non-combatant Evacuation Operations plans consistent with DOS evacuation procedures available via the appropriate U.S. Embassy, references (ag), (ah) and this manual.

(2) Evacuation plans must contain guidance discussing or depicting primary and alternate transportation routes, modes of transportation, shelter locations, and safe haven locations.

(3) A discussion of limitations to conducting evacuation such as:

(a) Geographic isolation such as installations located on islands or peninsulas.

(b) Natural or man-made barriers that impact the direction of travel such as mountain ranges, bodies of water, bridges, or other choke points.

(c) Availability and limitations of mass transit modes (air, rail, ship, bus).

(d) Personnel with special needs such as physical or developmental disabilities, elderly, children, those without independent transportation means, language barriers. Special needs persons will be registered and tracked throughout the evacuation operation.

(e) Hazard-specific impacts to transportation modes such as flooding or seismic.

(f) Other special category personnel onboard an installation such as unaffiliated civilians or prisoners.

(4) The use of impractical personal conveyances during evacuation such as travel-trailers, campers, motorhomes, buses, motorcycles, bicycles, and boats, may not be an appropriate form of transportation during the hazard and may result in blocking the progress of the evacuation. EPI broadcasts must include any prohibitions on the use of these transportation conveyances.

(5) The source of the threat coming from a specific direction may limit resources available for response.

(6) Use of evacuation zones. Evacuation (vulnerability) zones provide a foundation to model traffic movements from one geographic area to another. Include storm surge modeling in the development of the evacuation zones. Update zone models as information changes based upon exercises or real-world events. Evacuation zones are designed to meet several functions:

(a) For coastal areas, they must reflect the areas that will need to be evacuated due to storm surge inundation.

(b) Alignment to available population data such as the EM plan community profile, enumeration districts, census tracts, zip code areas, transportation analysis zones.

(c) Ease of understanding.

(7) Assembly areas. Designate assembly areas where personnel should muster after a facility or building evacuation.

(8) Personnel accountability instructions.

(9) Family preparedness. Develop family preparedness guidance consistent with other EM program requirements.

(10) Public awareness training for all personnel. Region emergency managers and installation EMOs are responsible for training and equipping (if required) evacuation wardens, shelter managers, and any other personnel designated in writing to support evacuation plans.

(11) Public safety information. Provide public safety information such as checklists and evacuation maps. Post evacuation maps in strategic locations and on the appropriate websites as authorized, and consider the information needs of others who visit the installation.

(12) Exercises. Exercises should be planned, executed, and evaluated on an annual basis depending on local conditions. Lessons learned should be incorporated into region and installation evacuation and shelter plans.

(13) Methods used to communicate EPI to all personnel.

(14) Debris removal and road clearing for evacuation routes.

(15) Specific evacuation procedures for each category of personnel.

(16) Local or Region guidance regarding the issuance of evacuation orders, processing of claims.

(17) A discussion of evacuation for animals (working dogs, pets, or livestock).

(18) Evacuation plans must be consistent with and support the installation's COOP plan.

(19) Fleet and tenant command requirements to support evacuation, sortie, COOP, contingency plans.

g. For a developing hazard or threat with an advanced warning the installation CO will:

(1) Convene a threat working group to analyze the hazard and develop COAs for protection of personnel and sustainment of MEFs.

(2) If an evacuation COA is recommended and accepted, solicit concurrence from the REGCOM.

(3) After receiving region concurrence, initiate evacuation SOPs per the evacuation FAA of the EM plan. Evacuation procedures must address the movement of operational commands, tenant commands, and limited emergency response and recovery equipment. Evacuation

procedures must be integrated with the COOP plan, the movement of CAT 1 personnel to a designated emergency relocation site, and the sustained operations of the limited number of CMFs.

(4) Recall all mission essential personnel.

(5) Activate the EOC and the installation COOP plan.

h. When possible, evacuation orders should start when there is at least eight hours of daylight included in the evacuation time allowed.

i. Determine the clearance time and notify the REGCOM and receiving installation CO.

(1) Clearance time refers to the time required to clear all evacuees from the evacuation routes and complete movement to shelter, safe haven, or designated receiving relocation site(s). Clearance time begins with the evacuation order, continues as the first evacuating vehicle enters the transportation network, and ends when the last evacuating vehicle reaches its destination.

(2) Clearance time includes the time required by evacuees to secure their homes and prepare to leave (mobilization time), the time spent by evacuees traveling along the road network (travel time), and the time spent by evacuees waiting on the road due to traffic congestion (delay time). Clearance time is not the time a single vehicle spends traveling on the road.

(3) Clearance time is based on a set of assumed conditions and behavioral responses. It is likely that an actual emergency will differ from any simulated emergency for which clearance times are calculated. Key assumptions guiding this analysis are grouped into six areas:

(a) Population data.

(b) Emergency scenarios.

(c) Timeliness of the evacuation order.

(d) Behavioral characteristic of the evacuating population.

(e) Roadway network and traffic control assumptions.

(f) Evacuation zones.

j. The most common hazard requiring the evacuation of an installation is a tropical cyclone or other form of destructive weather. Tables A-1 through A-5 show the hurricane/tropical cyclone COR actions in progression. These actions may not all be applicable for other hazards requiring an evacuation.

Action	COR 5 (Completed annually NLT 15 May)
CNIC EM	Originate a task to outline annual region and installation requirements for MEF and CAT 1 personnel reporting as outlined in Standard 12.
	Upon receipt of region commander's report indicating tenant non-compliance with MEF and CAT 1 reporting, liaise with corresponding echelon 1 and 2 commands to complete reporting requirements. Provide final report to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (OPNAV N1) with list of reporting discrepancies by September in accordance with Naval Operations report control.
	Review and update CNIC EM plan based on lessons learned, changes to the NRF or changes to policy. Disseminate updates to region Emergency Managers.
	Consolidate and review list of region Emergency Manager and installation EMO personnel. Disseminate this information as appropriate.
	Maintain copies of all region EM plans.
	Ensure proper communication architectures such as satellite phones, communications vans and computers are in place to support evacuation operations.

Table A-1. CNIC Annual COR 5 Requirements

Action	COR 5 (Completed annually NLT 15 May)
Region and Installation	Develop region or installation-wide evacuation notification procedures.
	Train all military and civilian personnel assigned to the region and installation staffs on the policies and procedures contained in this Manual.
	Develop and review muster procedures at each level of command. Provide this information to CNIC and disseminate to all assigned military and civilian personnel.
	Review and pre-designate safe havens for evacuees. Provide safe haven information to CNIC and all assigned military and civilian personnel.
	Identify and designate specific evacuation routes. Provide evacuation route information to CNIC and all assigned military and civilian personnel.
	Coordinate and deconflict evacuation planning with local civil authorities, other service counterparts, and receiving installations and regions.
	As required, revise mutual aid agreements to support evacuated personnel.

Table A-2. Region and Installation Annual COR 5 Requirements

Action	COR 3 & 4 (Prior to Executing Evacuation Orders)
Region and Installation	Coordinate with local law enforcement and transportation officials for road status between the installation and safe haven.
	Coordinate and deconflict execution of evacuation with local EM officials and other service counterparts to reduce conflict with local populace movements.
	Ensure assigned personnel are kept informed of existing conditions of readiness. Direct them to take appropriate preparedness measures such as filling prescriptions, re-fueling vehicles, stocking food and water, and making hotel reservations. Provide personnel with directions to the safe haven with a detailed map, emergency contact numbers, and special reporting instructions.
	Provide a liaison at the safe haven receiving area to coordinate the arrival of evacuated personnel.
	Coordinate with CNIC to determine policy for entitlement disbursing.
Region PSD	Coordinate with local law enforcement and transportation officials for road status between the installation and safe haven.
	Coordinate and deconflict execution of evacuation with local EM officials and other service counterparts to reduce conflict with local populace movements.
CNIC EM	Assist region Emergency Manager and Installation EMO coordination efforts with local authorities (CONUS only), other service counterparts, and receiving installations and regions.

Table A-3. Shore Enterprise COR 3 & 4 Requirements

Action	COR 1, 2, and 3 (When Executing Evacuation Orders)
Region and Installation	Issue region or installation-wide evacuation TDY orders.
	Notify receiving installation when the evacuation has started and provide projected numbers of personnel and estimated time of arrival (ETA).
Region PSD	Inform CNIC of evacuation and safe haven location.
CNIC N1 and N8	Process incremental claims for evacuation allowances.
CNIC EM	Based on the scale of the event and status of supplemental funding, CNIC Director of Total Force Manpower (N1) and Director of Financial Management (N8) may designate a central site to generate and fund all evacuation orders.

Table A-4. Shore Enterprise COR 1, 2 & 3 Requirements

Action	Restoration of COR 5 (Termination of Evacuation Orders)
Region and Installation	Coordinate with local law enforcement and transportation officials for information regarding road conditions from the safe haven back to the installation.
	Coordinate and deconflict return movement of evacuated personnel with local EM officials and other service counterparts to reduce conflict with local populace movements.
	Direct evacuated personnel to return to the installation and advise them of road conditions or other transportation limitations.
	Collect lessons learned, develop after-action report (AAR), and forward to CNIC.
Region PSD	Process final claims for evacuation allowances.
	Collect lessons learned, develop AAR, and forward to CNIC.
CNIC EM	Monitor return to base (RTB) operations and provide support to region Emergency Manager and installation EMO, as necessary.
	Collect lessons learned and forward to senior Navy leadership for review.
	Update CNIC EMP based on lessons learned. Disseminate updates to region and installation EMO as required.

Table A-5. Shore Enterprise Restoration of COR 5 Requirements

RESPONSE ANNEX B: SAFE HAVEN

1. Overview. Conducting efficient safe haven operations is an important element of managing an evacuation. The safe haven provides a stable cost-effective environment to protect and track evacuees, conduct COOP, and to manage initial recovery efforts.

2. Objectives. To provide commanders policy, guidance, and decision-making support, for the use of safe havens during an evacuation. The JTR describes a safe haven as a location named in an evacuation order, or modification of the order, where dependents are directed to relocate on a temporary basis

3. Requirements. Installations will develop and conduct safe haven operations consistent with the guidance provided in this manual and the following CNIC policy.

a. Managing evacuees. Personnel ordered to a safe haven must wait for the evacuation authority to direct them to return to their permanent duty station or proceed to some other designated place. Personnel evacuated to a safe haven are entitled to certain allowances. The installation Command Pay and Personnel Administrator can assist with determining allowances associated with evacuation to a safe haven. The Army, as the Executive Agent, promulgates a summary message of the JTR and applicable funding citations for dependents. This message is typically published on the first working day of the fiscal year and is entitled "Continental United States (CONUS) Evacuation Entitlements fiscal year XX."

b. Safe Haven Per Diem and Allowances. Commanders are responsible for consulting the JTR and the General Services Administration (GSA) website for the most current regulations. The following per diem and allowance information is provided as a summary: Additional information may be found at http://www.gsa.gov.

(1) Military. Evacuation per diem and allowances for military and their dependents while in safe haven are governed by the JTR. Rates are calculated using the GSA website.

(a) Military members in an evacuation status are under TDY or permanent change of station (PCS) orders and are entitled to per diem and allowances as authorized in the orders.

(b) Dependents of military members are authorized per diem and allowances while in an evacuation status. For the first 30 days after the evacuation order, dependents age 12 or older are authorized the full safe haven allowance, while those under age 12 are authorized 50 percent of the safe haven allowance rate. After the 30-consecutive day period expires, the safe haven allowance rate is reduced to 60 percent of the per diem rate for dependents age 12 and older, and 30 percent of the per diem rate for dependents under age 12 unless extension of full safe haven rate is authorized by higher authority.

(c) Designated Place Allowances. When dependents select a designated place, or convert their safe haven to a designated place, they must establish a permanent residence as soon as practical. Per diem is authorized to offset expenses of lodgings, meals, and incidental expenses while establishing this residence. Per diem begins on the day the dependents arrive at

the designated place or convert their safe haven to a designated place. Per diem ends at 2400 on the day the dependents first occupy the permanent residence or at 2400 on the 30th day after selecting a designated place, whichever is earlier.

(2) Civilian. Per diem and allowances for civilians and their dependents while at a safe haven are governed by the JTR. Rates are calculated using the GSA website.

(a) CONUS. For the first 30 days after evacuation, employees and dependents age 12 and older are authorized the full safe haven allowance, while those dependents under age 12 are authorized 50 percent of the safe haven allowance rate. After the 30-consecutive day period expires, the safe haven allowance rate is reduced to 60 percent of the per diem rate for employees and dependents age 12 and older, and 30 percent of the per diem rate for dependents under age 12.

(b) OCONUS

1. Day 1-30. For the first 30 days after arrival at safe haven, the "first evacuee" will receive up to 100 percent of the lodging per diem rate and 100 percent of the meals and incidental expenses (M&IE) per diem rate. The first evacuee can be either the civilian employee or a dependent. Remaining dependents over age 18 will receive 100 percent of the M&IE per diem rate. Each additional evacuee under age 18 is entitled to 50 percent of the M&IE per diem rate.

2. Day 31 through termination of safe haven. The first evacuee will receive up to 100 percent of the lodging per diem rate and 80 percent of the M&IE per diem rate. Each additional evacuee age 18 or older will receive 80 percent of the M&IE per diem rate. Evacuees under age 18 will receive 40 percent of the M&IE per diem rate.

(3) Disbursing Policy. Based upon the scale of the event and status of supplemental funding, disbursing of evacuation allowances will either be decentralized (i.e., allowances will be disbursed by individual commands), or centralized at CNIC.

(a) Decentralized Disbursing. Decentralized disbursing procedures apply when all of the following occur:

1. An installation CO or REGCOM has issued an evacuation order.

2. Emergency supplemental funds have not been authorized or appropriated for the purposes of disaster relief or recovery.

3. CNIC is supporting only those activities under their funding authority and for which CNIC is the echelon 2 commander.

(b) Centralized disbursing. Centralized disbursing procedures apply when all of the following occur:

1. The President issues a National Disaster Notice, or a national disaster

is otherwise declared.

2. Emergency supplemental funds are appropriated for the purposes of disaster relief or recovery.

3. CNIC is designated by the CNO to execute these funds.

4. Responsibilities

a. REGCOMs and installation COs authorizing an evacuation are responsible for compliance with the requirements listed in paragraph B.3. of this Annex and the JTR.

b. Installation COs will identify safe havens in advance during evacuation plan development.

c. Installation COs will ensure support agreements and contracts required to support safe haven operations are negotiated and executed in advance.

d. The installation EMO will develop a Safe Haven FAA to the EM plan consistent with the installation's Evacuation FAA and this Annex.

5. Concept of Operations

a. The commander that orders an evacuation will designate a safe haven location for evacuees. The safe haven location may be an exact location, or a broad area CONUS and non-foreign OCONUS. Safe haven locations should be within one day's travel distance and co-located with a Navy installation whenever feasible.

(1) Inform the REGCOM of the safe haven location. If communications with the ROC are disrupted, inform the CNIC SEOC of the safe haven location, and notify the ROC after communications are restored.

(2) The Region or installation CO that orders personnel to evacuate to a safe haven will maintain accountability of all affected personnel for the duration of the evacuation per Standard 12 - Personnel.

(3) Determine feasibility of returning evacuated personnel to their primary duty stations and establish a designated place.

(4) If returning evacuated personnel to their primary duty stations will be significantly delayed, recommend that tenant commands establish an alternate workplace.

b. CONUS and non-foreign OCONUS REGCOMs authorizing an evacuation will:

(1) Deconflict multiple safe haven locations to ensure receiving installations or areas are not overburdened for emergencies affecting multiple installations within or across a Region.

(2) Inform receiving installation COs of the impending arrival of evacuees.

(3) Receiving installation COs or REGCOMs will make every effort to accommodate the needs of evacuees and will be prepared to perform the following tasks in support of the evacuees:

(a) Establish a central receiving watch desk co-located at the visiting quarters or combined bachelor quarters to register evacuees and distribute services. Watch desk should be manned 24 hours a day for a minimum 72 hours following the emergency.

(b) Assign temporary lodging, housing, or shelter, as required. If lodging is not available on the installation, the installation CO will assist evacuees in obtaining commercial lodging.

(c) Provide access to sustenance, as required.

(d) Provide access to commissary and exchange facilities, as authorized.

(e) Provide emergency medical services, as needed.

(f) Provide a venue for exchange of information such as town hall meetings or briefings.

(g) Provide access to Fleet and Family Support Centers (FFSCs). Assess need to expand service through creation of a community service center.

(h) Accept, manage, and distribute authorized donations of food and supplies for evacuees.

(i) As feasible, provide temporary shelter for pets accompanying evacuees. This service is not an entitlement and is secondary to provision of services in direct support of human needs and restoration of MEFs.

c. Other Authorization. If the installation CO is not the ordering or authorizing authority, safe haven will be as ordered. If the ordered safe haven is a broad area, evacuees may establish safe haven anywhere within that area; however, the installation CO may recommend a specific safe haven location that would provide centralized support for their personnel.

d. CNIC N8 will designate an emergency HQ financial POC who will establish CNIC policies and procedures for centralized or decentralized disbursing following a catastrophic event. All financial questions will be directed to the CNIC POC. Regions will be responsible for working all financial issues through the designated CNIC POC. Comply with guidance issued by Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and with other fiscal laws and policies.

e. Demobilization. Ordering evacuees to return to their primary duty station can be conducted in phases, or all at once, depending on the progress of recovery efforts at the affected installation.

(1) Recovery efforts will be focused on restoring MEFs and other essential supporting activities that support critical missions. However, once MEFs and ESAs are restored, other non-mission essential services will require restoration before military and civilian dependent families can be ordered to return. This includes services provided by the local community and private sector.

(2) Commanders must weigh the fiscal concerns of sustaining dependent families in a safe haven with the impacts of ordering their return to a community still struggling to restore their basic services and critical infrastructure. For dependent families that live off-installation within the surrounding community, determine the condition of the following activities before ordering them to return:

(a) Local government functions. Have civil authorities canceled their own evacuation orders and authorized civilian residents of the community to return?

(b) Emergency services. Have the local fire, police, and emergency medical services completed their response and recovery efforts and returned to normal operations?

(c) Critical infrastructure. Has power, water, sanitation, and communications been restored?

(d) Transportation. Are the major roads, bridges, and tunnels safe for travel? Are mass transit systems restored

(e) Public schools. Are the schools open?

(f) Local economy. Have recovery efforts progressed to the point that groceries, gas stations, pharmacies, financial institutions, and other basic services are open?

(g) Special needs personnel. Persons with special needs and dependents classified as exceptional family members should be evaluated on an individual basis to determine if their basic needs can be satisfied at the installation, or by the surrounding community, before ordering their return.

RESPONSE ANNEX C: NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. Overview. All installations must be prepared to conduct or support Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) for U.S. citizens living, working, or traveling OCONUS. Political unrest, increasing international tensions, or widespread natural or technological disasters, may require the immediate evacuation of these personnel to the U.S. with little or no preparation time. The DOS is the responsible agency for conducting NEO.

2. Objectives. Operational forces or overseas Navy Regions may be tasked to implement or support NEO under the responsibility and authority of the assigned CCDR. Geographic CCDRs are responsible for planning and conducting NEO to assist the DOS.

3. Requirements. NEO planning should be conducted for both CONUS and OCONUS Navy Regions and installations per references (ah) and (ai).

a. OCONUS Regions and installations must be prepared to conduct NEO for personnel assigned to them. OCONUS Regions and installations with a seaport of debarkation (SPOD), or an airport of debarkation (APOD), must be prepared to support NEO tasking from their supported CCDR under the authority of the DOS.

b. CONUS Regions and installations must be prepared to conduct repatriation operations, including:

(1) Establishing emergency processing centers to receive, process, support, and provide follow-on transfer of evacuees.

(2) Reception of evacuees by offering temporary lodging, feeding, access to medical services, local transportation to additional commercial debarkation points, and other elements of mass care.

4. Responsibilities

a. OCONUS REGCOMs and installation COs will:

(1) Develop plans and be prepared to support or conduct NEO in coordination with supported CCDRs and in tandem with internal evacuation planning requirements.

(2) Review and familiarize themselves with host nation support agreements, capabilities, restrictions, and other diplomatic considerations per reference (ah).

(3) Ensure provisions are made for the protection and evacuation of all DoD non-combatants and when appropriate, military personnel, per reference (ag).

(4) Ensure capabilities and resources required to conduct NEO, personnel accountability, and command and control, are manned, trained, and equipped.

b. CONUS REGCOM and installation COs will:

(1) Develop plans, be prepared to support or conduct repatriation operations in coordination with CCDRs, affected OCONUS Regions, CNIC, and in tandem with internal evacuation planning requirements.

(2) Ensure provisions are made for the protection of evacuees in coordination with port of entry security forces, the DOS, DoD Police, and the FBI.

(3) Ensure capabilities and resources required to conduct repatriation operations, personnel accountability, and command and control, are manned, trained, and equipped.

5. Concept of Operations. Every NEO scenario is unique. Preparedness and coordination are the pillars of success for NEO. OCONUS Regions and installations must address their unique requirements, limitations, and coordinate their planning intentions with their supported CCDRs.

RESPONSE ANNEX D: SHELTER-IN-PLACE

1. Overview. SIP is a temporary action taken to protect personnel from hazards or threats normally occurring in the outside environment that develop with little or no warning and prevent evacuation. Initiating SIP requires rapid decision making to ensure effectiveness.

a. SIP differs from sheltering operations in that SIP locations are not certified and are staffed only by those personnel already present in the building. Shelters are certified, supplied, and staffed specifically to provide temporary protection to endangered personnel.

b. SIP differs from lockdown in that SIP is focused on protecting personnel from external threats and can be implemented on a local or area-specific location. Lockdown is conducted during an attack by an adversary, active shooter, or other security threat, when the positive security of the installation has been compromised. Lockdown requires securing all installation entry control points (ECP), securing or locking all exterior and interior doors and windows of buildings installation wide. The goal of lockdown is to deny the attacker(s) easy access to CMFs or personnel and to enhance the safety for bystanders while responding security forces engage the threat.

c. Not all buildings and facilities onboard an installation are suitable for SIP.

d. Delayed notification of installation personnel reduces the effectiveness of SIP.

e. Personnel that are outdoors when an emergency initiates are more vulnerable.

2. Objectives. To provide a personnel protection strategy for certain types of hazards such as, destructive weather, HAZMAT release including CBRN threats, and seismic events.

3. Requirements. Per reference (a), SIP is a required response capability for installations, an essential protection strategy, and is applicable to all personnel onboard the installation. Reference (b) requires installations to utilize FEMA guidance when developing SIP plans and capabilities. The following SIP response capabilities are required for Navy installations:

a. All installation CAT 1 - 5 personnel will register with the AtHoc system to enable rapid notification of emergencies.

b. Develop a SIP FAA to the EM plan that discusses execution of SIP for the following hazards:

(1) Destructive weather.

(2) HAZMAT and CBRN threats.

(3) Seismic events.

(4) Other identified local hazards or threats.

c. Develop HSAs to the EM plan that compliment and align with the SIP FAA.

d. Develop EAPs for all facilities and buildings onboard the installation, consistent with the guidance provided in this manual, for the proper execution of SIP during an emergency. EAPs must assign duties to individuals for the following actions:

(1) Securing all doors, windows, rooftop access scuttles, and service tunnels.

(2) Other facility specific actions such as, securing ventilation, stopping all industrial or other operations, and placing critical assets or machinery in a safe condition.

(3) Establishing one available ECP to the facility or building to allow CAT 1 or 5 personnel to ingress or egress in performance of their emergency duties. The ECP must remain locked and monitored continuously. Develop procedures for the ECP monitor to allow CAT 2 - 4 personnel transitioning from the outside into the facility or building after SIP is ordered.

(4) Safety wardens to direct the immediate and follow-on actions of personnel inside the facility or building.

(5) Communicating the status of the facility or building SIP and personnel musters to the EOC.

(6) Identify a facility manager for each building or manned structure they occupy.

(7) Identify spaces within facilities that could serve as a safe haven during a natural or man-made hazard per reference (aj).

(8) Provide SIP kits containing items and supplies per reference (aj) needed to protect a facility, refuge area, or safe room, from the hazards expected to occur, to all suitable SIP facilities. Each SIP kit will contain instructions and checklists for conducting SIP and for protecting individuals from hazards expected to occur.

(9) Provide SIP training to all installation personnel.

4. Responsibilities

a. Installation COs will:

(1) Ensure the SIP response requirements, discussed in paragraph 3 above, are conducted.
(2) Coordinate with the PW department and assess all installation facilities and buildings for their suitability to provide SIP protection to occupants.

b. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Develop the SIP FAA to the installation EM plan and other HSAs for hazards that would potentially trigger a SIP response. Ensure these HSAs provide scenario specific triggers

for SIP and the CDO actions for ordering SIP are provided in HSA checklists to enable rapid execution of SIP for the installation.

(2) Serve as the POC for AtHoc registration and ensure all CAT 1 - 5 personnel have established and updated their AtHoc accounts.

(3) Test the installation's MWN systems periodically to ensure all personnel are able to receive the notification for SIP.

(4) Coordinate with the installation Training Officer (ITO) to ensure training and exercises on SIP procedures are conducted for installation personnel. All facility occupants must be informed of the location and usage of safe rooms or refuge areas within each facility.

(5) Coordinate with the PW department for development of GIS products (maps) that depict all facilities or buildings onboard the installation with safe rooms. Consolidate a list of these facilities and buildings into a ready reference table and provide to the installation fire, security, and police departments.

(6) Coordinate with installation facility managers and:

(a) Establish SIP capabilities in all suitable facilities and buildings.

(b) Develop internal floor plans depicting the locations of safe rooms for each facility or building. Provide this information to building occupants in an employee building safety brochure or handout, and during training. Do not post them in common areas, which could potentially enable an active shooter to easily locate them.

(c) Develop a standardized method of discreetly marking safe rooms for building occupants to quickly identify in an emergency. Use discretion in developing this method to ensure an active shooter is not able to deduce the marking system enabling them to target these rooms based on the markings.

(d) Install SIP kits with supplies and instructions in all SIP capable buildings.

c. All installation departments and tenant commands will:

(1) Develop EAPs, consistent with the guidance provided in this manual, for the proper execution of SIP during an emergency.

(2) Identify a facility manager for each building or manned structure they occupy.

d. All installation facility managers will:

(1) Coordinate with the PW department to assess and identify safe rooms within their facilities or buildings that are compliant with reference (aj).

(2) Coordinate with the installation EMO and develop a discreet standardized marking system to identify safe rooms for building occupants to quickly locate in an emergency.

(3) Develop internal floor plans depicting the locations of safe rooms for each facility or building. Provide this information to building occupants in an employee building safety brochure or handout, and during training. Do not post them in common areas which could potentially enable an active shooter to easily locate them.

(4) Coordinate and implement facility or building EAPs for the proper execution of SIP.

5. Concept of Operations. The actions discussed here are focused primarily on those conducted by personnel during SIP and do not discuss additional actions taken by personnel during a natural or man-made hazard response. Those additional actions should be discussed in the appropriate HSA and FAA of the installation EM plan.

a. SIP Locations.

(1) Certain CMFs are constructed as hardened facilities or designed and constructed with collective protection (COLPRO) capabilities. Reference (ak) describes COLPRO as "facilities or systems equipped with air filtration devices and air locks to provide personnel with a toxic-free environment." Hardened facilities designed with COLPRO are well suited for SIP and provide protection against most natural and man-made hazards including HAZMAT and CBRN.

(2) For all other facilities and buildings that are not hardened or built with COLPRO capabilities, determine what design basis threat criteria was used in the construction of their facility, and consult reference (u) for any assumed levels of protection provided by the facility. Individual facilities or buildings may have spaces within them that would serve effectively as safe rooms for certain natural and man-made hazards. Safe room design and construction criteria are prescribed per reference (aj) and are described as "Safe Havens" (not to be confused with safe havens used during evacuation). Facility managers will consult with installation PW to determine if any areas within their facility are designated as "Safe Havens."

(3) Refuge areas may be present in certain facilities or buildings and are provided for persons with physical limitations that prevent them from using stairs. Refuge areas compliant with reference (ak) may offer protection from certain listed hazards.

(4) Many structures such as hangars, sheds, and guard shacks do not provide adequate protections against most hazards and are normally assessed as non-SIP capable. Instructions must be provided to occupants regarding the risks inherent to working in a non-SIP capable structure and provided options to reduce this risk.

b. CDOs must have unencumbered access to the installation's MWN systems at all times and properly trained to operate it. This may be accomplished by stationing a watch that is in continuous contact with the CDO at the MWN system.

c. Once a hazard has occurred, the CDO will follow local established procedures, access the EM plan HSA for the specific hazard, the SIP FAA, and the operator's guidelines for the MWN system.

(1) The CDO will pass a SIP alert via the installation's MWN systems.

(2) The alert message must indicate the nature and location of the hazard so building occupants can utilize the correct SIP method that provides the best protection.

d. After receiving the order to SIP, facility managers perform the automatic actions per their facility EAPs.

e. All personnel comply with their facility manager's instructions if inside a facility, or seek shelter if caught outside.

f. Facility managers verify the status of their building's compliance with the SIP EAP, direct all workspace managers to conduct a muster of their assigned personnel, and identify any unknown individuals in their spaces. Verify all unmanned spaces are secure.

g. Facility mangers will pass the muster information and facility status to the installation EOC when requested.

h. As installation first responders arrive on scene:

(1) Each hazard scenario is unique; personnel should be prepared for a lengthy response period.

(2) Personnel taking shelter in a facility or building that the on-scene commander has determined lies within the area of the hazard may be required to evacuate.

i. SIP will remain in effect until the installation CO has given the order to secure from SIP (normally upon recommendation from the on-scene commander, EMO, or CDO).

j. SIP terminates after the emergency has passed, conditions outside are safe, and the CDO has passed the "All Clear" signal over the installation MWN systems.

k. Ensure all personnel are warned that dangerous conditions may exist outside of their buildings due to damage caused during the event and they should exercise caution when exiting their facility.

RESPONSE ANNEX E: LOCKDOWN

1. Overview. Lockdown is a protection strategy used during an attack by an adversary, active shooter, or other security threat, and/or when the positive security of the installation has been compromised. Lockdown is a temporary sheltering technique personnel will perform as long as necessary until the threat has ended. Initiating lockdown requires rapid decision making to ensure effectiveness.

2. Objectives. To deny the attacker(s) easy access to buildings, CMFs, or personnel, and to enhance the safety for bystanders while responding security forces engage the threat.

3. Requirements. Per reference (a), lockdown is a required response capability for installations, and is applicable to all military uniformed services, federal employees, contractor personnel, dependents, or other guests of the installation.

a. Installations will:

(1) Register all CAT 1 - 5 personnel with the AtHoc system to enable rapid notification of emergencies.

(2) Develop EAPs for all facilities and buildings onboard the installation, consistent with the guidance provided in this manual, for the proper execution of lockdown during an emergency.

(a) EAPs must assign duties to individuals for the following actions:

1. Locking and securing all entrances to facilities or buildings.

2. Locking and securing all windows, rooftop access scuttles and service tunnels.

3. Other facility specific actions such as, securing ventilation, stopping all industrial or other non-essential operations, placing critical assets or machinery in a safe condition.

4. Establishing one available ECP to the facility or building to allow CAT 1 or 5 personnel to ingress or egress in the performance of their emergency duties. The ECP must remain locked and monitored continuously. Develop procedures for the ECP monitor to allow CAT 2 - 4 personnel transitioning from the outside into the facility or building after lockdown is ordered

5. Safety wardens to direct the immediate and follow-on actions of personnel inside the facility or building.

6. Communicating the status of the facility or building lockdown and personnel musters to the EOC.

(3) Identify a facility manager for each building or manned structure onboard the installation.

(4) Identify spaces within facilities that could serve as a safe haven during an attack per reference (aj).

(5) Provide active shooter response and survival training for all installation personnel.

4. Responsibilities

a. Installation COs will:

(1) Ensure the lockdown response requirements in paragraph E.3. are fulfilled.

(2) In coordination with the PW department, assess all installation facilities and buildings for the identification of potential safe rooms and their suitability to provide protection to occupants during active shooter events. For descriptions of different types of facilities suitable for lockdown refer to Annex D.

(3) In coordination with the installation EMO, ensure all CAT 1 - 5 personnel are registered in the AtHoc system.

b. Installation EMOs will:

(1) Develop the Lockdown FAA and Active Shooter HSA to the installation EM plan. Ensure the active shooter HSA provides scenario specific triggers for lockdown and the CDO actions for ordering lockdown are provided in HSA checklists to enable rapid execution of lockdown for the installation.

(2) Serve as the POC for AtHoc registration. Ensure all personnel have established and updated their AtHoc accounts.

(3) Test the installation's MWN systems periodically to ensure all personnel are able to receive the notification for lockdown.

(4) In coordination with the ITO, ensuring training and exercises on lockdown procedures are conducted for installation personnel.

(5) In coordination with the PW department, develop GIS products (maps) that depict all facilities or buildings onboard the installation with safe rooms. Consolidate a list of these facilities and buildings into a ready reference table and provide to the installation fire, security, and police departments.

(6) In coordination with installation facility managers:

(a) Establish lockdown capabilities in all suitable facilities and buildings.

(b) Develop internal floor plans depicting the locations of safe rooms for each facility or building. Provide this information to building occupants in an employee building safety brochure or handout, and during training. Do not post them in common areas which could potentially enable an active shooter to easily locate them.

(c) Develop a standardized method of discreetly marking safe rooms for building occupants to quickly identify in an emergency. Use discretion in developing this method to ensure an active shooter is not able to deduce the marking system enabling them to target these rooms based on the markings.

(d) All installation departments and tenant commands will:

1. Develop EAPs, consistent with the guidance provided in this manual, for the proper execution of lockdown during an emergency.

2. Identify a facility manager for each building or manned structure they occupy.

(e) All installation facility managers will:

1. In coordination with the PW department, assess and identify safe rooms within their facilities or buildings that are compliant with reference (aj).

2. In coordination with the installation EMO, identify safe rooms with a discreet standardized marking system for building occupants to quickly locate in an emergency.

3. Develop internal floor plans depicting the locations of safe rooms for each facility or building. Provide this information to building occupants in an employee building safety brochure or handout, and during training. Do not post them in common areas which could potentially enable an active shooter to easily locate them.

4. Coordinate and implement facility or building EAPs for the proper execution of lockdown.

5. Concepts of Operations. The actions discussed in this section are focused primarily on those conducted during a lockdown and do not discuss additional actions taken by installation personnel during an active shooter or other security event response. Those additional actions should be discussed in the appropriate HSA and FAA of the installation EM plan.

a. Lockdown requires securing all installation ECPs, and securing or locking all exterior and interior doors and windows of facilities or buildings installation wide. The differences between SIP and lockdown are discussed in Annex D.

b. Response to an active shooter or other security event is conducted by installation NSF and managed by the installation Security Officer. Lockdown planning should be coordinated with the installation security and AT programs to ensure alignment of response actions and FPCON protocols.

c. Facilities or buildings penetrated by an attacker are excluded from lockdown requirements. Personnel inside a facility or building where an attack is occurring must take protective actions after self-assessing their best options. The most effective protective actions for an active shooter event are:

(1) Evacuate to safety. Personnel who choose this option should be trained on local procedures for what to expect when encountering responding NSF personnel during their evacuation.

(2) Conceal and shelter. Not all internal spaces are suitable for concealing and sheltering during an active shooter attack. Facility managers must identify which spaces provide suitable concealment and protection for an active shooter event (lockable door with solid steel frame, barricade objects, phone, solid walls that extend through the acoustic ceiling to the next floor above), and discreetly mark them for quick identification.

(3) Self-defense. Aggressively defend against or disrupt the attacker through whatever means are available. Personnel who chose this option of last resort should attempt to execute their offensive or defensive strategy in teams, using decisive speed and violence, and adapting common items into weapons to either disrupt or disable the attacker.

d. CDOs should have unencumbered access to the installation's MWN systems at all times and properly trained to operate it. This may be accomplished by stationing a watch at the MWN system that is in continuous contact with the CDO.

e. Once an active shooter event or other security threat has occurred, the CDO will follow local established procedures, access the EM plan HSA for active shooter, the Lockdown FAA, and the operator's guidelines for the MWN system.

(1) The CDO will pass an active shooter security threat alert via the installation's MWN systems and order the installation lockdown. The alert message must indicate the location and nature of the active shooter/security threat so building occupants are aware of their proximity to the threat.

(2) The EOC staff should be prepared to coordinate the arrival and entry of mutual aid responders with security personnel at the installation ECP.

f. After receiving the order to lockdown:

(1) Facility managers perform the automatic actions per their facility EAPs.

(2) Installation personnel conduct the automatic actions prescribed per local instruction or procedure (secure fence line ECPs, establish cordons, etc.).

(3) All personnel comply with their facility manager's instructions if inside a facility, or seek shelter if caught outdoors.

(4) Facility managers verify the status of their building's compliance with the lockdown EAP, direct all workspace managers to conduct a muster of their assigned personnel, and identify any unknown individuals in their spaces. Verify all unmanned spaces are secure.

(5) Facility managers will pass the muster information and facility status to the installation EOC when requested.

g. As installation NSF teams engage and neutralize the threat:

(1) Each active shooter security event scenario is unique (e.g. hostage situation, method of attack, weapons and tactics used, or number of attackers). Personnel should be prepared for a lengthy response period.

(2) Once an active shooter security threat event initiates, positive security of the installation is assumed to be compromised until the threat is neutralized and the installation is swept to verify no additional adversaries or threats remain.

(3) Building-by-building security sweeps may be conducted by NSF teams. Facility managers should be prepared to support the NSF when they arrive. If facility managers can attest to the building's security during the lockdown, and have verified the identities of all unassigned or unknown personnel inside the building when it was locked down, the NSF team leader may elect to consider the building clear to expedite security sweeps.

h. Lockdown will remain in effect until the installation CO has given the order to terminate the lockdown (normally upon recommendation from the on-scene commander, Security Officer, or ATO). During the security sweep, the installation CO may authorize NSF teams to evacuate personnel from buildings as they are cleared to an established staging or triage area. This action is preferred for large installations to alleviate hardships for personnel sheltering in their building for extended periods.

i. Lockdown will terminate after the emergency has passed, conditions outside are safe, and the CDO has passed the "All Clear" signal over the installation MWN systems.

j. Ensure personnel are warned that dangerous conditions may exist outside of their buildings due to damage caused during the event and they should exercise caution when exiting their facility.

RESPONSE ANNEX F: DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1. Overview. Responding to an emergency within a local jurisdiction is the responsibility of local, municipal, and state governments. Emergencies or disasters that overwhelm the local, municipal, and state governments' response capabilities may require a large national response using resources available from other states through the EMAC, and federal assistance through the Stafford Act and the NRF.

2. Objectives. To provide policy and guidance for the conduct of DSCA, per references (x) and (am)

3. Requirements

a. All CONUS Regions and installations will:

(1) Be prepared to employ Navy resources in support of civil authorities when directed by higher authority, or requested by local civil authorities under the Immediate Response (IR) authority or Emergency Authority as described in paragraph F.4. below.

(2) Ensure DSCA response actions are conducted per references (x) and (am) if the actions:

(a) Include the use of U.S. federal military forces; National Guard forces performing duty per Title 32, U.S. Code; DoD civilians; DoD contract personnel; and DoD component assets.

(b) Are in response to requests for assistance from federal, state, tribal, and local governments for domestic incidents, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities.

(c) When support to state, tribal, or local authorities, is provided by National Guard forces per Title 32, U.S. Code, it is considered DSCA but is conducted as a state, territory, or district-directed action.

(3) When directed by higher authority, be prepared to support civilian LE agencies consistent with the needs of military preparedness, while recognizing and conforming to the legal limitations on direct DoD involvement in civilian law enforcement activities.

(a) Support of civilian LE agencies by Navy personnel must be provided per sections 112, 351, 831, 1116, 1751, and 1385 of title 18, U.S. Code (The Posse Comitatus Act); section 1970 of title 2, U.S. Code (for support to the U.S. Capitol Police); reference (am), and other federal laws, including those protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals as applicable.

(b) Except as authorized in reference (am), DoD personnel are prohibited from providing the following forms of direct civilian LE assistance:

1. Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

2. A search or seizure.

3. An arrest; apprehension; stop and frisk; engaging in interviews, interrogations, canvassing, or questioning of potential witnesses or suspects; or similar activity.

4. Using force or physical violence, brandishing a weapon, discharging or using a weapon, or threatening to discharge or use a weapon except in self-defense, in defense of other DoD persons in the vicinity, or in defense of non-DoD persons, including civilian LE personnel, in the vicinity when directly related to an assigned activity or mission.

5. Evidence collection; security functions; crowd and traffic control; and operating, manning, or staffing checkpoints.

6. Surveillance or pursuit of individuals, vehicles, items, transactions, or physical locations, or acting as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

7. Forensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from a suspect for use in a civilian LE investigation in the U.S. unless there is a DoD nexus (e.g., the victim is a member of the military or the crime occurred on an installation under exclusive DoD jurisdiction) or the responsible civilian law enforcement official requesting such testing declares in writing that the evidence to be examined was obtained by consent.

(4) Conduct DSCA planning consistent with NIMS, the NRF, and supported CCDR contingency plans for operations in their AOR.

(5) Be aware that per reference (e), DSCA operations may not involve the Region or installation EM programs directly but may involve coordination with EM assets. EM programs may execute DSCA-related activities, such as planning, training and exercising for a DSCA role; Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), FEMA Region coordination, and NEPLO program management. Incidents that fall within the scope of Navy DSCA require close coordination with EM activities as described in this manual.

(6) Be prepared to provide military forces to protect military equipment, personnel and assets critical to MEFs and critical infrastructure. This may include assistance in restoring or protecting military assets off the installation such as recruiting stations, NOSCs, and installation critical infrastructure and must be per references (x) and (am).

4. Responsibilities

a. CONUS REGCOMs will:

(1) Per reference (e), serve as Navy DSCA RPAs and support the NCC assigned as Navy DSCA Primary Planning Agents (PPA). The NCCs assigned as PPAs are Commander, USFFC, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command (NAVNORTH), and PACFLT. DSCA is the responsibility and jurisdiction of the RPAs, DSCA coordinators, NEPLOs and NCCs. U.S.

Regions within the PACOM AOR may have additional requirements identified in writing by their supported CCDR. DSCA coordinators must maintain close coordination with the Region Emergency Manager in Regions where the DSCA coordinator is not also the Region Emergency Manager.

(2) As directed by PPAs, be prepared to provide assistance to civil authorities during emergencies within their AOR, with resources under their control, within the scope and limitations of applicable laws and regulations regarding DSCA. DSCA mission support should be tailored to ensure adverse impacts to primary Navy missions are minimized.

(3) Serve as RPA to their PPA for Navy DSCA program planning, coordination, and operations within their AOR, and for ensuring that subordinate organizations have an effective standing program in support of civil authorities.

(4) Coordinate with their respective PPA, and other agencies as required, for DSCA responses, special events, and exercises.

(5) Exercise DSCA program coordination with PPA, as appropriate.

(6) Provide CNIC a DSCA plan for the Region that complies with their respective PPA and supported CCDRs DSCA plans. The Region DSCA plan must be consistent with the NRF and NIMS, executable in all hazards, and consider the geographical terrain, climate, population, infrastructure, jurisdictional authorities, and adjoining Navy Regions DSCA response coordination as required.

(7) Designate a Region NEPLO and a DSCA Coordinator (N3N), which may be the same person.

(8) Provide guidance, support, and assign responsibilities to NEPLOs within their AOR for the execution of DSCA operations and exercises.

(9) Deploy NEPLOs as required for DSCA operations in their AOR, and to provide SA of emerging or potential hazards that may impact Navy installations or surrounding locations.

(10) Assume custody, ownership, maintenance, and management, of communications and information technology systems provided to NEPLOs to operate remotely.

(11) Assess and report the status of their DSCA and NEPLO programs to CNIC annually.

(12) Review and approve all DSCA related support agreements for installations under their cognizance.

(13) Oversee installation readiness to support the PPA as a BSI, ISB, federal staging area, federal team staging facility, and modular airborne fire-fighting system operating base. BSIs and ISBs are described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination.

b. CONUS installation COs will:

(1) As directed by the REGCOM, be prepared to provide assistance to civil authorities during emergencies within their AOR, with resources under their control, within the scope and limitations of applicable laws and regulations regarding DSCA. DSCA mission support should be tailored to ensure adverse impacts to primary Navy missions are minimized.

(2) Be aware that except for IR and Emergency Authority, only the SECDEF may approve requests from civil authorities or qualifying entities for federal military support for:

(a) Defense assistance in responding to civil disturbances (requires Presidential authorization).

(b) Defense response to CBRN incidents.

(c) Defense assistance to civilian LE organizations, except as authorized in reference (am).

(d) Assistance in responding with assets with potential for lethality. This support includes loans of arms; vessels or aircraft; or ammunition; all support to CT operations; and all support to civilian LE authorities in situations where a confrontation between civilian LE and civilian individuals or groups is reasonably anticipated.

(3) Provide support or assistance for a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority. IR authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory. All requests from civil authorities and qualifying entities for assistance shall be evaluated for:

(a) Legality (compliance with the laws)

(b) Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD Forces).

(c) Risk (safety of DoD Forces).
(d) Cost (including the source of funding and the effect on the DoD budget).

(e) Appropriateness (whether providing the requested support is in the interest of the Department).

(f) Readiness (impact on the DoD's ability to perform its other primary missions).

1. Installation COs will ensure the IR support does not interfere with, or negatively impact their primary missions, facilities, or the safety of personnel.

2. Per reference (e), installation COs acting under IR authority must report the request, the nature of the response, and all other pertinent information to their chain of command

and an OPREP 3 reporting to immediately notify the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC) through the chain of command and the NMCC. Notification should reach the NMCC within two hours of the decision to provide immediate response.

3. IR is provided to requesting civil authorities on a cost-reimbursable basis, however, it should not be delayed or denied because of the inability or unwillingness of the requester to commit to reimbursing the Navy.

4. An IR mission must end when the issue that initiated the request for IR is resolved, or when directed by higher authority. If the IR mission has not ended within 72 hours, installation COs will reassess if support is still required.

5. The civil authority requesting immediate response support must provide a written request that supports the request and the nature of the response as soon as possible.

(4) Ensure that Navy forces will not be used to quell civil disturbances unless specifically authorized by the President, per applicable law, or as permitted under emergency authority. Per reference (x), installation COs are provided emergency authority in extraordinary emergency circumstances; where prior authorization by the President is impossible, and local elected authorities are unable to control a civil disturbance; to take temporary actions necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances if:

(a) Such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life, destruction of property, and needed to restore governmental function and public order.

(b) When duly constituted federal, state, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for federal property or federal governmental functions. Federal action, including the use of federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect federal property or functions.

(5) In coordination with the installation EMO, develop a DSCA FAA to the EM plan that describes EM program support for the installation's DSCA program per the region DSCA plan and this manual that discusses the following:

(a) Procedures for reimbursement of response services provided.

(b) Procedures for establishing a BSI or ISB.

(c) Relationships with civil authorities including copies of all support agreements.

(d) Contact information for NEPLOs assigned to support.

(e) IR and Emergency Authority.

(f) Local limitations or challenges for DSCA support, as applicable.

(6) Designate a DSCA representative to assist coordination of installation DSCA-related activities with the region DSCA Coordinator.

(7) Be prepared to execute an assignment as a BSI or ISB.

(8) Engage in DSCA mutual aid planning with civil authorities to develop appropriate support requirements.

(9) Document and report all DSCA related activities and expenses, and submit for reimbursement.

(10) When directed by the REGCOM, coordinate funding and support with operational commanders, and federal, state, territory, tribal, and local governments.

5. Concept of Operations. Because of its unique capabilities and resources, the U.S. Navy may be requested through established channels to provide DSCA emergency support to state and local governments during an emergency after their resources have been expended.

a. DSCA is designed to provide emergency support within CONUS, its territories and possessions, and does not apply to overseas installations.

b. For OCONUS installations, foreign disaster relief (FDR) is defined and delineated in reference (al). Host nation employees are subject to specific restrictions, such as local agreements, legal requirements and conditions of employment that can limit response.

c. DSCA operations and EM program activities may occur simultaneously requiring coordination and de-confliction of requirements to ensure appropriate application of resources within the legal restrictions governing the use of Title 10 forces.

d. The DSCA program allows for development of support agreements between local governments and nearby installations. Support agreements developed in advance allow both parties to request assistance from each other for isolated and short duration events. Use of either parties' response capabilities and resources are normally prescribed for specific reasons and conditions. Support agreements are subject to legal review before approval by the REGCOM. Use of support agreements at the local level allows installations and local governments to share their response capabilities for the mutual benefit of both and streamlines the requesting process allowing for quicker response. Support agreements are described in Standard 10 - Operational Coordination and reference (e).

e. DSCA is initiated by a request for DoD assistance from civil authorities or qualifying entities or is authorized by the President or SECDEF.

f. DoD is either a coordinating, primary, or a supporting agency for all of the 15 ESFs under the NRF. DoD is responsible for conducting or supporting ESF mission assignments, as assigned by FEMA or the ESF coordinator, during a declared national disaster. An ESF mission

assignment is just one of the many potential methods of tasking DoD resources with DSCA response.

g. DSCA Command and Control

(1) Many civilian jurisdictions across the U.S. have developed detailed strategies for integrating available Title 10 and Title 32 military units and resources into their respective disaster response plans, training, and exercise operations.

(2) The DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and DSCA codifies the concept of a dual-status commander as the normal command and control arrangement for DSCA to facilitate the integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces for domestic response. The dual-status commander has the authority to direct both federal Active Duty forces, and state National Guard forces in response to domestic incidents. Dual-status commanders are approved by SECDEF with the consent of the state governor.

(3) CNIC DSCA is managed within N3.

(4) Navy Shore DSCA command and control is coordinated under two methods, a permanent operational and administrative structure, and an ad-hoc structure that is event-specific and designed to meet the unique requirements of the disaster or event being supported. The permanent command and control structure for Navy Shore DSCA is represented in Figure F-1.



Figure F-1. Navy Shore DSCA Organization

(5) DSCA operations. The DCO or Joint Force commander establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another. DSCA operations are generally conducted in the following phases:

(a) Phase 0 (shape)

(b) Phase 1 (anticipate)

(c) Phase 2 (respond)

(d) Phase 3 (operate)

(e) Phase 4 (stabilize)

(f) Phase 5 (transition)

(6) CNIC is responsible for managing the Navy Phase 0 Shore DSCA and NEPLO programs and to fund the RPA DSCA plans and requirements per PPA guidance. Navy Phase 0 Shore DSCA efforts involve maintaining continuous SA, training, planning, evaluation of plans, and capabilities identification for disaster preparedness that involve Navy shore assets. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, participation in working groups, identification of gaps or seams, developing mitigation strategies and plans through exercises, DSCA senior leadership seminars, and public affairs outreach. These activities continue through all phases. As part of the SA function, REGCOM may deploy NEPLOs to perform a Navy liaison function to provide SA of emerging or potential hazards that may impact Navy installations or surrounding locations.

(7) DSCA incident response develops using a top down approach as SA improves and requests are received.

(8) The DSCA Tracking System (DSCATS) is used to track and report all Phase 0 Shore DSCA support agreements, Immediate Response actions, manage all NEPLO training, readiness, and DSCA reporting.

(9) NEPLO support. NEPLOs are senior Navy Reserve officers who serve as a cadre of DSCA experts and are assigned to key DoD HQ, FEMA national and region HQ, and state and territory National Guard headquarters, to represent and support the PPAs and RPAs in DSCA Phases 0 through 5, in coordination with the DCO.

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RESPONSE ANNEX G: FATALITY MANAGEMENT

1. Overview. Proper management of fatalities, especially if in large numbers, is a primary public health and safety concern during a disaster.

2. Objectives. To provide policy and guidance for the handling of human remains including their decontamination, mortuary affairs, transport and dignified transfer, and funeral honors. These resources may be leveraged for mass casualty response planning. This Annex discusses all aspects of Navy fatality management to provide installations with a solid foundation to conduct mass casualty planning and response.

3. Requirements. Regions and installations will:

a. Conduct all operational reporting regarding death of a Service Member per references (y) and (z).

b. Conduct all administrative reporting regarding death of a Service Member per references (an), (ao), and (ap).

c. Ensure the successful dignified transfer of remains per reference (aq).

4. Responsibilities. REGCOMs will:

a. Coordinate CACO notification missions.

b. Coordinate military funeral honors support.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Coordination. Establishing contacts and agreements with municipalities and facilities to support fatality management requirements is necessary. Contacts may include the coroner, medical examiner, morgues, and funeral homes to address the needs of the installation.

b. Death of a Service Member. Death of a Navy member occurring onboard a Navy installation must be reported to the Navy Service Casualty Office (PERS-13) as soon as possible after notification. The Service Members' current command is responsible for reporting the casualty using the PCR via Defense Casualty Information Processing System (DCIPS). Installations will follow their Region's casualty reporting procedures and policies regarding CACO notification missions.

(1) To hasten CACO notification and benefits processing, reporting commands are requested to include the following documents with the PCR submitted to DCIPS:

(a) NAVPERS 1070/602 Dependency Application/Record of Emergency Data.

(b) SGLV 8286 Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Election and Certificate.

(2) The following categories of personnel casualties must be reported:

(a) Death of an Active Duty or Reserve Service Member, to include U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen, or dependent.

(b) Death of a DoD civilian employee or DoD contractor due to hostile or non-hostile action OCONUS or the result of hostile action within CONUS.

(c) Death of a 120-day disability retired member.

(d) Additional categories of casualties not considered a fatality, yet still requiring reporting via PCR, are discussed in detail per references (ao) and (ap).

(3) Reporting commands can contact Navy Casualty Operations during emergencies at 1-800-368-3202 or 901-634-9279 (after hours). Additional information for Navy Casualty Operations may be found by logging into DCIPS at any of the following sites: https://dcsa.hrc.army.mil/pcr; https://dcsb.hrc.army.mil/pcr; https://dcsc.hrc.army.mil/pcr; or https://dcsd.hrc.army.mil/pcr.

c. Funeral Honors. The practice of rendering funeral honors is considered a solemn and sacred obligation and a total force mission. Funeral honors program management, scheduling, tracking, training, and funding is conducted by Navy Regions.

d. Mortuary Affairs. Remains returning from a theater of conflict contaminated with CBRN agents will be decontaminated and returned through routine mortuary channels. For remains that cannot be decontaminated to a safe transportation level, protecting the health of Service Members and the public must take precedence over the rapid repatriation of remains.

(1) Temporary interment or temporary storage of contaminated remains that pose a threat to public health is recommended until safe handling procedures and materials can be identified. Temporary interment should be considered only after exploring all other courses of action. Authority for temporary interment in an OCONUS theater resides with the supported CCDR.

(2) DoD directing the cremation of remains is not authorized.

(3) References (w) and (aq) provide further discussion and policy for decontamination of human remains.

RESPONSE ANNEX H: EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION-1 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING TEMPLATE

1. Overview. Per Standard 8 - Planning, Navy installations may develop and use ESFs as an option for EM planning. This Annex is an example planning template that is modeled on the NRF ESF-1 for Transportation. For the purpose of this ESF, transportation refers to the infrastructure and the resources necessary to move personnel and materials from one location to another, relocating MEP in support of COOP, conducting evacuations, or for other emergency or disaster response requirements that involve transportation capabilities.

2. Objectives. To provide a planning template for installations considering the use of ESFs for EM planning purposes. Use of this template is encouraged to support uniformity across the Shore Enterprise.

3. Requirements

a. Coordinating Agencies

(1) The installation PW department is a primary agency.

(2) Support agencies:

(a) Navy Region or installation FP.

(b) Navy Region or installation Air Operations.

(c) Navy Region or installation Port Operations.

(d) Navy Region or installation Supply.

(e) Navy installation tenant commands with organic air, land, rail, or sea transportation capabilities as specified in pre-established instructions MOU.

(f) U.S. government, state, or local municipality organizations with organic air, land, rail, or sea transportation capabilities as specified in pre-established MOUs.

(g) Private sector organizations with organic air, land, rail, or sea transportation capabilities as specified in pre-established contracts or MOUs.

4. Responsibilities

a. The installation PWO is designated as the ESF-1 Coordinator and is responsible for:

(1) Supporting EOC operations and coordinating ESF-1 activities.

(2) Developing an ESF-1 SOP to document ESF-1 support requirements with the assistance of the installation EMO.

(3) Coordinating with other organizations for designation of transportation bases, staging areas, refueling, and repair facilities.

(4) Coordination of planning tasks associated with transportation resources needed to establish and sustain an ISB.

b. The installation security department is responsible for installation traffic management, deconfliction, and local jurisdiction coordination during an ESF-1 activation.

5. Concept of Operations. ESF-1 support includes the coordination of transportation activities to enhance the efforts of emergency response agencies that protect the public and the MEP that sustain MEFs. It also supports the National Planning Goal Critical Transportation core capability, by establishing priorities and allocation of transportation resources, processing transportation requests, managing traffic, determining priorities of road and runway repair, and for conducting EM coordination with neighboring jurisdictions and the ROC. ESF-1 may be activated independently or in conjunction with other ESFs, as determined by the EOC. ESF-1 Primary Agencies are responsible for review and revision of the installation ESF-1.

a. Situation

(1) An event has occurred that effects the installation, Region, or the Nation, requiring activation of ESF-1 or,

(2) The installation or Region has received urgent tasking from HHQ to conduct a DSCA mission involving transportation capabilities or,

(3) The installation CO has received a request for DSCA support from a local or state jurisdiction that meets the conditions for IR per references (e) and (x).

b. Assumptions

(1) A significant emergency or disaster may severely damage organic transportation infrastructure. The movement of personnel and materials could be negatively affected.

(2) Many local transportation modes may be disrupted affecting the ability of MEP to respond when activated.

(3) Response operations may require traffic control to divert traffic around damaged, isolated, or evacuated areas. Transportation systems used for emergency response operations may be saturated beyond local capabilities and require assistance from other agencies.

c. Limitations. Many Navy installations are located at geographically isolated areas such as islands, peninsulas, or other remote locations. These areas require an increased reliance on local

transportation infrastructure or local contracts for fuel. These sites are at higher risk to the negative impacts of transportation disruptions.

d. Prevention. Installations should develop and deliver public awareness information to all installation personnel regarding the threat of terrorism attacks on public transportation modes when appropriate. Use of public transportation modes should be limited during heightened FPCON.

e. Protection

(1) Installations must coordinate and pre-plan transportation missions for organizations and tenant commands with COOP support requirements. Identify all MEFs, their alternate relocations sites, CAT 1 personnel required to relocate, and determine transportation resources needed to support relocation, if not resourced internally by the organization or tenant command sustaining the MEF. Exercise pre-planned transportation missions annually to measure effectiveness of plans and capabilities. Document pre-planned transportation missions in the ESF-1 SOP.

(2) Installations must coordinate and pre-plan transportation missions for organizations and tenant commands with evacuation support requirements. Identify all safe havens and CAT 2 - 4 personnel required to evacuate. Determine transportation resources needed to support relocation, if not resourced internally by the organization or tenant command ordered to evacuate. Exercise pre-planned transportation missions annually to measure effectiveness of plans and capabilities. Document pre-planned transportation missions in the ESF-1 SOP.

(3) ESF-1 Primary Agencies will develop an inventory of all available organic and contracted transportation assets and resources available for conducting pre-planned transportation missions. Include POCs, locations, operating areas, contractual statement of work for commercial carriers, and the location of fuel distribution points. Document all inventories in the ESF-1 SOP.

(4) ESF-1 Primary Agencies, in coordination with the EMWG, will determine limitations and vulnerabilities for organic transportation capabilities, and develop contingency plans as necessary for conducting emergency transportation operations under all hazard and threat conditions. Document contingency plans in the ESF-1 SOP.

(5) Installations will ensure all ESF-1 support personnel are trained in their roles and responsibilities per the ESF-1 SOP and their departmental guidance. Transportation planning is the responsibility of the public works officer or those offices with transportations assets who participate in COOP and evacuation planning.

(6) Installations will ensure ESF-1 scenarios are integrated into exercises to validate this ESF and supporting procedures.

f. Response

(1) Activation. The installation EOC will notify the ESF-1 Primary and Support Agencies of EOC activation. The ESF-1 Coordinator will report to the EOC to coordinate ESF-1 activities in support of the IMT. The ESF-1 Coordinator will determine additional EOC staffing needs as necessary to assist with ESF-1 activities.

(2) EOC operations. The ESF-1 Coordinator and supporting staff may report to and work from an alternate location if space is limited in the EOC. Alternate ESF-1 support locations will be designated in advance and identified in the installation EM Plan.

(a) All designated ESF-1 Support Agencies must identify resources available for supporting response and recovery operations and report them to the ESF-1 Coordinator.

(b) The ESF-1 Coordinator will prioritize and provide transportation resources to organizations or tenant commands with MEFs that have activated COOP, upon request.

(c) The ESF-1 Coordinator will prioritize and provide transportation resources to organizations or tenant commands that have ordered evacuation, upon request.

(d) The ESF-1 Coordinator will receive all transportation related requests for assistance (RFA) and prioritize the allocation of resources based upon MEF sustainment, FP, DSCA, and first responder needs. RFAs that cannot be resourced locally will be forwarded to the ROC for follow on action.

(e) The ESF-1 Coordinator will track the status of all transportation assets and resources deployed on and off the installation through completion of the mission.

(3) Recovery

(a) Upon completion of damage assessments, determine incident priorities and transportation demands that support recovery operations.

(b) Ensure the appropriate prioritization for repairs of transportation infrastructure to facilitate MEP access to CMFs and first responder access to all areas of the installation.

(c) Provide transportation support for mobilization sites, staging areas, ISBs, and distribution points.

(d) Plan for and conduct demobilization of deployed transportation assets once the mission is completed.

(e) Documentation. All organizations involved in the recovery effort must keep detailed records of expenses to facilitate reimbursement. Ensure all EOC, first responder, dispatch, SITREPS, and operational records associated with the event are collected and reviewed to support development of a lessons learned and AARs.

(4) Mitigation

(a) Conduct an analysis of the hazard or threat causing the EOC activation for development of remediation actions and hazard mitigation plans.

(b) Provide results of the hazard or threat analysis to the installation working group for follow-on action.

(c) Update the installation EM Plan and applicable HSAs with the hazard and threat analysis findings and recommendations of the working group.

6. Administration. Submit copies of AARs and lessons learned to the region Emergency Manager.

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RESPONSE ANNEX I: MASS CASUALTY

1. Overview. Large scale disasters present the possibility for mass casualties. A primary function of Navy EM is to save lives. This requires the Shore Enterprise to develop the capacity for managing large numbers of casualties during a crisis.

2. Objectives. To provide policy and guidance for mass casualty planning and Navy MTF coordination

3. Requirements. Regions and installations will develop mass casualty response plans and capabilities per references (w) and (ac). Planning should address:

a. The available medical resources in proximity to the installation.

b. MAAs to support mass casualty requirements.

c. Procedures for operating with local hospitals.

d. Navy F&ES mass casualty procedures.

e. Triage.

f. Treatment.

g. Patient tracking.

h. Patient transport.

4. Responsibilities. The installation CO will:

a. In coordination with the installation EMO, ensure a mass casualty FAA to the EM plan is developed and implemented.

b. Establish coordination channels and synchronize plans with the closest MTF for the support of mass casualties during an emergency.

5. Concept of Operations

a. The EM response capabilities of Navy MTFs vary significantly based on their staffing and composition, ranging from large Navy Medical Centers with over 1,000 staff and advanced trauma care capabilities, to small Branch Health Clinics with a handful of staff members and limited primary care support capabilities. Close coordination between MTF and installation leadership and EM personnel is critical to managing expectations and building effective MTF support into an installation mass casualty response plan.

b. Navy MTF support during mass casualty incidents broadly fits into three categories:

(1) Trauma care. Certain MTFs can receive trauma patients from the incident directly via ambulance or other transport.

(2) Mass casualty response teams. Certain MTFs that have trained and equipped a small team of medical response personnel, who possess advanced trauma care skills –e.g. Emergency Room (ER) physicians, Fleet Marine Force Corpsmen, and Independent Duty Corpsmen (IDCs). The MTF mass casualty response teams are trained to coordinate with the Incident Commander, then deploy to/near the incident site, where they can assist in stabilizing and triaging patients, and help prepare them for evacuation.

(3) Mass casualty patient decontamination. Certain MTFs have trained and equipped teams to decontaminate patients that self-refer to the MTF following an incident on or near the installation that requires decontamination. This MTF patient decontamination team does not deploy away from the MTF.

(a) The largest Navy MTFs have patient decontamination teams trained and equipped to use OSHA Level C PPE and employ OSHA First Receiver guidelines to operate in a "warm zone" and decontaminate patients exposed to hazardous substances.

(b) The teams provide these MTFs with the capability to respond to a contingency where large numbers of installation personnel that have been or believe they have been exposed to a hazardous substance and report to the MTF seeking urgent medical care.

(c) MTF patient decontamination teams are trained and equipped to decontaminate both ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients, but the teams do not have any trauma care capability, nor do they increase the level of care the MTF can provide. As a result, most Navy MTFs with a patient decontamination team cannot receive or treat trauma patients, and after cleaning the patients via the decontamination shelter, they can only refer them to definitive care facilities if additional medical care is needed.

APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

(a) DoD Instruction 6055.17 of 13 February 2017, DoD Emergency Management Program

(b) OPNAVINST 3440.17A, Navy Installation Emergency Management Program

(c) OPNAVINST 3040.5E, Procedures and Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Reactor and Radiological Accidents

(d) OPNAVINST 3440.15D, Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapon Incident Response Management

(e) OPNAVINST 3440.16E, Navy Defense Support of Civil Authorities Program

(f) DoD Instruction 2000.12 of 1 March 2012, DoD Anti-terrorism Program

(g) DoD Instruction O-2000.16 of 17 November 2016, DoD Anti-terrorism Program Implementation

(h) DoD Instruction 6055.06 of 3 October 2019, DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program

(i) OPNAVINST 11320.23G, Navy Fire and Emergency Services Program

(j) Joint Publication 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities

(k) OPNAVINST 5090.1D, Environmental Readiness Program

(l) OPNAVINST 5100.23G, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program

(m) OPNAVINST 3030.5C, Navy Continuity of Operations Program and Policy

(n) DoD Instruction 6200.03 of 28 March 2019, Public Health Emergency Management within the Department of Defense

(o) OPNAVINST 3400.12, Required Operational Capability Levels for Navy Installations and Activities

(p) NFPA Standard 473, Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents

(q) OPNAVINST 3400.10H, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Requirements Supporting Operational Readiness

(r) OPNAVINST 3502.8, Navy Mission Assurance Program

(s) OPNAVINST 5530.14E, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program

(t) DoD Directive 3020.40 of 29 November 2016, Mission Assurance

(u) UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Anti-terrorism Standards for Buildings

(v) UFC 4-021-01, Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems

(w) BUMEDINST 3440.10A, Navy Medicine Force Health Protection Emergency Management Program

(x) DoD Directive 3025.18 of 29 December 2010, Defense Support of Civil Authorities

(y) OPNAVINST F3100.6J, Special Incident Reporting

(z) CNICINST 5214.1B, Commander Critical Information Requirements and Significant Event Reporting

(aa) CNIC M-3440.18, Navy Dispatch Center Management

(ab) CNIC M-5530.1, CNIC Ashore Protection Program

(ac) CNICINST 3440.3A, CNIC All Hazards Plan

(ad) OPNAVINST 3500.41A, Pandemic Influenza Policy

(ae) OPNAVINST 3501.360A, Defense Readiness Reporting System – Navy

(af) DoD Instruction 1400.32 of DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning Guidelines and Procedures

(ag) DoD Directive 3025.14 of 26 February 2013, Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad

(ah) Joint Publication 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

(ai) Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms

(aj) UFC 4-023-10, Safe Havens

(ak) UFC 4-024-01, Security Engineering: Procedures for Designing Airborne Chemical, Biological and Radiological Protection for Buildings

(al) DoD Directive 5100.46 of 6 July 2012, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)

(am) DoD Instruction 3025.21 of 27 February 2013, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies

(an) OPNAVINST 1770.1A, Casualty Assistance Calls and Funeral Honors Support (CAC/FS) Program Coordination

(ao) NAVPERS 15560D, Navy Military Personnel Manual

(ap) NAVADMIN 090/15, Personnel Casualty Reporting

(aq) DoD Directive 1300.22 of 30 October 2015, Mortuary Affairs Policy

(ar) OPNAVINST 3006.1, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Catastrophic Events

(as) BUMEDINST 6200.17A, Public Health Emergency Officers

(at) OPNAVINST 5380.1D, Acceptance and Use of Voluntary Services in the Navy

(au) DoD Instruction 3020.52 of 18 May 2012, DoD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards

(av) OPNAVINST 5215.17A, Navy Directives Management Program

(aw) Federal Management Regulations, Part 102-74 Facility Management

(ax) CNICINST 4000.1B, CNIC Support Agreement (SA) Program

(ay) DoD Instruction 2000.21 DOD of 5 April 2016, Support to International Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents

(az) UFC 4-141-04, Emergency Operations Center Planning and Design

(ba) Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater

(bb) DoD Instruction 3020.45 of 14 August 2018, Mission Assurance Construct

(bc) CNIC M-3501.1, Shore Training Manual

(bd) CNICINST 3000.11, Shore Training Plan

(be) OPNAVINST 1500.75D, Policy and Governance for Conducting High-Risk Training

(bf) CNICINST 3400.10, Shore Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management and Defense Programs

(bg) NWP 3-11 Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations

(bh) DoD Directive 3020.26 of 14 February 2018, DoD Continuity Programs

(bi) DoD Instruction 3020.42 of 17 February 2006, Defense Continuity Plan Development

(bj) SECNAVINST 3030.4E, Department of the Navy Policy for Continuity of Operations Programs

(bk) UFC 4-020-01, DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual

(bl) SECNAV M-5210.1, Department of the Navy Records Management Program Manual

(bm) DoDM 3025.01 Volume 2, Defense Support of Civil Authorities: DoD Incident Response of 11 November 2016

(bn) DoD Directive 4715.01E of 19 March 2005, Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH)

(bo) DoD Instruction 6055.01 of 14 October 2014, DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program

(bp) DoD Instruction 6055.05 of 11 November 2008, Occupational and Environmental Health (OEH)

(bq) NTTP 3-11.24, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations

(br) NTTP 3-11.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Passive Defense

APPENDIX B
ACRONYMS

AAR	After-Action Report
AHTA	All Hazard Threat Assessment
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
ARC	American Red Cross
AT	Anti-Terrorism
ATNS	Automated Telephone Notification System
ATO	Anti-Terrorism Officer
BCOC	Base Cluster Operations Center
BDOC	Base Defense Operations Center
BOS	Base Operating Support
BSA	Balanced Survivability Assessments
BSI	Base Support Installation
BSO	Budget Submitting Office
BUMED	Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
BWC	Battle Watch Captain
BWT	Battle Watch Team
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control, and Communications
C4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CA	Criticality Assessment

CAC	Common Access Card
CACO	Casualty Assistance Calls Officer
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CART	Command Assessment for Readiness and Training
CAT	Category
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive protection
CBR-D	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCMD	Combatant Command
CCR	Configuration Change Request
CDO	Command Duty Officer
CDNS	Computer Desktop Notification System
CEM	Certified Emergency Manager
CERC	Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
CERT	Contingency Engineering Response Team
CGC	Continuity Guidance Circulars
CI	Counterintelligence
CIN	Course Identification Number
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CLEOC	Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center
CM	Consequence Management
CMF	Critical Mission Facility
CMS	Center Management System

CNIC	Commander, Navy Installations Command
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNRNW	Commander, Navy Region Northwest
CNRSE	Commander, Navy Region Southeast
CO	Commanding Officer
COA	Course of Action
COG	Continuity of Government
COLPRO	Collective Protection
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental U.S.
COOP	Continuity of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
COR	Conditions of Readiness
COTS	Commercial-off-the-Shelf
CPC	CBRN Pharmaceutical Countermeasures
CPO	Continuity Program Officer
CRE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Response Enterprise
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CWP	Continuous Warning Point
DAT	Disaster Assessment Team
DCA	Defense Critical Asset
DCI	Defense Critical Infrastructure
DCIPS	Defense Casualty Information Processing System
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer

DEERS	Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
DERG	Devolution Emergency Relocation Group
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DON	Department of the Navy
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DSCATS	Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tracking System
DTL	Duty Task List
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
E-911	Enhanced-911
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
ECC	Emergency Control Center
ECG	Enduring Constitutional Government
ECP	Entry Control Point
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
EFAC	Emergency Family Assistance Center
ELMR	Enterprise Land Mobile Radio
EM	Emergency Management
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMO	Emergency Management Officer
EMPA	Emergency Management Program Assessment
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EMSL	Emergency Management for Senior Leaders

EMWG	Emergency Management Working Group
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPI	Emergency Public Information
ER	Emergency Room
ERG	Emergency Relocation Group
ERT	Emergency Response Team
ESA	Essential Supporting Activity
ESAMS	Enterprise Safety Application Management System
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ESSENCE	Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics
EXORD	Execution Order
F&ES	Fire and Emergency Services
FAA	Functional Area Annex
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCD	Federal Continuity Directives
FDR	Foreign Disaster Relief
F&ES	Fire & Emergency Services
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEP	Final Evaluation Problem
FFR	Fleet and Family Readiness
FFSC	Fleet and Family Support Center

FHP	Force Health Protection
FP	Force Protection
FPCON	Force Protection Condition
FTS	Full-Time Support
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOTS	Government-off-the-Shelf
GS	General Schedule
GSA	General Services Administration
GV	Giant Voice
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material
HHQ	Higher Headquarters
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
HSA	Hazard-Specific Appendix
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IAEM	International Association of Emergency Managers
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Command
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IDC	Independent Duty Corpsmen
IEM	Installation Emergency Management
IMT	Incident Management Team

INSER	Integrated Nuclear Survivability Assessment
IPE	Individual Protective Equipment
IR	Immediate Response
IS	Information System
ISB	Incident Support Base
ISIC	Immediate Superior in Command
IT	Information Technology
ITO	Installation Training Officer
IV	Indoor Voice
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information Systems
JMET	Joint Mission Essential Task
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTR	Joint Travel Regulations
LDC	Local Dispatch Center
LE	Law Enforcement
M&IE	Meals and Incidental Expenses
M&S	Modeling and Simulation
MA	Mission Assurance
MAA	Mutual Aid Agreement
MAC	Multi-Agency Coordination
MAO	Mission Assurance Officer
MBAC	Military Biological Advisory Committee

MEF	Mission Essential Function
MEM	Medical Emergency Manager
MEP	Mission Essential Personnel
MET	Mission Essential Task
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTF	Medical Treatment Facility
MWN	Mass Warning and Notification
MWR	Morale, Welfare and Recreation
NAF	Non-Appropriated Funds
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command
NAVNORTH	U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command
NAVOSH	Navy Occupational Safety and Health
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSUP	Naval Supply Systems Command
NCC	Navy Component Command
NCEM	Navy Certified Emergency Management
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NDRF	National Disaster Recovery Framework
NEF	National Essential Function
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NEPLO	Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
NEPMU	Navy Environment Preventive Medicine Units
NFAAS	Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System
NFIRS	National Fire Incident Reporting System

NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIWC	Naval Information Warfare System
NJOIC	National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCI	Navy-Marine Corps Intranet
NMET	Navy Mission Essential Task
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
NOSC	Navy Operations Support Center
NPC	Navy Personnel Command
NPG	National Preparedness Goal
NPS	National Preparedness System
NRF	National Response Framework
NSF	Navy Security Force
OCONUS	Outside Continental U.S.
OIC	Officer-in-Charge
OPG	Operational Planning Group
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OPNAV	Chief of Naval Operations
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP	Operational Report
ORM	Operational Risk Management

OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSH	Occupational Safety and Health
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PA	Personnel Accountability
PACFLT	U.S. Pacific Fleet
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PBFT	Planning Board for Training
PCR	Personnel Casualty Report
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PHEO	Public Health Emergency Officer
PMEF	Primary Mission Essential Function
POA&M	Plan of Action and Milestones
POC	Point of Contact
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPA	Primary Planning Agent
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PQS	Personnel Qualification Standards
PREP	Preparedness for Response Exercise Program
PSAD	Public Safety Answering Point
PSD	Personnel Support Detachment
PW	Public Works
PWO	PW Officer
RA	Risk Assessment

RDC	Region Dispatch Center
RDO	Region Duty Officer
REGCOM	Region Commander
RFA	Request for Assistance
RFI	Request for Information
RFS	Request for Support
RM	Risk Management
ROC	Region Operations Center
RP	Religious Program Specialist
RPA	Region Planning Agent
RRP	Risk Remediation Package
RSAM	Region Support Agreement Manager
RTF	Response Task Force
RWG	Recovery Working Group
SA	Situational Awareness
SAF	Stand-Alone Facility
SAR	Search and Rescue
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SEOC	Shore Enterprise Operations Center
SEL	Standardized Equipment List
SER	Significant Event Report
SIP	Shelter-in-Place
SITREP	Situation Report
SME	Subject Matter Expert

SMIG	Shore Mission Integration Group
SNS	Strategic National Stockpile
SOFA	Status-of-Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPOD	Seaport of Debarkation
SRT	Special Reaction Teams
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
SYSCOM	System Command
TCA	Task Critical Assets
TDY	Temporary Duty
TOA	Table of Allowance
TT&E	Testing, Training, and Exercise
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TTX	Tabletop Exercise
TWG	Threat Working Group
TWMS	Total Workforce Management System
UC	Unified Command
UFC	Unified Facilities Criteria
UIC	Unit Identification Code
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USFFC	U.S. Fleet Forces Command
USG	U.S. Government
VA	Vulnerability Assessment
WMD-CST	Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team

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APPENDIX C
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4. Website. Additional information may be found at https://g2.cnic.navy.mil/tscnichq/N3/N37/homepage/Home.aspx

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